Causal Decision Theory: A Counterexample

Philosophical Review 122 (2):289-306 (2013)
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Abstract
The essay presents a novel counterexample to Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Its interest is that it generates a case in which CDT violates the very principles that motivated it in the first place. The essay argues that the objection applies to all extant formulations of CDT and that the only way out for that theory is a modification of it that entails incompatibilism. The essay invites the reader to find this consequence of CDT a reason to reject it.
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Archival date: 2010-09-29
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2010-09-29

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