View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

53 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
1 — 50 / 53
  1. added 2020-02-21
    Prime Cuts And The Method Of Recombination.David-Hillel Ruben - forthcoming - Episteme 2021.
    Whether some condition is equivalent to a conjunction of some (sub-) conditions has been a major issue in analytic philosophy. Examples include: knowledge, acting freely, causation, and justice. Philosophers have striven to offer analyses of these, and other concepts, by showing them equivalent to such a conjunction. Timothy Williamson offers a number of arguments for the idea that knowledge is ‘prime’, hence not equivalent to or composed by some such conjunction. I focus on one of his arguments: the requirement that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2019-11-30
    Factivity and Epistemic Certainty: A Reply to Sankey.Moti Mizrahi - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (4):443-444.
    This is a reply to Howard Sankey’s comment (“Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi”) on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. While Sankey is right that factivity does not entail epistemic certainty, the factivity of knowledge does entail that knowledge is epistemic certainty.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2019-10-20
    Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Stefanie Rocknak - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of Quine's understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction, especially as it is conveyed in his paper, "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism.".
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-10-20
    The Construction of Relations in Hume and Quine, Directed by Jaakko Hintikka (Introduction).Stefanie A. Rocknak - 1999 - Dissertation, Boston University
    Hume and Quine argue that human beings do not have access to general knowledge, that is, to general truths . The arguments of these two philosophers are premised on what Jaakko Hintikka has called the atomistic postulate. In the present work, it is shown that Hume and Quine in fact sanction an extreme version of this postulate, according to which even items of particular knowledge are not directly accessible in so far as they are relational. For according to their fully (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  5. added 2019-07-05
    Екокритичний аспект дикості у поетичному циклі Олега Лишеги «Снігові і вогню».Tetiana Hanzha - 2018 - NaUKMA Researh Papers. Literary Studies 1:62-65.
    У статті проаналізовано категорію дикості в поезії Олега Лишеги. Екокритична категорія дикості – як протилежність до цивілізованого, обжитого, людського – дає змогу окреслити основні ознаки лісу у поезії Лишеги як дикого, непередбачуваного, тваринного, магічного простору. Близька взаємодія суб’єкта лірики із лісовим ландшафтом створює глибшу ідентичність дикого лісу, який, отримавши голос, промовляє у тексті. Надзвичайно важливим для поета є збереження неприрученості, гармонійне співіснування світу природи і світу людей.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2019-07-01
    Are Modal Conditions Necessary for Knowledge?Mark Anthony Dacela - 2019 - Kritike 13 (1):101.
    Modal epistemic conditions have played an important role in post-Gettier theories of knowledge. These conditions purportedly eliminate the pernicious kind of luck present in all Gettier-type cases and offer a rather convincing way of refuting skepticism. This motivates the view that conditions of this sort are necessary for knowledge. I argue against this. I claim that modal conditions, particularly sensitivity and safety, are not necessary for knowledge. I do this by noting that the problem cases for both conditions point to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2019-06-06
    A Failed Twist to an Old Problem: A Reply to John N. Williams.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):75-81.
    John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. added 2019-01-23
    Knowledge and Belief in the Letter of Paul the Persian.Said Hayati - 2016 - In Dietmar W. Winkler (ed.), Syrische Studien. LIT Verlag. pp. 63-73.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2019-01-06
    Evidentialism, Knowledge, and Evidence Possession.Timothy Perrine - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):433-449.
    Evidentialism has shown itself to be an important research program in contemporary epistemology, with evidentialists giving theories of virtually every important topic in epistemology. Nevertheless, at the heart of evidentialism is a handful of concepts, namely evidence, evidence possession, and evidential fit. If evidentialists cannot give us a plausible account of these concepts, then their research program, with all its various theories, will be in serious trouble. In this paper, I argue that evidentialists has yet to give a plausible account (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10. added 2018-12-14
    Die identifikationistische Lösung des Gettier Problems.Sven Bernecker - 2015 - In Dirk Koppelberg & Stefan Tolksdorf (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie -- Wie und Wozu? Munster, Germany: Mentis. pp. 189-214.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2018-03-25
    The Activity of Speaking.Jesús Gerardo Martínez del Castillo - 2015 - International Journal of Language and Linguistics 3 (6-1):59-66.
