The Existence of Mind-Independent Physical Objects

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The author challenges both the eliminative idealist's contention that physical objects do not exist and the phenomenalist idealist's view that statements about physical objects are translatable into statements about private mental experiences. Firstly, he details how phenomenalist translations are parasitic on the realist assumption that physical objects exist independently of experience. Secondly, the author confronts eliminative idealism head on by exposing its heuristic sterility in contrast with realism's predictive success.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ALLTEO-27
Upload history
First archival date: 2016-04-28
Latest version: 2 (2017-06-16)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-04-28

Total views
730 ( #6,102 of 57,106 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
83 ( #7,655 of 57,106 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.