View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

95 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
1 — 50 / 95
  1. added 2020-03-22
    Certainty in Action.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    When is it permissible to rely on a proposition in practical reasoning? Standard answers to this question face serious challenges. This paper uses these challenges to motivate a certainty norm of practical reasoning. This norm holds that one is permitted to rely on p in practical reasoning if and only if p is epistemically certain. After developing and defending this norm, I consider its broader implications. Taking a certainty norm seriously calls into question traditional assumptions about the importance of belief (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2020-03-07
    Critical Review of Richard Moran, The Exchange of Words. [REVIEW]Peter Graham - 2020 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2.
    Moran's book is sure to be widely read. It does more to bring to light the moral psychology characteristic of tellings understood as assurances than any other work I know. His book raises challenges for other views, introduces interesting and evocative distinctions, and puts together in one place Moran's sustained reflections on the way we provide others a distinctive kind of reason for belief though normatively binding ourselves though the exchange of words. I agree that assurances and acceptances in Moran's (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2020-02-07
    New Work for Certainty.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    This paper argues that we should assign certainty a central place in epistemology. While epistemic certainty played an important role in the history of epistemology, recent epistemology has tended to dismiss certainty as an unattainable ideal, focusing its attention on knowledge instead. I argue that this is a mistake. Attending to certainty attributions in the wild suggests that much of our everyday knowledge qualifies, in appropriate contexts, as certain. After developing a semantics for certainty ascriptions, I put certainty to explanatory (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2020-01-30
    Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion.Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper defends a new norm of assertion: Assert that p only if you are in a position to know that p. We test the norm by judging its performance in explaining three phenomena that appear jointly inexplicable at first: Moorean paradoxes, lottery propositions, and selfless assertions. The norm succeeds by tethering unassertability to unknowability while untethering belief from assertion. The PtK‐norm foregrounds the public nature of assertion as a practice that can be other‐regarding, allowing asserters to act in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2020-01-20
    The Warrant Account and the Prominence of 'Know'.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2018 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology (4):467-483.
    Many philosophers agree that there is an epistemic norm governing action. However, they disagree on what this norm is. It has been observed that the word ‘know’ is prominent in ordinary epistemic evaluations of actions. Any opponent of the knowledge norm must provide an explanation of this fact. Gerken has recently proposed the most developed explanation. It invokes the hypothesis that, in normal contexts, knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary and very frequently sufficient (Normal Coincidence), so that knowledge-based assessments would be (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2020-01-01
    Knowledge Is (Still) the Norm of Assertion.Kok Yong Lee - 2017 - NCCU Philosophical Journal 37:33-74.
    In this paper, I defend the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion. I first examine three prominent “counterexamples”: false assertion, selfless assertion, and assertion based on mere justified true belief. I argue that they all fail to square well with our ordinary intuitions. However, the contemporary debate over the norm of assertion depends heavily on the method of counterexamples, whose crux is to prompt our intuitions regarding the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of a certain kind of assertions. This method (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2019-12-16
    Refined Invariantism.Jacques‐Henri Vollet - 2020 - Theoria 86 (1):100-127.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2019-11-20
    Representing Knowledge.Peter van Elswyk - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
    A speaker's use of a declarative sentence in a context has two effects: it expresses a proposition and represents the speaker as knowing that proposition. This essay is about how to explain the second effect. The standard explanation is act-based. A speaker is represented as knowing because their use of the declarative in a context tokens the act-type of assertion and assertions represent knowledge in what's asserted. I propose a semantic explanation on which declaratives covertly host a "know"-parenthetical. A speaker (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2019-11-09
    A Rightness-Based Theory of Communicative Propriety.Daniel Drucker - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):121-135.
    ABSTRACTWe express and communicate many attitudes beyond belief, such as amusement, joy, admiration, hatred, and desire. I consider whether there are any general norms that would cover all of these cases. The most obvious generalisation of the most popular norms for assertion, fittingness-based theories, fail in part because it is sometimes an intrinsic good to have certain kinds of mental states. I develop an alternative, rightness-based, approach, according to which it is appropriate to communicate a mental state to an interlocutor (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2019-11-03
    Disagreement with a Bald-Faced Liar.Teresa Marques - manuscript
    How can we disagree with a bald-faced liar? Bald-faced lies seem to pose problems for accounts of lying and of assertion. Recent proposals try to defuse those problems by arguing that bald-faced lies are not really assertions, but rather performances of fiction-like scripts, or different types of language games. If that’s the case, how can we disagree with a bald-faced liar? Can there be a disagreement in doxastic state if it’s common ground that what the speaker says is false? And (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2019-11-03
    An Inferential Articulation of Metaphorical Assertions.Richmond Kwesi - 2019 - RIFL 3 (1):116-132.
