Properties

Edited by Gabriele Contessa (Carleton University)
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  1. On Some Objections to the Powers-BSA.Samuel Kimpton-Nye - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    This paper responds to Friend’s (2023) critique of the Powers-BSA, a view according to which laws of nature are efficient descriptions of how modally laden properties (powers) are possibly distributed in spacetime. In the course of this response, the paper discusses the nature of scientific and metaphysical explanation, the aim of science and the structure of modal space.
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  2. Bealer to Kripke, On Mental Properties.Vitor Manuel Dinis Pereira - 2023 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 44 (3&4):171-194.
    Bealer’s argument against Kripke is presented. We then show how Kripke could counteract it. Our idea that the identity materialist may have the possibility of explaining why type psychophysical identities only appear to be contingent (but are necessary), because we confuse the exemplified properties (one property) with the concepts that subsume them (two distinct concepts), is supported by McGinn’s and Nagel’s materialistic intuitions. It remains to be seen whether a critique of Kripke like that of Bealer runs counter to the (...)
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  3. Intention and Judgment-Dependence: First-Personal vs. Third-Personal Accounts.Ali Hossein Khani - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):41-56.
    ABSTRACT A Third-Person-Based or Third-Personal Judgment-Dependent account of mental content implies that, as an a priori matter, facts about a subject’s mental content are precisely captured by the judgments of a second-person or an interpreter. Alex Byrne, Bill Child, and others have discussed attributing such a view to Donald Davidson. This account significantly departs from a First-Person-Based or First-Personal Judgment-Dependent account, such as Crispin Wright’s, according to which, as an a priori matter, facts about intentional content are constituted by the (...)
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  4. Ficta and Virtuality: An Ingardenian Ontology of Virtualized Ficta.Hicham Jakha - forthcoming - Rivista di Estetica:1-16.
    In my paper, I establish an Ingardenian phenomenological ontology of virtualized ficta, i.e., fictional entities introduced to virtual gaming. The first Section of my paper provides an ontology of virtualized ficta, focusing primarily on their ‘‘existential moments’’. But in order to have a firm grasp of the ontological aspects grounding the virtual work, it’s important to engage its strata. This is what I attempt to do in Section 1.2. Virtualized ficta’s intentional dependencies are strongly manifest in what I call the (...)
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  5. Systemic materialism.Gustavo E. Romero - 2022 - In Gustavo E. Romero, Javier Pérez-Jara & Lino Camprubí (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: Its Ontology and Epistemology. Springer. pp. 79-107.
    I present a condensed exposé of systemic materialism, a synthesis of materialism and systemism originally proposed by Mario Bunge. Matter is identified with mutability of propertied particulars, and a concrete or material system is defined as an object with composition, structure, mechanism, and environment. I review different aspects of this ontology, and discuss some of its implications for epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. I also try to identify some problems of this view and offer some ways to overcome the difficulties. I (...)
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  6. Truth dependence against transparent truth.Susanna Melkonian-Altshuler - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-17.
    Beall’s (e.g., 2009, 2021) transparency theory of truth is recognized as a prominent, deflationist solution to the liar paradox. However, it has been neglected by truth theorists who have attempted to show that a deflationist theory of truth can (or cannot) account for truth dependence, i.e., the claim that the truth of a proposition depends on how things described by the proposition are, but how these things are does not depend on the truth of the proposition. Truth theorists interested in (...)
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  7. Properties, potentialities and modality.Barbara Vetter - 2024 - In A. R. J. Fisher & Anna-Sofia Maurin (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Properties. London & New York: Routledge. pp. 315-324.
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  8. Your red isn't my red! Connectionist Structuralism and the puzzle of abstract objects (draft).Chris Percy - manuscript
    This draft preprint presents a nine step argument for “Connectionist Structuralism” (CS), an account of the ontology of abstract objects that is neither purely nominalist nor purely platonist. CS is a common, often implicit assumption in parts of the artificial intelligence literature, but such discussions have not presented formal accounts of the position or engaged with metaphysical issues that potentially undermine it. By making the position legible and presenting an initial case for it, we hope to support a constructive dialogue (...)
