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  1. added 2020-10-15
    Libertarianism and the Problem of Flip-Flopping.Fischer John Martin - 2016 - In Daniel Speak & Kevin Timpe (eds.), Free Will and Theism. Oxford: pp. 48-61.
    I am going to argue that it is a cost of libertarianism that it holds our status as agents hostage to theoretical physics, but that claim has met with disagreement. Some libertarians regard it as the cost of doing business, not a philosophical liability. By contrast, Peter van Inwagen has addressed the worry head on. He says that if he were to become convinced that causal determinism were true, he would not change his view that humans are free and morally (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-19
    Compatibilism Can Be Natural.John Turri - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 51:68-81.
    Compatibilism is the view that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. Natural compatibilism is the view that in ordinary social cognition, people are compatibilists. Researchers have recently debated whether natural compatibilism is true. This paper presents six experiments (N = 909) that advance this debate. The results provide the best evidence to date for natural compatibilism, avoiding the main methodological problems faced by previous work supporting the view. In response to simple scenarios about familiar activities, people judged that agents had (...)
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  3. added 2020-06-09
    Folk Intuitions and the Conditional Ability to Do Otherwise.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Siyuan Yin & Rose Graves - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (7):968-996.
    In a series of pre-registered studies, we explored (a) the difference between people’s intuitions about indeterministic scenarios and their intuitions about deterministic scenarios, (b) the difference between people’s intuitions about indeterministic scenarios and their intuitions about neurodeterministic scenarios (that is, scenarios where the determinism is described at the neurological level), (c) the difference between people’s intuitions about neutral scenarios (e.g., walking a dog in the park) and their intuitions about negatively valenced scenarios (e.g., murdering a stranger), and (d) the difference (...)
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  4. added 2020-06-08
    Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics.Thomas Nadelhoffer, David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (8).
    The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this (...)
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  5. added 2020-05-04
    Free Will and Compatibilism.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    The author mounts a case against the libertarian and hard determinist's thesis that free will is impossible in a deterministic world. He charges incompatibilists with misconstruing ordinary 'free will' talk by overlaying common language with their own metaphysical presuppositions. Through a review of ordinary discourse and recent developments in jurisprudence and the sciences, he draws together the four key factors required for an act to be free. He then puts his 4C theory to work in giving a credible account of (...)
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  6. added 2020-05-04
    The Replication Argument for Incompatibilism.Patrick Todd - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1341-1359.
    In this paper, I articulate an argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. My argument comes in the form of an extended story, modeled loosely on Peter van Inwagen’s “rollback argument” scenario. I thus call it “the replication argument.” As I aim to bring out, though the argument is inspired by so-called “manipulation” and “original design” arguments, the argument is not a version of either such argument—and plausibly has advantages over both. The result, I believe, is a more convincing (...)
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  7. added 2020-05-04
    (Β) Não Dá Base Ao Incompatibilismo Entre Determinismo E Livre-Arbítrio.Domingos Faria - 2019 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 75 (3):1951-1976.
    Our aim in this paper is to critically assess Peter van Inwagen’s consequence argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. This argument is sound only if rule is valid. We present reasons to reject or to be skeptical of the rule and similar rules. So, the consequence argument is not a sound argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism.
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  8. added 2020-05-04
    Hard-Incompatibilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - In Gregg D. Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    As philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism continue to gain traction, we are likely to see a fundamental shift in the way people think about free will and moral responsibility. Such shifts raise important practical and existential concerns: What if we came to disbelieve in free will? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some (...)
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  9. added 2020-05-04
    Traditional Compatibilism Reformulated and Defended.Markus E. Schlosser - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:277-300.
    Traditional compatibilism about free will is widely considered to be untenable. In particular, the conditional analysis of the ability to do otherwise appears to be subject to clear counterexamples. I will propose a new version of traditional compatibilism that provides a conditional account of both the ability to do otherwise and the ability to choose to do otherwise, and I will argue that this view withstands the standard objections to traditional compatibilism. For this, I will assume with incompatibilists that the (...)