    This paper argues for the view that metaphors are assertions by locating metaphor within our social discursive practices of asserting and inferring. The literal and the metaphorical differ not in the stating of facts nor in the representation of states of affairs but in the kind of inferential involvements they have and the normative score-keeping practices within which the inferential connections are articulated. This inferentialist based account of metaphor is supplemented by insights from accommodation theory. The account is significant for (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2019-10-14
    Assertions, Handicaps, and Social Norms.Peter Graham - forthcoming - Episteme.
    How should we undertand the role of norms—especially epistemic norms—governing assertive speech acts? Mitchell Green (2009) has argued that these norms play the role of handicaps in the technical sense from the animal signals literature. As handicaps, they then play a large role in explaining the reliability—and so the stability (the continued prevalence)—of assertive speech acts. But though norms of assertion conceived of as social norms do indeed play this stabilizing role, these norms are best understood as deterrents and not (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2019-10-04
    Lying and Knowing.Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    This paper defends the simple view that in asserting that p, one lies iff one knows that p is false. Along the way it draws some morals about deception, knowledge, Gettier cases, belief, assertion, and the relationship between first- and higher-order norms.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2019-10-01
    Assessing the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Quique Badia Masoni - manuscript
    This paper aims to consider some relevant objections to Timothy Williamson's knowledge-first account of assertion. More specifically, this paper focuses on the question of whether or not there exists only one rule or norm that is constitutive of assertions. The paper examines three recent contributions which put pressure on the knowledge rule for assertion. Firstly, the paper discusses an alternative normative approach regarding the normative implications that a given subject must fulfil while asserting (MacFarlane, 2009). Assuming this approach and focusing (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2019-09-23
    The Norm of Assertion: A ‘Constitutive’ Rule?Neri Marsili - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    According to an influential hypothesis, the speech act of assertion is subject to a single 'constitutive' rule, that takes the form: "One must: assert that p only if p has C". Scholars working on assertion interpret the assumption that this rule is 'constitutive' in different ways. This disagreement, often unacknowledged, threatens the foundations of the philosophical debate on assertion. This paper reviews different interpretations of the claim that assertion is governed by a constitutive rule. It argues that once we understand (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. added 2019-09-09
    Can Artificail Entities Assert?Ori Freiman & Boaz Miller - forthcoming - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    There is an existing debate regarding the view that technological instruments, devices, or machines can assert ‎or testify. A standard view in epistemology is that only humans can testify. However, the notion of quasi-‎testimony acknowledges that technological devices can assert or testify under some conditions, without ‎denying that humans and machines are not the same. Indeed, there are four relevant differences between ‎humans and instruments. First, unlike humans, machine assertion is not imaginative or playful. Second, ‎machine assertion is prescripted and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2019-09-06
    Endorsement and Assertion.Will Fleisher - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Scientists, philosophers, and other researchers commonly assert their theories. This is surprising, as there are good reasons for skepticism about theories in cutting-edge research. I propose a new account of assertion in research contexts that vindicates these assertions. This account appeals to a distinct propositional attitude called endorsement, which is the rational attitude of committed advocacy researchers have to their theories. The account also appeals to a theory of conversational pragmatics known as the Question Under Discussion model, or QUD. Hence, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. added 2019-06-27
    On Predicting.Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    I propose an account of the speech act of prediction that denies that the contents of prediction must be about the future and illuminates the relation between prediction and assertion. My account is a synthesis of two ideas: (i) that what is in the future in prediction is the time of discovery and (ii) that, as Benton and Turri recently argued, prediction is best characterized in terms of its constitutive norms.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2019-06-06
    Peirce on Assertion, Speech Acts, and Taking Responsibility.Kenneth Boyd - 2016 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 52 (1):21.