    The most comprehensive manifestation of language can be seen in the activity of speaking. In it the activity of speaking cannot be understood unless it is referred to the concepts of language and a language. Anything in language can be found in the activity of speaking. Because of this you can find what language is if you abstract from the innumerable manifestations of the activity of speaking.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. added 2018-03-17
    Reason Dethroned; Knowledge Regained.James Arthur Moore - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Hume held that we have no rational justification for our inductive beliefs. A more radical view is that we have no rational justification for any of our beliefs. This dissertation has two goals pertaining to this more radical view. // The first goal is to find a basis for constructive epistemology that is consistent with this view. This goal is first sought by considering externalist theories of knowledge since these do not require rational justification for knowledge. Externalist theories are defended (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2018-01-30
    Saving Safety From Counterexamples.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Synthese.
    In this paper I will offer a comprehensive defense of the safety account of knowledge against counterexamples that have been recently put forward. In section 1, I will discuss different versions of safety, arguing that a specific variant of method-relativized safety is the most plausible. I will then use this specific version of safety to respond to counterexamples in the recent literature. In section 2, I will address alleged examples of safe beliefs that still constitute Gettier cases. In section 3, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2017-10-06
    La Connaissance Commune: Une Sémantique Pour la Logique Modale.L. Lismont & P. Mongin - 1993 - Logique Et Analyse 133 (134):133-149.
    This French paper is a prelimary report on the authors' work on the logics of common knowledge and common belief. See L. Lismont and P. Mongin, "On the logic of common belief and common knowledge", Theory and Decision 37 (1): 75-106. 1994 for a more complete report.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. added 2017-10-05
    On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge.Luc Lismont & Philippe Mongin - 1994 - Theory and Decision 37 (1):75-106.
    The paper surveys the currently available axiomatizations of common belief (CB) and common knowledge (CK) by means of modal propositional logics. (Throughout, knowledge- whether individual or common- is defined as true belief.) Section 1 introduces the formal method of axiomatization followed by epistemic logicians, especially the syntax-semantics distinction, and the notion of a soundness and completeness theorem. Section 2 explains the syntactical concepts, while briefly discussing their motivations. Two standard semantic constructions, Kripke structures and neighbourhood structures, are introduced in Sections (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  16. added 2017-08-13
    Unconscious Perception and Perceptual Knowledge.Paweł J. Zięba - 2017 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Contributions of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 6-12, 2017 Kirchberg am Wechsel. Kirchberg am Wechsel: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 301-303.
    It has been objected recently that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported hypothesis that unconscious perception is possible. Because epistemological disjunctivism is plausible only in conjunction with naïve realism (for a reason I provide), the objection reaches it too. In response, I show that the unconscious perception hypothesis can be changed from a problem into an advantage of epistemological disjunctivism. I do this by suggesting that: (i) naïve realism is consistent with the hypothesis; (ii) the contrast between epistemological (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. added 2017-03-28
    Methods Matter: Beating the Backward Clock.Murray Clarke, Fred Adams & John A. Barker - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):99-112.
    In “Beat the (Backward) Clock,” we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu’s Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick’s or Fred Dretske’s Theories of Knowledge. Williams’ reply to our paper, “There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke,” is a further attempt to defend their counterexample against a range of objections. In this paper, we argue that, despite the number and length of footnotes, Williams is still wrong.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. added 2017-03-24
    Doświadczenie źródłowe z perspektywy klasycznej filozofii indyjskiej.Marzenna Jakubczak - 2016 - Archiwum Historii Filozofii I Myśli Społecznej 61:41-58.
    The author of this paper discusses the source experience defined in terms of the ancient Indian philosophy. She focuses on two out of six mainstream Hindu philosophical schools, Sāṃkhya and Yoga. While doing so the author refers to the oldest preserved texts of this classical tradition, namely Yogasūtra c. 3rd CE and Sāṃkhyakārikā 5th CE, together with their most authoritative commentaries. First, three major connotations of darśana, the Sanskrit equivalent of φιλοσοφια, are introduced and contextualised appropriately for the comparative study (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2017-03-17
    Stanley and the Stakes Hypothesis.Michael J. Shaffer - 2017 - The Reasoner 11:73-74.
    The main examples of pragmatic encroachment presented by Jason Stanley involve the idea that knowledge ascription occurs more readily in cases where stakes are low rather than high. This is the stakes hypothesis. In this paper an example is presented showing that in some cases knowledge ascription is more readily appropriate where stakes are high rather than low.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2017-01-09
    Two Non-Counterexamples to Truth-Tracking Theories of Knowledge.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (1):67-73.
    In a recent paper, Tristan Haze offers two examples that, he claims, are counterexamples to Nozick's Theory of Knowledge. Haze claims his examples work against Nozick's theory understood as relativized to belief forming methods M. We believe that they fail to be counterexamples to Nozick's theory. Since he aims the examples at tracking theories generally, we will also explain why they are not counterexamples to Dretske's Conclusive Reasons Theory of Knowledge.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  21. added 2017-01-09
    Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right.Davide Fassio - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3):265-289.