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  10. added 2020-05-04
    “Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing Honderich’s Third Way”.Paul Russell - 2017 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity. London, UK: Palgrave. pp. Pp. 159-79..
    In the third and final part of his A Theory of Determinism (TD) Ted Honderich addresses the fundamental question concerning “the consequences of determinism.” The critical question he aims to answer is what follows if determinism is true? This question is, of course, intimately bound up with the problem of free will and, in particular, with the question of whether or not the truth of determinism is compatible or incompatible with the sort of freedom required for moral responsibility. It is (...)
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  11. added 2020-05-04
    Incompatibilism and the Fixity of the Past.Neal A. Tognazzini & John Martin Fischer - 2017 - In John Keller (ed.), Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes From the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140-148.
    A style of argument that calls into question our freedom (in the sense that involves freedom to do otherwise) has been around for millennia; it can be traced back to Origen. The argument-form makes use of the crucial idea that the past is over-and-done-with and thus fixed; we cannot now do anything about the distant past (or, for that matter, the recent past)—it is now too late. Peter van Inwagen has presented this argument (what he calls the Consequence Argument) in (...)
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  12. added 2020-05-04
    Outsourcing the Deep Self: Deep Self Discordance Does Not Explain Away Intuitions in Manipulation Arguments.Gunnar Björnsson - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):637-653.
    According to manipulation arguments for incompatibilism, manipulation might undermine an agent’s responsibility even when the agent satisfies plausible compatibilist conditions on responsibility. According to Sripada, however, empirical data suggest that people take manipulation to undermine responsibility largely because they think that the manipulated act is in discord with the agent’s “deep self,” thus violating the plausible compatibilist condition of deep self concordance. This paper defends Sripada’s general methodological approach but presents data that strongly suggest that, contrary to Sripada’s contention, most (...)
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  13. added 2020-05-04
    The Manipulation Argument.Kristin Mickelson - 2016 - In Chapter 14, the Routledge Companion to Free Will (editors: Meghan Griffith , Kevin Timpe & Neil Levy). New York: Routledge.
    "The Manipulation Argument has recently taken center stage in the free-will debate, yet little else can be said of this newcomer that is uncontroversial. At present, even the most fundamental elements of the Manipulation Argument--its structure, conclusion, and target audience--are a matter of dispute. As such, we cannot begin, as we ideally would, with a simple and relatively uncontroversial overview of the argument. Instead, clarifying the debate over the basic structure and general conclusion of the Manipulation Argument will be our (...)
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  14. added 2020-05-04
    Recent Buddhist Theories of Free Will: Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Beyond.Rick Repetti - 2014 - Journal of Buddhist Ethics 21:279-352.
    Critical review of Buddhist theories of free will published between 2000 and 2014.
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  15. added 2020-05-04
    Agency and Incompatibilism. [REVIEW]Randolph Clarke - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):519-525.
    This paper is part of a symposium discussing Helen Steward's A METAPHYSICS FOR FREEDOM. Steward argues for what she calls Agency Incompatibilism: agency itself is incompatible with determinism. This paper examines what Steward presents as her main argument for Agency Incompatibilism and finds it wanting.
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  16. added 2020-05-04
    Précis of Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Gregg Caruso - 2014 - Science, Religion and Culture 1 (3):178-201.
    Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life provides the most lively and comprehensive defense of free will skepticism in the literature. It contains a reworked and expanded version of the view he first developed in Living without Free Will. Important objections to the early book are answered, some slight modifications are introduced, and the overall account is significantly embellished—for example, Pereboom proposes a new account of rational deliberation consistent with the belief that one’s actions are causally determined and (...)
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  17. added 2020-05-04
    Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency.Oisín Deery, Matthew S. Bedke & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 126–50.
    Incompatibilists often claim that we experience our agency as incompatible with determinism, while compatibilists challenge this claim. We report a series of experiments that focus on whether the experience of having an ability to do otherwise is taken to be at odds with determinism. We found that participants in our studies described their experience as incompatibilist whether the decision was (i) present-focused or retrospective, (ii) imagined or actual, (iii) morally salient or morally neutral. The only case in which participants did (...)
