The Existence of Mind-Independent Physical Objects

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Abstract
The author challenges both the eliminative idealist's contention that physical objects do not exist and the phenomenalist idealist's view that statements about physical objects are translatable into statements about private mental experiences. Firstly, he details how phenomenalist translations are parasitic on the realist assumption that physical objects exist independently of experience. Secondly, the author confronts eliminative idealism head on by exposing its heuristic sterility in contrast with realism's predictive success.
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First archival date: 2016-04-28
Latest version: 2 (2017-06-16)
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References found in this work BETA
The Web of Belief.Quine, W. V. O. & Ullian, J. S.
Rational Belief Systems.Cargile, James & Ellis, Brian

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2016-04-28

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