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  9. Qua-Objects, (Non-)Derivative Properties and the Consistency of Hylomorphism.Marta Campdelacreu & Sergi Oms - 2023 - Metaphysica 24 (2):323-338.
    Imagine a sculptor who molds a lump of clay to create a statue. Hylomorphism claims that the statue and the lump of clay are two different colocated objects that have different forms, even though they share the same matter. Recently, there has been some discussion on the requirements of consistency for hylomorphist theories. In this paper, we focus on an argument presented by Maegan Fairchild, according to which a minimal version of hylomorphism is inconsistent. We argue that the argument is (...)
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  10. Troubles With Power Structuralism’s Account of Causation.Damiano Migliorini - 2022 - Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 24 (2).
    The Power Structuralist View (PSV) is an account of causation in which causal relations are reduced to the powers that are activated in the subject by another subject’s power, instantly and simultaneously. PSV is based on two main assumptions: (a) holism; (b) reductionism. After justifying the choice to place PSV within the so-called ‘process accounts’ of causation (PA), I will show how, generally, every PA must solve the so-called “transference paradox” (TP) and why PSV is an innovative account. However, PSV (...)
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  11. Debating Powers: Where the Real Puzzle Lies.Samuel Kimpton-Nye - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Stephen Mumford and Alexander Bird disagree about which properties are powers and, correspondingly, about the extent of the philosophical work to which powers may be put. Unfortunately, there is an important respect in which these authors are talking past each other and so the reason for their disagreement remains obscured. I highlight what has gone wrong in their recent exchange, attempt to clear up the confusion and pinpoint the true source of their disagreement. My hope is to redirect the efforts (...)
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  12. Review of Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic by Robert Trueman. [REVIEW]Nicholas K. Jones - forthcoming - Mind.
    This is a review of "Properties and Propositions: The Metaphysics of Higher-Order Logic" by Robert Trueman. Following an overview of the main themes of the book, I discuss the metaphysical presuppositions of Trueman's Fregean notation for predicate abstraction and evaluate his argument for strict typing.
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  13. Essays on Postdeflationary Substantive Theorizing about Truth.Teemu Tauriainen - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Jyväskylä
    This dissertation explores the prospects of postdeflationary substantive theorizing about truth. Postdeflationary theories define the concept of truth or the property of being a true truthbearer in a way that respects the deflationary desiderata of clarity, purity, and permissiveness with truth-aptness, without a necessary commitment to the core negative thesis of the deflationary approach. Postdeflationary substantive theories further acknowledge the complexity and explanatory utility of truth in understanding and defining other concepts and phenomena. The motivation for pursuing this study arises (...)
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  14. Dispositionalism’s (grand)daddy issues: time travelling and perfect masks.Giannini Giacomo & Donatella Donati - 2022 - Analysis 83 (1):40-49.
    There is a tension between Dispositionalism––the view that all metaphysical modality is grounded in actual irreducible dispositional properties––and the possibility of time travel. This is due to the fact that Dispositionalism makes it much harder to solve a potentiality-based version of the grandfather paradox. We first present a potentiality-based version of the grandfather paradox, stating that the following theses are inconsistent: 1) time travel is possible, 2) powers fully ground modality, 3) self-defeating actions are impossible, 4) time-travellers retain their intrinsic (...)
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  15. Modes, Predication, and Charity: A Reply to Melamed.Martin Lin - manuscript
    In this paper, I respond to criticisms of my book Being and Reason recently made by Yitzhak Melamed.
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  16. Two conceptions of absolute generality.Salvatore Florio & Nicholas K. Jones - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5-6):1601-1621.
    What is absolutely unrestricted quantification? We distinguish two theoretical roles and identify two conceptions of absolute generality: maximally strong generality and maximally inclusive generality. We also distinguish two corresponding kinds of absolute domain. A maximally strong domain contains every potential counterexample to a generalisation. A maximally inclusive domain is such that no domain extends it. We argue that both conceptions of absolute generality are legitimate and investigate the relations between them. Although these conceptions coincide in standard settings, we show how (...)
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  17. Is There a Metaphysically Robust Distinction Between Natural and Artificial Dispositions?Joaquim Giannotti - forthcoming - In William A. Bauer & Anna Marmodoro (eds.), Artificial Dispositions: Investigating Ethical and Metaphysical Issues. Bloomsbury.