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  18. added 2020-05-04
    Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?John Martin Fischer & Garrett Pendergraft - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.
    The Consequence Argument has elicited various responses, ranging from acceptance as obviously right to rejection as obviously problematic in one way or another. Here we wish to focus on one specific response, according to which the Consequence Argument begs the question. This is a serious accusation that has not yet been adequately rebutted, and we aim to remedy that in what follows. We begin by giving a formulation of the Consequence Argument. We also offer some tentative proposals about the nature (...)
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  19. added 2020-05-04
    Fischer Against the Dilemma Defence: The Defence Prevails.David Widerker & Stewart Goetz - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):283-295.
    In a recent paper, John Fischer develops a new argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) based on a deterministic scenario. Fischer uses this result (i) to rebut the Dilemma Defense - a well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to PAP; and (ii) to maintain that: If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities. In this article, we argue that Fischer's new argument against PAP fails, thus leaving points (i) and (...)
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  20. added 2020-05-04
    What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.
    Incompatibilists and compatibilists (mostly) agree that there is a strong intuition that a manipulated agent, i.e., an agent who is the victim of methods such as indoctrination or brainwashing, is unfree. They differ however on why exactly this intuition arises. Incompatibilists claim our intuitions in these cases are sensitive to the manipulated agent’s lack of ultimate control over her actions, while many compatibilists argue that our intuitions respond to damage inflicted by manipulation on the agent’s psychological and volitional capacities. Much (...)
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  21. added 2020-05-04
    Lehrer and the Consequence Argument.Danilo Šuster - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):77-86.
    The consequence argument of van Inwagen is widely regarded as the best argument for incompatibilism. Lewis’s response is praised by van Inwagen as the best compatibilist’s strategy but Lewis himself acknowledges that his strategy resembles that of Lehrer. A comparison will show that one can speak about Lehrer-Lewis strategy, although I think that Lewis’s variation is dialectically slightly stronger. The paper provides a response to some standard objections of incompatibilists to the Lehrer-Lewis reply.
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  22. added 2020-05-04
    Relativity of a Free Will Concept Depending on Both Conscious Indeterminism and Unconscious Determinism.Franz Klaus Jansen - 2011 - Philosophy Study 1 (2):103 - 117.
    Free will is difficult to classify with respect to determinism or indeterminism, and its phenomenology in consciousness often shows both aspects. Initially, it is felt as unlimited and indeterminate will power, with the potentiality of multiple choices. Thereafter, reductive deliberation is led by determinism to the final decision, which realises only one of the potential choices. The reductive deliberation phase tries to find out the best alternative and simultaneously satisfying vague motivations, contextual conditions and personal preferences. The essential sense of (...)
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  23. added 2020-05-04
    Intuitions About Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing.Eddy Nahmias - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition. Oxford University Press.
    It is often called “the problem of free will and determinism,” as if the only thing that might challenge free will is determinism and as if determinism is obviously a problem. The traditional debates about free will have proceeded accordingly. Typically, incompatibilists about free will and determinism suggest that their position is intuitive or commonsensical, such that compatibilists have the burden of showing how, despite appearances, the problem of determinism is not really a problem. Compatibilists, in turn, tend to proceed (...)
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  24. added 2020-05-04
    Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2008 - In Pablo Muchnik (ed.), Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will.
    This paper concerns the role of the transcendental distinction between agents qua phenomena and qua noumena in Kant's theory of free will. It argues (1) that Kant's incompatibilism can be accommodated if one accepts the "ontological" interpretation of this distinction (i.e. the view that agents qua noumena are ontologically prior to agents qua phenomena), and (2) that Kant's incompatibilism cannot be accommodated by the "two-aspect" interpretation, whose defining feature is the rejection of the ontological priority of agents qua noumena. The (...)
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  25. added 2020-05-04
    Love Imperiled.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2007 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3 (1):0-0.
    In this paper, we argue that hard incompatibilism imperils a typical component of loving relations —lovable behavior—if it imperils moral praiseworthiness. We propose that to be lovable behavior, the behavior must exemplify the property of being commendable (the property of being praiseworthy from the standpoint of love), in contrast to being morally praiseworthy (praiseworthy from the point of view of moral duty). But if hard incompatibilism undermines moral praiseworthiness, then it just as surely undermines commendability. Thus, hard incompatibilism imperils a (...)
