Free Will and Compatibilism

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The author mounts a case against the libertarian and hard determinist's thesis that free will is impossible in a deterministic world. He charges incompatibilists with misconstruing ordinary 'free will' talk by overlaying common language with their own metaphysical presuppositions. Through a review of ordinary discourse and recent developments in jurisprudence and the sciences, he draws together the four key factors required for an act to be free. He then puts his 4C theory to work in giving a credible account of how caused human agents 'could have done otherwise'.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ALLFWA-7
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-12-28
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-12-28

Total views
2,175 ( #1,591 of 64,116 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
702 ( #417 of 64,116 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.