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  18. Dispositions and Powers.Toby Friend & Samuel Kimpton-Nye - 2023 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Tuomas E. Tahko.
    As we understand them, dispositions are relatively uncontroversial 'predicatory' properties had by objects disposed in certain ways. By contrast, powers are hypothetical 'ontic' properties posited in order to explain dispositional behaviour. Chapter 1 outlines this distinction in more detail. Chapter 2 offers a summary of the issues surrounding analysis of dispositions and various strategies in contemporary literature to address them, including one of our own. Chapter 3 describes some of the important questions facing the metaphysics of powers including why they're (...)
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  19. Meaning and the World.Ryan Simonelli - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Chicago
    I motivate and develop a use-based semantic theory in opposition to the dominant paradigm in philosophical and linguistic semantics. Drawing inspiration from Wilfrid Sellars, I argue that contemporary semantic theories are faced with a basic problem of explanatory circularity. These theories universally presuppose that worldly knowledge of such things as properties or sets of possible worlds precedes and underlies knowledge of meaning. However, I argue that it is only through learning a language--mastering the rules governing the use of the expressions (...)
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  20. Spinoza and the Puzzle of Attributes: An Essentialist Approach.Ataollah Hashemi - manuscript
    In Spinoza’s ontology, there are only two categories of existing items: an independent entity that is one substance, and dependent entities that are infinite modes; “nothing exists external to the intellect except substances and their affections”(Proof of 1.P.4). Nevertheless, Spinoza introduces a third notion, ‘attribute’, that is defined as “what the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence” (1.d.4). Spinoza’s metaphysics is known for the doctrine of substance monism that indicates that only one substance exists. Spinoza, however, explicitly states (...)
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  21. Coincident Objects and The Grounding Problem.Ataollah Hashemi - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 16 (41):164-173.
    Pluralists believe in the occurrence of numerically distinct spatiotemporal coincident objects. They argue that there are coincident objects that share all physical and spatiotemporal properties and relations; nevertheless, they differ in terms of modal and some other profiles. Appealing to the grounding problem according to which nothing can ground the modal differences between coincident objects, monists reject the occurrence of coincident objects. In the first part of this paper, I attempt to show that the dispute between monists and pluralists cannot (...)
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  22. Reference to Properties in Natural Language.Friederike Moltmann - 2023 - In Anthony Fisher & Anna Sofia Maurin (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Properties. Routlledge.
    This paper gives a perspectival overview of the semantics of potential property-referring terms and presents new and surprising generalizations about explicit property-referring terms like 'the property of being wise', which raise fundamental issues regarding ontology and learnability and a core-periphery distinction in natural language ontology.
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  23. Spiritual metaphysics #2: the mysterious truth about experiential ‘interchangeability’.Peter Eastman - 2022 - Medium.Com.
    A study in the ontology of perceptual ‘meaning’, especially with regard to the fact that any particular meaning is always potentially replaceable by its polar opposite. -/- We’re picking up a thread here from where we left off in the previous article (Spiritual metaphysics #1) and taking another look at an aspect of the features of any basic perception. Disregarding (for now) the fact that all perceptions (of whatever kind; mental or sense perceptual) are always, as it were, ‘illumined’ by (...)
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  24. Ontology and Arbitrariness.David Builes - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):485-495.
    In many different ontological debates, anti-arbitrariness considerations push one towards two opposing extremes. For example, in debates about mereology, one may be pushed towards a maximal ontology (mereological universalism) or a minimal ontology (mereological nihilism), because any intermediate view seems objectionably arbitrary. However, it is usually thought that anti-arbitrariness considerations on their own cannot decide between these maximal or minimal views. I will argue that this is a mistake. Anti-arbitrariness arguments may be used to motivate a certain popular thesis in (...)