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  26. added 2020-05-04
    Kausalität zwischen Physik und deskriptiver Metaphysik.Geert Keil - 2004 - Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 29 (3):287-294.
    The short paper continues a debate on free will, causation and laws of nature between the author and the German philosopher Peter Rohs (opened in a previous issue of the same journal). Both Keil and Rohs are libertarians, but they disagree on a number of metaphysical issues. Keil maintains that causation is a relation between changes, i.e. time-consuming events, not between instantaneous states. Against Davidson’s “principle of the nomological character of causality”, Keil holds that no exceptionless laws subsuming cause-effect pairs (...)
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  27. added 2020-05-04
    Alternate Possibilities and Their Entertainment.S. Roush - 1998 - Philosophy 73 (4):559-571.
    In this paper it is argued that Frankfurt's and Strawson's defenses of compatibilism are insufficient due to neglected features of the role of alternate possibilities in assigning moral responsibility. An attempt is made to locate more adequately the genuine source of tension between free will and determinism, in a crowding phenomenon in the view of an action which our concept of responsibility has not grown up coping with. Finally, an argument is made that due to the nature of belief we (...)
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  28. added 2020-05-04
    Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It.R. E. Hobart - 1934 - Mind 43 (169):1-27.
    The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...)
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  29. added 2020-04-07
    Scheler e o problema do livre arbítrio.Nathalie de la Cadena - 2019 - In Roberto Kahlmeyer-Mertens, Katyana M. Weyh, Eduardo Henrique Silveira Kisse & Marcelo Ribeiro da Silva (eds.), Max Scheler: Novas Recepções. Toledo, Brasil: Vivens. pp. 217-250.
    Max Scheler apresentou sua formulação sobre o problema do livre arbítrio no opúsculo Phänomenologie und Metaphysik der Freiheit, de 1912- 1914, publicado em Gesammelte Werke, Band X. No presente capítulo, esta compreensão é apresentada de maneira resumida e, em seguida, apreciada à luz do debate contemporâneo entre o compatibilismo e o incompatibilismo. Ao fim, se pretende justificar a hipótese de que a posição scheleriana neste debate seria em favor do incompatibilismo libertarianista.
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  30. added 2020-02-10
    Counterfactuals, Counteractuals, and Free Choice.Fabio Lampert & Pedro Merlussi - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    In a recent paper, Pruss (2013) proves the validity of the rule beta-2 relative to Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals, which is a significant step forward in the debate about the consequence argument. Yet, we believe there remain intuitive counter-examples to beta-2 formulated with the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. We offer a novel and two-dimensional formulation of the Lewisian semantics for coun- terfactuals and prove the validity of a new transfer rule according to which a new version of the consequence (...)
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  31. added 2019-12-28
    Frankfurt Cases and 'Could Have Done Otherwise'.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    In his seminal essay, Harry Frankfurt argued that our exercise of free will and allocation of moral responsibility do not depend on us being able to do other than we did. Leslie Allan defends this moral maxim from Frankfurt's attack. Applying his character-based counterfactual conditional analysis of free acts to Frankfurt's counterexamples, Allan unpacks the confusions that lie at the heart of Frankfurt's argument. The author also explores how his 4C compatibilist theory measures up against Frankfurt’s conclusions.
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  32. added 2019-09-11
    Contextualizing Free Will.Romy Jaster - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (2):187-204.
    Hawthorne toys with the view that ascriptions of free will are context-sensitive. But the way he formulates the view makes freedom contextualism look like a non-starter. I step into the breach for freedom contextualism. My aim is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that freedom contextualism can be motivated on the basis of our ordinary practice of freedom attribution is not ad hoc. The view explains data which cannot be accounted for by an ambiguity hypothesis. On the other hand, (...)
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  33. added 2019-06-06
    Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions.Magill Kevin - 1997 - London: author open access, originally MacMillan.