    Some philosophers have recently argued that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge in a specific circumstance depends on features of the subject’s practical situation that are unrelated to the truth of the subject’s belief, such as the costs for the subject of being wrong about whether the believed proposition is true. One of the best-known arguments used to support this view is that it best explains a number of paradigmatic cases, such as the well-known Bank Case, in which a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. added 2017-01-09
    In Defense of the Kantian Account of Knowledge: Reply to Whiting.Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3): 371-382.
    In this paper I defend the view that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient from an important objection due to Daniel Whiting, in this journal. Whiting argues that this view fails to deal adequately with a familiar sort of counterexample to analyses of knowledge, fake barn cases. I accept Whiting’s conclusion that my earlier paper offered an inadequate treatment of fake barn cases, but defend a new account of basic perceptual reasons that is consistent (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23. added 2016-12-12
    Ernest Sosa's epistemology and other theories of knowledge.Pris Francois-Igor - 2017 - Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology 1:36-44.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2016-10-15
    (Anti)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis.J. Adam Carter & Bolesław Czarnecki - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):374-397.
    Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson & Marc Moffett (2009; 2011a; 2011b) and Carlotta Pavese (2015a; 2015b) have embraced precisely this strategy (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2016-09-10
    Die Elimination des Wissensbegriffs1.Ludwig Fahrbach - 2004 - Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie: International Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 6:45-56.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. added 2016-07-06
    The Necessity of Exosomatic Knowledge for Civilization and a Revision to Our Epistemology.Ray Scott Percival - 2012 - In Norbert-Bertrand Barbe (ed.), Le Néant dans la Pensée contemporaine. [The Nothing in Contemporary Thought.]. pp. 136-150.
    The traditional conception of knowledge is justified, true belief. If one looks at a modern textbook on epistemology, the great bulk of questions with which it deals are to do with personal knowledge, as embodied in beliefs and the proper experiences that someone ought to have had in order to have the right (or justification) to know. I intend to argue that due to the explosive growth of knowledge whose domain is “outside the head”, this conception has outlived its relevance. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2016-05-18
    Belief States in Criminal Law.James A. Macleod - forthcoming - Oklahoma Law Review 68.
    Belief-state ascription — determining what someone “knew,” “believed,” was “aware of,” etc. — is central to many areas of law. In criminal law, the distinction between knowledge and recklessness, and the use of broad jury instructions concerning other belief states, presupposes a common and stable understanding of what those belief-state terms mean. But a wealth of empirical work at the intersection of philosophy and psychology — falling under the banner of “Experimental Epistemology” — reveals how laypeople’s understandings of mens rea (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. added 2016-04-01
    Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism.Christos Kyriacou - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:27-44.
    I present an argument for a sophisticated version of sceptical invariantism that has so far gone unnoticed: Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism (BSI). I argue that it can, on the one hand, (dis)solve the Gettier problem, address the dogmatism paradox and, on the other hand, show some due respect to the Moorean methodological incentive of ‘saving epistemic appearances’. A fortiori, BSI promises to reap some other important explanatory fruit that I go on to adduce (e.g. account for concessive knowledge attributions). BSI can (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. added 2016-03-23
    Indywidualny wymiar wiedzy a jej wartość.Marek Pepliński - 2013 - Filo-Sofija 13 (23):219-230.
    On Relation between the Individual Character of Propositional Knowledge and Its Value -/- The paper presents two aspects of human propositional knowledge, objective and subjective. The former is based on the truth condition, and the latter on the belief condition. Then several problems of the value of knowledge are briefly presented. The last part contains two arguments for the sine qua non belief condition of knowledge, one of which concerns the problem of epistemic luck assumed in virtue.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2016-02-15
    Against Knowledge-First Epistemology.Mikkel Gerken - 2018 - In Gordon and Jarvis Carter (ed.), Knowledge-First Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 46-71.
    I begin by criticizing reductionist knowledge-first epistemology according to which knowledge can be used to reductively analyze other epistemic phenomena. My central concern is that proponents of such an approach commit a similar mistake to the one that they charge their opponents with. This is the mistake of seeking to reductively analyze basic epistemic phenomena in terms of other allegedly more fundamental phenomena. I then turn to non-reductionist brands of knowledge-first epistemology. Specifically, I consider the knowledge norms of assertion and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2015-12-02
    On the Metaphysics of Knowledge.Sven Bernecker - 2015 - In Markus Gabriel, Wolfram Hogrebe & Andreas Speer (eds.), Das Neue Bedürfnis Nach Metaphysik / the New Desire for Metaphysics. De Gruyter. pp. 161-180.