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  25. A Case For Higher-Order Metaphysics.Andrew Bacon - forthcoming - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones (eds.), Higher-order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
    Higher-order logic augments first-order logic with devices that let us generalize into grammatical positions other than that of a singular term. Some recent metaphysicians have advocated for using these devices to raise and answer questions that bear on many traditional issues in philosophy. In contrast to these 'higher-order metaphysicians', traditional metaphysics has often focused on parallel, but importantly different, questions concerning special sorts of abstract objects: propositions, properties and relations. The answers to the higher-order and the property-theoretic questions may coincide (...)
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  26. Fictional Universal Realism.Jeffrey Goodman - 2022 - Metaphysica 23 (2):177-192.
    Certain realists about properties and relations identify them with universals. Furthermore, some hold that for a wide range of meaningful predicates, the semantic contribution to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which those predicates figure is the universal expressed by the predicate. I here address ontological issues raised by predicates first introduced to us via works of fiction and whether the universal realist should accept that any such predicates express universals. After assessing arguments by Braun, D. and Sawyer, S. (...)
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  27. An Armstrongian defense of dispositional monist accounts of laws of nature.Mousa Mohammadian - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (3):1-15.
    Bird reveals an important problem at the heart of Armstrong’s theory of laws of nature: to explain how a law necessitates its corresponding regularity, Armstrong is committed to a vicious regress. In his very brief response, Armstrong gestures towards an argument that, as he admits, is more of a “speculation.” Later, Barker and Smart argue that a very similar problem threatens Bird’s dispositional monist theory of laws of nature and he is committed to a similar vicious regress. In this paper, (...)
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  28. The Puzzle of Fictional Resemblance.Jeffrey Goodman - 2022 - Res Philosophica 99 (3):361-375.
    This paper discusses a puzzle, the heart of which is this question: How is it that real individuals can resemble fictional individuals? It seems that any answer given by one who has taken a stand on the ontology of fictional individuals will come with significant drawbacks. An Anti-Realist will have to explain, or explain away, the apparent truth of our positive assertions of resemblance, while a Realist will have to explain how we are to understand resemblance in light of either (...)
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  29. Till Death Do Us Part: The Moral Problems of Personites.Andrew Russo & Martin Montminy - manuscript
    According to the worm theory, persons are (maximal) aggregates of person-stages existing at different times. Personites, on the other hand, are non-maximal aggregates of stages that are nonetheless very much like persons. Their existence appears to make instances of prudential self-sacrifice morally problematic: the personites that exist at the time of the sacrifice but not at the time of the reward seem to be unfairly exploited. Instances of punishment appear to give rise to a similar problem. We argue that these (...)
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  30. Physicalism or Anti-Physicalism: A Disjunctive Account.Umut Baysan & Nathan Wildman - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.
    In this paper, we make a case for the disjunctive view of phenomenal consciousness: consciousness is essentially disjunctive in being either physical or non-physical in the sense that it has both physical and non-physical possible instances. We motivate this view by showing that it undermines two well-known conceivability arguments in philosophy of mind: the zombie argument for anti-physicalism, and the anti-zombie argument for physicalism. By appealing to the disjunctive view, we argue that two hitherto unquestioned premises of these arguments are (...)
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  31. Eliminating Eliminativism.Jason Harlan - 2016 - The Oxford Philosophical Society (OUDCE) Annual Review 38 (Autumn/Winter 2016):8-10.
    This article challenges a particular form of Eliminative Materialism as presented in the work, "Quining Qualia" where Dr. Daniel Dennett argues that qualia, as he defines it, does not exist. The paper underscores the contradictory nature of Dennett's "Intuition Pumps" and shows how he assumes the very notion he proports to defeat namely, that first-person (or subjective) conscious experience, commonly termed "qualia," exists.
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  32. Higher‐order metaphysics.Lukas Skiba - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10):1-11.
    Subverting a once widely held Quinean paradigm, there is a growing consensus among philosophers of logic that higher-order quantifiers (which bind variables in the syntactic position of predicates and sentences) are a perfectly legitimate and useful instrument in the logico-philosophical toolbox, while neither being reducible to nor fully explicable in terms of first-order quantifiers (which bind variables in singular term position). This article discusses the impact of this quantificational paradigm shift on metaphysics, focussing on theories of properties, propositions, and identity, (...)
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  33. The Varieties of Instantiation.Umrao Sethi - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (3):417-437.