    C.S. Peirce held what is nowadays called a “commitment view” of assertion. According to this type of view, assertion is a kind of act that is determined by its “normative effects”: by asserting a proposition one undertakes certain commitments, typically to be able to provide reason to believe what one is asserting, or, in Peirce’s words, one “takes responsibility” for the truth of the proposition one asserts. Despite being an early adopter of the view, if Peirce’s commitment view of assertion (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  20. added 2019-01-30
    Epistemic Norms of Assertion and Action.Mikkel Gerken & Esben Nedenskov Petersen - forthcoming - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The purpose of the present chapter is to survey the work on epistemic norms of action, practical deliberation and assertion and to consider how these norms are interrelated. On a more constructive note, we will argue that if there are important similarities between the epistemic norms of action and assertion, it has important ramifications for the debates over speech acts and harm. Thus, we hope that the chapter will indicate how thinking about assertions as a speech act can benefit from (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2019-01-29
    Three Problems for the Knowledge Rule of Assertion.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (3):264-270.
    Timothy Williamson has argued that, unless the speech act of assertion were supposed to be governed by his so-called Knowledge Rule, one could not explain why sentences of the form "A and I do not know that A" are unassertable. This paper advances three objections against that argument, of which the first two aim to show that, even assuming that Williamson's explanandum has been properly circumscribed, his explanation would not be correct, and the third aims to show that his explanandum (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. added 2018-10-11
    Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
    If I were to say, “Agnes does not know that it is raining, but it is,” this seems like a perfectly coherent way of describing Agnes’s epistemic position. If I were to add, “And I don’t know if it is, either,” this seems quite strange. In this chapter, we shall look at some statements that seem, in some sense, contradictory, even though it seems that these statements can express propositions that are contingently true or false. Moore thought it was paradoxical (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2018-10-11
    Abominable KK Failures.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1227-1259.
    KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations has recently emerged in its favour. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know it, p’. Such conditionals are manifestly not assertable—a fact that KK defenders can easily (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24. added 2018-08-29
    Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge.Eric Marcus & John Schwenkler - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):873-889.
    ABSTRACTWe argue that honesty in assertion requires non-empirical knowledge that what one asserts is what one believes. Our argument proceeds from the thought that to assert honestly, one must follow and not merely conform to the norm ‘Assert that p only if you believe that p’. Furthermore, careful consideration of cases shows that the sort of doxastic self-knowledge required for following this norm cannot be acquired on the basis of observation, inference, or any other form of detection of one’s own (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2018-08-08
    Assertion: A Defective Theoretical Category.Herman Cappelen - forthcoming - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2018-06-25
    Rescuing the Assertability of Measurement Reports.Michael J. Shaffer - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (1):39-51.
    It is wholly uncontroversial that measurements-or, more properly, propositions that are measurement reports-are often paradigmatically good cases of propositions that serve the function of evidence. In normal cases it is also obvious that stating such a report is an utterly pedestrian case of successful assertion. So, for example, there is nothing controversial about the following claims: (1) that a proposition to the effect that a particular thermometer reads 104C when properly used to determine the temperature of a particular patient is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2018-06-05
    Modal Disagreements.Justin Khoo - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (5):511-534.
    It is often assumed that when one party felicitously rejects an assertion made by an- other party, the first party thinks that the proposition asserted by the second is false. This assumption underlies various disagreement arguments used to challenge contex- tualism about some class of expressions. As such, many contextualists have resisted these arguments on the grounds that the disagreements in question may not be over the proposition literally asserted. The result appears to be a dialectical stalemate, with no independent (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  28. added 2018-06-04
    Testimonial Knowledge and Context-Sensitivity: A New Diagnosis of the Threat.Alex Davies - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (1):53-69.
    Epistemologists typically assume that the acquisition of knowledge from testimony is not threatened at the stage at which audiences interpret what proposition a speaker has asserted. Attention is instead typically paid to the epistemic status of a belief formed on the basis of testimony that it is assumed has the same content as the speaker’s assertion. Andrew Peet has pioneered an account of how linguistic context sensitivity can threaten the assumption. His account locates the threat in contexts in which an (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2018-06-04
    You Don't Say! Lying, Asserting and Insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield
    This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here, against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort to speech act theory to develop a detailed account of what an assertion is, and what can make it insincere. Even a sincere assertion, however, can be improper (e.g., it can be false, or unwarranted): in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2018-06-04
    The Value and Normative Role of Knowledge.Julien Dutant - 2014 - Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.