    This paper argues for an overlooked dimension in the metaphysical microstructure of knowledge. The connection between knowledge and truth is even deeper than generally acknowledged. Knowledge, I argue, supervenes not only on a specific (namely modal) relation between the proposition p’s truth and an agent’s belief that p, but also on specific relations between the proposition’s truthmaker and the belief’s justification-maker. S knows that p only if the states of affairs referred to by S’s reasons for believing that p are (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. added 2015-09-09
    Two New Counterexamples to the Truth-Tracking Theory of Knowledge.Tristan Haze - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3):309-311.
    I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Briggs and Nolan (2012), and seem invulnerable to a recent defence of the theory against known counterexamples, by Adams and Clarke (2005).
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  33. added 2015-09-04
    Taking the Metaphysics of Knowledge Seriously: A Response to the Paper of Sven Bernecker.Joachim Horvath - 2015 - In Andreas Speer, Wolfram Hogrebe & Markus Gabriel (eds.), Das Neue Bedürfnis Nach Metaphysik / the New Desire for Metaphysics. De Gruyter. pp. 181-188.
    In his “On the Metaphysics of Knowledge” (this volume), Sven Bernecker presents a novel ‘identificationist’ account of knowledge. In this paper, I will not directly address the epistemological adequacy of Bernecker’s identificationism. Rather, I want to focus on its substantial metaphysical commitments, especially on the problematic idea that our epistemic reasons identify the truthmaker of our respective belief when we know something. My conclusion will be that being a truthmaker for p is metaphysically more demanding than being an epistemic reason (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2015-08-24
    Reflectieve dynamiek in het latere werk van Wittgenstein.Tine Wilde - 2004 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 96 (2):85-113.
    The point of Wittgenstein’s remarks on colour concerns, not so much colours as such, as well as our ability to see [that implies both seeing ánd thinking] and our capacity to imagine something. This can be seen from the fact that Wittgenstein relates the notion of ‘seeing aspects’ on the one hand to the colour octahedron in PB, and on the other hand to the colour puzzles as discussed in ROC. This connection between Wittgenstein’s remarks on colour, on seeing aspects (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2015-06-29
    A Short Outline of the Indicativity Theory of Knowledge.Igal Kvart - manuscript
    Abstract In this paper I present a short outline of an Indicativity Theory of Knowledge, for the cases of Perceptual Knowledge and Knowledge by Memory. I explain the main rationale for a token-indicativity approach, and how it is fleshed out precisely in terms of chances. I elaborate on the account of the value of knowledge it provides, and what that value is. I explain why, given the rationale of conceiving Knowledge as token indicativity, separate sub-accounts in terms of chances should (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2015-06-29
    Knowledge Is NOT Belief for Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.Daniel Whiting - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (2):237-243.
    Mark Schroeder has recently proposed a new analysis of knowledge. I examine that analysis and show that it fails. More specifically, I show that it faces a problem all too familiar from the post-Gettier literature, namely, that it is delivers the wrong verdict in fake barn cases.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  37. added 2015-06-03
    Warrant Does Entail Truth.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):287-297.
    Let ‘warrant’ denote whatever precisely it is that makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. A current debate in epistemology asks whether warrant entails truth, i.e., whether (Infallibilism) S’s belief that p is warranted only if p is true. The arguments for infallibilism have come under considerable and, as of yet, unanswered objections. In this paper, I will defend infallibilism. In Part I, I advance a new argument for infallibilism; the basic outline is as follows. Suppose fallibilism is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  38. added 2014-12-14
    'The Problems of Philosophy' Bertrand Russell Review.Syra Mehdi - manuscript
    Russell identifies the conflict between the ego of self and the greater universe causes internal strife that can only be resolved by truly open questioning. Through this, we are enriching our lives and our minds, while becoming closer to our universal truths.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2014-04-02
    'Knows' Entails Truth.Michael Hannon - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:349-366.