    Working with the assumption that properties depend for their instantiation on substances, I argue against a unitary analysis of instantiation. On the standard view, a property is instantiated just in case there is a substance that serves as the bearer of the property. But this view cannot make sense of how properties that are mind-dependent depend for their instantiation on minds. I consider two classes of properties that philosophers often take to be mind-dependent: sensible qualities like color and bodily sensations (...)
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  34. Persistence as a Four-Dimensionalist: Perdurantism vs. Exdurantism.Richard Callais - 2021 - Dialogue 64 (1):24-29.
    The debate over persistence currently involves three competing theories—one three-dimensionalist theory called “endurantism” and two four-dimensionalist theories called “perdurantism” and “exdurantism.” This inner debate between the latter two persistence theories is what I aim to clarify, and ultimately, I argue that perdurantism is superior to exdurantism because exdurantism is too extravagant in counting ordinary objects in the world. Extravagant for the reason that objects in their entirety are bound to their momentary stages, and there is practically an interminable number of (...)
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  35. V—The Linguistic Approach to Ontology.Lee Walters - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (2):127-152.
    What are the prospects for a linguistic approach to ontology? Given that it seems that there are true subject-predicate sentences containing empty names, traditional linguistic approaches to ontology appear to be flawed. I argue that in order to determine what there is, we need to determine which sentences ascribe properties (and relations) to objects, and that there does not appear to be any formal criterion for this. This view is then committed to giving an account of what predicates do in (...)
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  36. On the Lewisian Principle of Recombination and Quidditism.Karol Lenart - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):357-371.
    In this paper, I discuss a connection between quidditism and the Lewisian principle of recombination. I begin by reconstructing a typical characterisation of a Lewisian principle of recombination, followed by an explanation of quidditism. In the remainder, I argue that a proponent of a Lewisian principle of recombination cannot endorse quidditism without some important modifications of her view.
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  37. A New Puzzle About Aristotelian Accidents.Tyler Huismann - 2021 - Metaphysics 4 (1):1-17.
    Aristotle gives a surprisingly broad menu of examples of something being accidental to something else. But the breadth of these examples seems to threaten a basic feature of accidentality, namely its asymmetry. ‘Accident’ has different senses, and one might think that that fact offers a way out, but some examples resist such an understanding. The best way forward, I argue, is to take accidentality to be contextual: relative to some context or condition, something might be accidental to something else; relative (...)
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  38. Ugliness Is in the Gut of the Beholder.Ryan P. Doran - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (5):88-146.
    I offer the first sustained defence of the claim that ugliness is constituted by the disposition to disgust. I advance three main lines of argument in support of this thesis. First, ugliness and disgustingness tend to lie in the same kinds of things and properties (the argument from ostensions). Second, the thesis is better placed than all existing accounts to accommodate the following facts: ugliness is narrowly and systematically distributed in a heterogenous set of things, ugliness is sometimes enjoyed, and (...)
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  39. The Possibility of Emergent Conscious Causal Powers.Lok-Chi Chan & Andrew J. Latham - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):195-201.
    ABSTRACT Lewtas [2017] recently articulated an argument claiming that emergent conscious causal powers are impossible. In developing his argument, Lewtas makes several assumptions about emergence, phenomenal consciousness, categorical properties, and causation. We argue that there are plausible alternatives to these assumptions. Thus, the proponent of emergent conscious causal powers can escape Lewtas’s challenge.
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  40. Presentism, Temporal Distributional Properties, and Fundamentality.Matthew Green - 2017 - Aporia 16:1-8.
    According to presentism, everything that exists is present. According to the truthmaker principle, for every true proposition there is a truthmaker – an entity that suffices for the truth of that proposition. According to realism about the past, there are true propositions about the past. Together these claims necessitate presently existing truthmakers for truths about the past (presentist truthmakers). Cameron (2010) argues that temporal distributional properties (TDPs) can play the role of presentist truthmakers. Corkum (2014) argues that they cannot. I (...)
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  41. Intrinsic colors - and what it is like to see them.Zoltan Jakab - 2003 - In R. Mausfeld & D. Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford, Egyesült Királyság: Oxford University Press. pp. 303-306.