    Why does knowledge matter? Two answers have been influential in the recent literature. One is that it has value: knowledge is one of the goods. Another is that it plays a significant normative role: knowledge is the norm of action, belief, assertion, or the like. This paper discusses whether one can derive one of the claims from the other. That is, whether assuming the idea that knowledge has value — and some defensible general hypotheses about norms and values —, we (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. added 2018-05-28
    Constitutive Rules: Games, Language, and Assertion.Indrek Reiland - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):136-159.
    Many philosophers think that games like chess, languages like English, and speech acts like assertion are constituted by rules. Lots of others disagree. To argue over this productively, it would be first useful to know what it would be for these things to be rule-constituted. Searle famously claimed in Speech Acts that rules constitute things in the sense that they make possible the performance of actions related to those things (Searle 1969). On this view, rules constitute games, languages, and speech (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. added 2018-05-03
    The Norm of Assertion: Empirical Data.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Cognition 177:165-171.
    Assertions are speech acts by means of which we express beliefs. As such they are at the heart of our linguistic and social practices. Recent research has focused extensively on the question whether the speech act of assertion is governed by norms, and if so, under what conditions it is acceptable to make an assertion. Standard theories propose, for instance, that one should only assert that p if one knows that p (the knowledge account), or that one should only assert (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. added 2018-04-10
    A Commitment-Theoretic Account of Moore's Paradox.Jack Woods - forthcoming - In An Atlas of Meaning: Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface).
    Moore’s paradox, the infamous felt bizarreness of sincerely uttering something of the form “I believe grass is green, but it ain’t”—has attracted a lot of attention since its original discovery (Moore 1942). It is often taken to be a paradox of belief—in the sense that the locus of the inconsistency is the beliefs of someone who so sincerely utters. This claim has been labeled as the priority thesis: If you have an explanation of why a putative content could not be (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2018-02-10
    Assertion and Modality.Fabrizio Cariani - forthcoming - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This essay is an opinionated exploration of the constraints that modal discourse imposes on the theory of assertion. Primary focus is on the question whether modal discourse challenges the traditional view that all assertions have propositional content. This question is tackled largely with reference to discourse involving epistemic modals, although connections with other flavors of modality are noted along the way.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2018-01-30
    Truth and Assertion: Rules Vs Aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.
    There is a fundamental disagreement about which norm regulates assertion. Proponents of factive accounts argue that only true propositions are assertable, whereas proponents of non-factive accounts insist that at least some false propositions are. Puzzlingly, both views are supported by equally plausible (but apparently incompatible) linguistic data. This paper delineates an alternative solution: to understand truth as the aim of assertion, and pair this view with a non-factive rule. The resulting account is able to explain all the relevant linguistic data, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. added 2017-12-11
    Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.
    Surprisingly little has been written about hedged assertion. Linguists often focus on semantic or syntactic theorizing about, for example, grammatical evidentials or epistemic modals, but pay far less attention to what hedging does at the level of action. By contrast, philosophers have focused extensively on normative issues regarding what epistemic position is required for proper assertion, yet they have almost exclusively considered unqualified declaratives. This essay considers the linguistic and normative issues side-by-side. We aim to bring some order and clarity (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37. added 2017-08-03
    Epistemic Norms and Epistemic Accountability.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.
    Everyone agrees that not all norms that govern belief and assertion are epistemic. But not enough attention has been paid to distinguishing epistemic norms from others. Norms in general differ from merely evaluative standards in virtue of the fact that it is fitting to hold subjects accountable for violating them, provided they lack an excuse. Different kinds of norm are most readily distinguished by their distinctive mode of accountability. My thesis is roughly that a norm is epistemic if and only (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  38. added 2017-07-27
    The Relativity of Evaluative Sentences: Disagreeing Over Disagreement.Justina Díaz Legaspe - 2013 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 54 (127):211-226.
    Evaluative sentences (moral judgments, expressions of taste, epistemic modals) are relative to the speaker's standards. Lately, a phenomenon has challenged the traditional explanation of this relativity: whenever two speakers disagree over them they contradict each other without being at fault. Hence, it is thought that the correction of the assertions involved must be relative to an unprivileged standard not necessarily the speaker's. I will claim instead that so far, neither this nor any other proposal has provided an explanation of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2017-05-29
    Knowledge-How is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.