    Most of us take it for granted that we are free agents: that we can sometimes act so as to shape our own lives and those of others, that we have choices about how to do so and that we are responsible for what we do. But are we really justified in believing this? For centuries philosophers have argued about whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism or natural causation, and they seem no closer to agreeing about (...)
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  34. added 2019-04-20
    Willensfreiheit. Antworten auf Walde, Willaschek und Jäger.Geert Keil - 2009 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (5):781-195.
    The article is a reply to three reviews of my book Willensfreiheit (Berlin/New York 2007) which were published in a previous issue of this journal. In the book, I develop a libertarian account of free will that invokes neither uncaused events nor mind-body dualism nor agent causality. Against Bettina Walde’s criticism, I argue that a well-balanced libertarianism can evade the luck objection and that it should not be portrayed as positing tiny causal gaps in an otherwise deterministic world. Against Marcus (...)
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  35. added 2019-04-08
    Anselm on Freedom and Grace.James A. Gibson - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 5:88-121.
    The chapter presents Anselm’s incompatibilist account of human freedom within the context of his theodicy and presents two arguments against his account. Both arguments aim to show there is a genuine conflict between his account of freedom and the role of God’s grace in making agents just. The first argument, the problem of harmonization, highlights the conflict within the soteriological context where an agent changes from being unjust to being just. The second argument, the problem of just creation, highlights the (...)
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  36. added 2018-09-27
    Gilberto Gomes é mesmo um compatibilista?Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Filosofia Unisinos 19 (3):179-188.
    This paper focuses on Gilberto Gomes’ work on free will. In a series of contributions that have had a significant impact on the respective literature, Gomes developed a conception about free will and argued that its existence is consistent with recent scientific findings, specially in neuroscience. In this paper, I object to a claim of Gomes about his conception of free will, namely the claim that it is a compatibilist conception. I seek to show that Gomes does not use the (...)
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  37. added 2018-03-13
    Libet-Style Experiments, Neuroscience, and Libertarian Free Will.Marcelo Fischborn - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):494-502.
    People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is (...)
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  38. added 2018-03-05
    Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to Do Otherwise.Patrick Todd - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):395-407.
    I provide a manipulation-style argument against classical compatibilism—the claim that freedom to do otherwise is consistent with determinism. My question is simple: if Diana really gave Ernie free will, why isn't she worried that he won't use it precisely as she would like? Diana's non-nervousness, I argue, indicates Ernie's non-freedom. Arguably, the intuition that Ernie lacks freedom to do otherwise is stronger than the direct intuition that he is simply not responsible; this result highlights the importance of the denial of (...)
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  39. added 2017-07-25
    Student.Krishna Mantirraju - manuscript
    Freedom is an impossibility; the dream of having the ability to choose anything one wants is hampered by reality. However, what aspect of reality ultimately hampers the birth of true freedom? What I propose is that reality itself makes freedom impossible. Furthermore, I also make the logical assumption, from the evidence I have found, that the only entity that can have freedom is a being that is formless, timeless, featureless, and is an infinite environment of nothing. While my studies today (...)
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  40. added 2016-12-08
    Reasons, Causes, and Chance-Incompatibilism.Markus Schlosser - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):335–347.
    Libertarianism appears to be incoherent, because free will appears to be incompatible with indeterminism. In support of this claim, van Inwagen offered an argument that is now known as the “rollback argument”. In a recent reply, Lara Buchak has argued that the underlying thought experiment fails to support the first of two key premises. On her view, this points to an unexplored alternative in the free will debate, which she calls “chance-incompatibilism”. I will argue that the rollback thought experiment does (...)
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  41. added 2016-12-08
    The Main Problem with Usc Libertarianism.Levy Ken - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127.
    Libertarians like Robert Kane believe that indeterminism is necessary for free will. They think this in part because they hold both that my being the ultimate cause of at least part of myself is necessary for free will and that indeterminism is necessary for this "ultimate self-causation". But seductive and intuitive as this "USC Libertarianism" may sound, it is untenable. In the end, no metaphysically coherent conception of ultimate self-causation is available. So the basic intuition motivating the USC Libertarian is (...)
