COMMENTARY: “Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties” by Andrew Egan

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Egan argues against Lewis’s view that properties are sets of actual and possible individuals and in favour of the view that they are functions from worlds to extensions (sets of individuals). Egan argues that Lewis’s view implies that 2nd order properties are never possessed contingently by their (1st order) bearers, an implication to which there are numerous counter-examples. And Egan argues that his account of properties is more commensurable with the role they play as the semantic values of predicates than is Lewis’s.
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First archival date: 2018-01-16
Latest version: 2 (2018-09-27)
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