- A Contextualist Defence of the Material Account of Indicative Conditionals.Matheus Silva - manuscriptdetails
- The Big Four - Their Interdependence and Limitations.Matheus Silva - manuscriptdetails
- Knowledge is the Norm of Assertion.Matthew A. Benton - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
- Assertion: The Constitutive Rule Account and the Engagement Condition Objection.Felix Bräuer - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
- On Predicting.Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.details
- Antisocial Modelling.Georgi Gardiner - forthcoming - In Alfano Mark, Jeroen De Ridder & Colin Klein (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology.details
- Thinking and Being Sure.Jeremy Goodman & Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-27.details
- Assertion, Implicature, and Iterated Knowledge.Eliran Haziza - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.details
- Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
- Assertion is Weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.details
- Assertion and Rejection.Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - In Daniel Altshuler (ed.), Linguistics Meets Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.details
- Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases: A Review and New Evidence.John Turri - forthcoming - In Igor Douven (ed.), The lottery problem. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.details
- Certainty and Assertion.Jacques-Henri Vollet - forthcoming - Dialectica.details
- A Credibility-Backed Norm for Testimony.Matt Weiner - forthcoming - Episteme:1-13.details
- A Commitment-Theoretic Account of Moore's Paradox.Jack Woods - forthcoming - In An Atlas of Meaning: Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface).details
- Assertion, Stakes and Expected Blameworthiness: An Insensitive Invariantist Solution to the Bank Cases.Brandon Yip - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.details
- Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
- Science, Assertion, and the Common Ground.Corey Dethier - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-19.details
- Assertion and the “How do you know?” challenge.Eliran Haziza - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-17.details
- How to Study Worlds: Or Why One Should (Not) Care About Methodology.Poul F. Kjaer - 2022 - In Marija Bartl & Jessica C. Lawrence (eds.), The Politics of European Legal Research: Behind the Method. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. pp. 208 - 2022.details
- "Knowledge First" and Its Limits.Tammo Lossau - 2022 - Dissertation, Johns Hopkins Universitydetails
- Two accounts of assertion.Martin Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
- Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox.David James Barnett - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (2):227-262.details
- The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.details
- Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by Their Authors.Haixin Dang & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Synthese (3-4):1-17.details
- Endorsement and Assertion.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.details
- Knowledge of Future Contingents.Andrea Iacona - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):447-467.details
- Norms of Assertion in the United States, Germany and Japan.Markus Kneer - 2021 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 118 (37):e2105365118.details
- Lying: Knowledge or Belief?Neri Marsili - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1445-1460.details
- Illocutionary harm.Henry Ian Schiller - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1631-1646.details
- Can Knowledge Really Be Non-Factive?Michael J. Shaffer - 2021 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 12 (2):215-226.details
- Representing Knowledge.Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (1):97-143.details
- Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
- P, but You Don’T Know That P.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690.details
- Knowledge and Assertion: A Critique of Lackey.Joshua Anderson - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (1):33-52.details
- Knowledge and Assertion: A Critique of Lackey.Joshua Anderson - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (1):33-52.details
- New Work For Certainty.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (8).details
- Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.details
- Assertion and the Future.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-504.details
- Assertion: A Defective Theoretical Category.Herman Cappelen - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Assertion and Modality.Fabrizio Cariani - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 505-528.details
- Can Artificial Entities Assert?Ori Freiman & Boaz Miller - 2020 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 415-436.details
- Epistemic Norms of Assertion and Action.Mikkel Gerken & Esben Nedenskov Petersen - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Critical Review of Richard Moran, The Exchange of Words. [REVIEW]Peter Graham - 2020 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2.details
- The Function of Assertion and Social Norms.Peter Graham - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 727-748.details
- Assertions, Handicaps, and Social Norms.Peter J. Graham - 2020 - Episteme 8:1-15.details
- Assertion and Testimony.Edward Hinchman - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Knowledge in the Face of Conspiracy Conditionals.Ben Holguín - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (3):737-771.details
- Proxy Assertion.Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- How to Understand the Knowledge Norm of Assertion: Reply to Schlöder.Jonny McIntosh - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):207-214.details
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