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  42. added 2016-11-02
    The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism.David Widerker & Ira M. Schnall - 2014 - In David Palmer (ed.), David Palmer (ed.) Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 88-106. Oxford University Press. pp. 88-106.
    Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) purports to establish the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility, without appealing to the notion of avoidability, a notion on whose analysis compatibilists and incompatibilists disagree. Van Inwagen intended DA to refute compatibilism, or at least to shift the burden of proof onto the compatibilist. In this paper, we offer a critical assessment of DA. We examine a variety of objections to DA due to John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Ishtiyaque Haji, Seth Shabo, Michael (...)
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  43. added 2016-10-05
    Free Will and Time Travel.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2016 - In Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy & Kevin Timpe (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will. New York: Routledge. pp. 680-690.
    In this chapter I articulate the threat that time travel to the past allegedly poses to the free will of the time traveler, and I argue that on the traditional way of thinking about free will, the incompatibilist about time travel and free will wins the day. However, a residual worry about the incompatibilist view points the way toward a novel way of thinking about free will, one that I tentatively explore toward the end of the chapter.
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  44. added 2016-09-23
    Carl Ginet, On Action. [REVIEW]Karl Pfeifer - 1992 - Philosophy in Review 12:196-199.
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  45. added 2016-09-20
    Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.John Turri - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):403-424.
    Compatibilism is the view that determinism is compatible with acting freely and being morally responsible. Incompatibilism is the opposite view. It is often claimed that compatibilism or incompatibilism is a natural part of ordinary social cognition. That is, it is often claimed that patterns in our everyday social judgments reveal an implicit commitment to either compatibilism or incompatibilism. This paper reports five experiments designed to identify such patterns. The results support a nuanced hybrid account: The central tendencies in ordinary social (...)
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  46. added 2016-08-23
    The Parallel Manipulation Argument.Taylor W. Cyr - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):1075-1089.
    Matt King has recently argued that the manipulation argument against compatibilism does not succeed by employing a dilemma: either the argument infelicitously relies on incompatibilist sourcehood conditions, or the proponent of the argument leaves a premise of the argument undefended. This article develops a reply to King’s dilemma by showing that incompatibilists can accept its second horn. Key to King’s argument for the second horn’s being problematic is “the parallel manipulation argument.” I argue that King’s use of this argument is (...)
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  47. added 2016-05-25
    Why God's Beliefs Are Not Hard-Type Soft Facts.David Widerker - 2002 - Religious Studies 38 (1):77-88.
    John Fischer has attacked the Ockhamistic solution to the freedom–foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that: (1) God's prior beliefs about the future, though being soft facts about the past, are soft facts of a special sort, what he calls ‘hard-type soft facts’, i.e. soft facts, the constitutive properties of which are ‘hard’, or ‘temporally non-relational properties’; (2) in this respect, such facts are like regular past facts which are subject to the fixity of the past. In this paper, I take issue (...)
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  48. added 2016-04-10
    Fischer’s Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Argument.Yishai Cohen - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):121-140.
    According to the Dilemma Defense, it is question-begging against the incompatibilist defender of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) to assume that the agent in a deterministic Frankfurt-style case (FSC) cannot do otherwise in light of causal determinism, but is nevertheless morally responsible. As a result, Fischer (Philos Rev 119:315–336, 2010; Analysis 73:489–496, 2013) attempts to undermine PAP in a different manner via a deterministic FSC. More specifically, Fischer attempts to show that if causal determinism rules out an agent’s moral (...)
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  49. added 2016-04-10
    Der metaphysische Begriff der Willensfreiheit und das Transferprinzip des Keine-Wahl-Habens.Godehard Brüntrup - 2000 - In Dirk Greiman & Constanze Peres (eds.), Wahrheit - Sein - Struktur. Auseinandersetzungen mit Metaphysik. Georg Olms. pp. 102-120.
    Article on the problem of free will and determinism. A defense of the so-called "consequence argument" arguing that free will and determinism are incompatible.
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  50. added 2015-08-26
    Responses.Helen Steward - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (6):681-706.
    As the author of A Metaphysics for Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), I respond to each of the preceding eight papers in this Special Issue.
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