    This is a commentary on Laurence Maloney’s chapter in Mausfeld R., and Heyer, D. (Eds.): Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. I discuss two related proposals as to the nature of object color formulated by Maloney. On the first proposal colors are photoreceptor excitations; on the second, they are fundamental, universal reflectance characteristics of terrestrial surfaces. I argue that the second proposal is suitable for purposes of color objectivism, whereas the first one is not. (...)
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  42. The Identity Theory of Powers Revised.Joaquim Giannotti - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):603-621.
    Dispositionality and qualitativity are key notions to describe the world that we inhabit. Dispositionality is a matter of what a thing is disposed to do in certain circumstances. Qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like. According to the Identity Theory of powers, every fundamental property is at once dispositional and qualitative, or a powerful quality. Canonically, the Identity Theory holds a contentious identity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. In the literature, this view faces a (...)
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  43. Quantum Entanglement Undermines Structural Realism.Seungbae Park - 2022 - Metaphysica 23 (1):1-13.
    Quantum entanglement poses a challenge to the traditional metaphysical view that an extrinsic property of an object is determined by its intrinsic properties. So structural realists might be tempted to cite quantum entanglement as evidence for structural realism. I argue, however, that quantum entanglement undermines structural realism. If we classify two entangled electrons as a single system, we can say that their spin properties are intrinsic properties of the system, and that we can have knowledge about these intrinsic properties. Specifically, (...)
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  44. Editorial introduction to ‘truth: concept meets property’.Jeremy Wyatt - 2020 - Synthese 198 (2):591-603.
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  45. The World Just Is the Way It Is.David Builes - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):1-27.
    What is the relationship between objects and properties? According to a standard view, there are primitive individuals that ‘instantiate’ or ‘have’ various properties. According to a rival view, objects are mere ‘bundles’ of properties. While there are a number of reasons to be skeptical of primitive individuals, there are also a number of challenges that the bundle theorist faces. The goal of this paper is to formulate a view about the relationship between objects and properties that avoids many of the (...)
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  46. It’s a kind of magic: Lewis, magic and properties.Daniel Nolan - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4717-4741.
    David Lewis’s arguments against magical ersatzism are notoriously puzzling. Untangling different strands in those arguments is useful for bringing out what he thought was wrong with not just one style of theory about possible worlds, but with much of the contemporary metaphysics of abstract objects. After setting out what I take Lewis’s arguments to be and how best to resist them, I consider the application of those arguments to general theories of properties and relations. The constraints Lewis motivates turn out (...)
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  47. Mind-Dependence in Berkeley and the Problem of Perception.Umrao Sethi - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):648-668.
    ABSTRACT On the traditional picture, accidents must inhere in substances in order to exist. Berkeley famously argues that a particular class of accidents—the sensible qualities—are mere ideas—entities that depend for their existence on minds. To defend this view, Berkeley provides us with an elegant alternative to the traditional framework: sensible qualities depend on a mind, not in virtue of inhering in it, but in virtue of being perceived by it. This metaphysical insight, once correctly understood, gives us the resources to (...)
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  48. Do We See Facts?Alfredo Vernazzani - 2020 - Mind and Language (4):674-693.
    Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology (...)
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  49. A Theory of Structured Propositions.Andrew Bacon - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (2):173-238.
    This paper argues that the theory of structured propositions is not undermined by the Russell-Myhill paradox. I develop a theory of structured propositions in which the Russell-Myhill paradox doesn't arise: the theory does not involve ramification or compromises to the underlying logic, but rather rejects common assumptions, encoded in the notation of the $\lambda$-calculus, about what properties and relations can be built. I argue that the structuralist had independent reasons to reject these underlying assumptions. The theory is given both a (...)
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  50. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions are Converse Relations.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    According to the so-called ‘standard theory’ of conditions, the conditionship relation is converse, that is, if A is a sufficient condition for B, B is a necessary condition for A. This theory faces well-known counterexamples that appeal to both causal and other asymmetric considerations. I show that these counterexamples lose their plausibility once we clarify two key components of the standard theory: that to satisfy a condition is to instantiate a property, and that what is usually called ‘conditionship relation’ is (...)
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