    It is a widely shared intuition that there is a close connection between knowledge-how and intentional action. In this paper, I explore one aspect of this connection: the normative connection between intending to do something and knowing how to do it. I argue for a norm connecting knowledge-how and intending in a way that parallels the knowledge norms of assertion, belief, and practical reasoning, which I call the knowledge-how norm of Intention. I argue that this norm can appeal to support (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. added 2017-05-22
    Contextualism and Knowledge Norms.Alex Worsnip - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 177-189.
    I provide an opinionated overview of the literature on the relationship of contextualism to knowledge norms for action, assertion, and belief. I point out that contextualists about ‘knows’ are precluded from accepting the simplest versions of knowledge norms; they must, if they are to accept knowledge norms at all, accept “relativized” versions of them. I survey arguments from knowledge norms both for and against contextualism, tentatively concluding that commitment to knowledge norms does not conclusively win the day either for contextualism (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. added 2017-04-20
    The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions.Michael Hannon - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):856-866.
    Knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘S knows that p’ are a central area of research in philosophy. But why do humans think and talk about knowledge? What are knowledge ascriptions for? This article surveys a variety of proposals about the role of knowledge ascriptions and attempts to provide a unified account of these seemingly distinct views.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. added 2017-04-06
    Evaluative Disagreements.Justina Diaz Legaspe - 2016 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (1):67-87.
    A recent quarrel over faultless disagreements assumes that disputes over evaluative sentences should be understood as regular, factual disagreements. Instead, I propose that evaluative disagreements should be understood in Lewisian terms. Language use works like a rule-governed game. In it, the assertion of an evaluative sentence is an attempt to establish one value as default in the conversation; its rejection, in turn, is in most cases the refusal to accept this move.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. added 2017-04-03
    Knowing-How, Showing, and Epistemic Norms.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3597-3620.
    In this paper I consider the prospects for an epistemic norm which relates knowledge-how to showing in a way that parallels the knowledge norm of assertion. In the first part of the paper I show that this epistemic norm can be motivated by conversational evidence, and that it fits in with a plausible picture of the function of knowledge. In the second part of the paper I present a dilemma for this norm. If we understand showing in a broad sense (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44. added 2017-03-28
    Reply to Simion.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):113-116.
    Mona Simion questions whether there is a distinction between taking back an assertion and taking back only the content of an assertion, as I have claimed. After arguing against the distinction in question, Simion grants that there is a difference between the cases that I use to illustrate the distinction, and thus turns to the task of explaining the difference in a way that keeps it from undermining the knowledge norm. The explanation she offers is in terms of a distinction (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. added 2017-01-08
    Knowledge, Assertion and Intellectual Humility.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (4):489-502.
    This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual humility (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. added 2017-01-08
    Assertion: Just One Way to Take It Back.Mona Simion - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):385-391.
    According to Jonathan Kvanvig, the practice of taking back one’s assertion when finding out that one has been mistaken or gettiered fails to speak in favour of a knowledge norm of assertion. To support this claim, he introduces a distinction between taking back the content of the assertion, and taking back the speech act itself. This paper argues that Kvanvig’s distinction does not successfully face close speech-act-theoretic scrutiny. Furthermore, I offer an alternative diagnosis of the target cases sourced in the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. added 2016-12-29
    Googled Assertion.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):490-501.
    Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions—made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. added 2016-12-08
    Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter explores the prospects for justifying the somewhat widespread, somewhat firmly held sense that there is some moral advantage to untruthfully implicating over lying. I call this the "Difference Intuition." I define lying in terms of asserting, but remain open about what precise definition best captures our ordinary notion. I define implicating as one way of meaning something without asserting it. I narrow down the kind of untruthful implicating that should be compared with lying for purposes of evaluating whether (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. added 2016-10-24
    Clifford and the Common Epistemic Norm.Robin McKenna - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (3):245-258.
    This paper develops a “Cliffordian” argument for a common epistemic norm governing belief, action, and assertion. The idea is that beliefs are the sorts of things that lead to actions and assertions. What each of us believes influences what we act on and assert, and in turn influences what those around us believe, act on, and assert. Belief, action, and assertion should be held to a common epistemic norm because, otherwise, this system will become contaminated. The paper finishes by drawing (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. added 2016-08-17
    Lying by Promising. A Study on Insincere Illocutionary Acts.Neri Marsili - 2016 - International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2):271-313.
    This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as “I promise that Φ ” can count as an assertion of its content Φ . Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
1 — 50 / 95