    It is almost universally presumed that knowledge is factive: in order to know that p it must be the case that p is true. This idea is often justified by appealing to knowledge ascriptions and related linguistic phenomena; i.e., an utterance of the form ‘S knows that p, but not-p’ sounds contradictory. In a recent article, Allan Hazlett argues that our ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive. From this it seems to follow that epistemologists cannot appeal to ordinary language (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  40. added 2014-03-27
    Truth-Maker Theory and the Stopped Clock: Why Heathcote Fails to Solve the Gettier Problem.Qilin Li - manuscript
    Adrian Heathcote has proposed a truth-making account of knowledge that combines traditional conditions of justified true belief with the truth-making condition, which would jointly provide us with the sufficient condition of knowledge, and this truth-maker account of knowledge in turn explains why a gettiered justified true belief fails to be regarded as a genuine instance of knowledge. In this paper, by the comparison of two different casual models that are illustrated by the thermometer and the clock respectively, however, it will (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. added 2014-02-10
    Infallibilism and Gettier’s Legacy.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  42. added 2013-10-17
    What is Truth?Ruel F. Pepa - manuscript
    On this particular issue about ¨truth¨, I´d rather focus more on the specific problematization of ¨sentential truth¨. In other words, I will not be concerned with the truth of an event or an experience per se in the objective, intersubjective or subjective sense. In the present consideration, I´d be more concentrated on the truth of beliefs uttered in meaningful statements. This distinctively philosophical approach—in the linguistic-analytic tradition—is supportive of the intent to determine whether certain beliefs are matters of knowledge or (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. added 2013-02-14
    A Logic of Justification and Truthmaking.Alessandro Giordani - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (2):323-342.
    In the present paper we propose a system of propositional logic for reasoning about justification, truthmaking, and the connection between justifiers and truthmakers. The logic of justification and truthmaking is developed according to the fundamental ideas introduced by Artemov. Justifiers and truthmakers are treated in a similar way, exploiting the intuition that justifiers provide epistemic grounds for propositions to be considered true, while truthmakers provide ontological grounds for propositions to be true. This system of logic is then applied both for (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  44. added 2013-02-12
    Epistemic Situationism: An Extended Prolepsis.Mark Alfano - 2017 - In Mark Alfano & Abrol Fairweather (eds.), Epistemic Situationism. Oxford University Press.
    This paper is an extended prolepsis in favor of epistemic situationism, the thesis that epistemic virtues are not sufficiently widely distributed for a virtue-theoretic constraint on knowledge to apply without leading to skepticism. It deals with four objections to epistemic situation: 1) that virtuous dispositions are not required for knowledge, 2) that the Big Five or Big Six personality model proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, 3) that the cognitive-affective personality system framework proves that intellectual virtues are a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  45. added 2013-01-25
    Knowledge as a Thick Concept: Explaining Why the Gettier Problem Arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.
    The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. But, whether or not this problem is resolvable, we still must face an important question: Why does the Gettier problem arise in the first place? So far, philosophers have seen it as either a problem peculiar to the concept of knowledge, or else an instance of a general problem about conceptual analysis. But I would like to steer a middle course. I argue that the Gettier problem arises because knowledge is a thick concept, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  46. added 2012-11-22
    Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (Eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford: OUP (2009). [REVIEW]Luca Moretti - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):1069-1073.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2012-09-01
    Rational Assertibility, the Steering Role of Knowledge, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Igal Kvart - manuscript
    Igal Kvart RATIONAL ASSERTIBILITY, THE STEERING ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE, AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT Abstract In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic encroachment – that there is a significant pragmatic ingredient in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. Epistemic contextualism has flaunted the notion of a conversational standard, and Stanley's subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) promoted stakes, each of which, according to their proponents, play a major role as pragmatic components in the truth conditions of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. added 2012-09-01
    A Counter-Example to SSI and Contextualism.Igal Kvart - manuscript
    In this paper, I present a counter-example to the two most prominent theories of pragmatic encroachment (regarding knowledge ascriptions): Contextualism (specifically, DeRose's version), and Stanley's Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI). The example is a variation on DeRose's bank case. -/- Key words: Knowledge, knowledge ascriptions, pragmatic encroachment, Stanley, DeRose, bank case, standards, stakes.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. added 2012-03-28
    Relevant Alternatives Contextualism and Ordinary Contingent Knowledge.Franck Lihoreau - 2008 - Disputatio 2 (24):281-294.
    According to David Lewis’s contextualist analysis of knowledge, there can be contexts in which a subject counts as knowing a proposition just because every possibility that this proposition might be false is irrelevant in those contexts. In this paper I argue that, in some cases at least, Lewis’ analysis results in granting people non-evidentially based knowledge of ordinary contingent truths which, intuitively, cannot be known but on the basis of appropriate evidence.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  50. added 2012-01-20
    Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge.Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):461-478.
    In “The Myth of Factive Verbs” (Hazlett 2010), I had four closely related goals. The first (pp. 497-99, p. 522) was to criticize appeals to ordinary language in epistemology. The second (p. 499) was to criticize the argument that truth is a necessary condition on knowledge because “knows” is factive. The third (pp. 507-19) – which was the intended means of achieving the first two – was to defend a semantics for “knows” on which <S knows p> can be true (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
1 — 50 / 53