Two Non-Counterexamples to Truth-Tracking Theories of Knowledge

Logos and Episteme 7 (1):67-73 (2016)
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Abstract
In a recent paper, Tristan Haze offers two examples that, he claims, are counterexamples to Nozick's Theory of Knowledge. Haze claims his examples work against Nozick's theory understood as relativized to belief forming methods M. We believe that they fail to be counterexamples to Nozick's theory. Since he aims the examples at tracking theories generally, we will also explain why they are not counterexamples to Dretske's Conclusive Reasons Theory of Knowledge.
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2016
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2069-0533
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ADATNT
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Archival date: 2017-01-09
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