Beliefs do not come in degrees

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778 (2017)
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Abstract
Philosophers commonly say that beliefs come in degrees. Drawing from the literature, I make precise three arguments for this claim: an argument from degrees of confidence, an argument from degrees of firmness, and an argument from natural language. I show that they all fail. I also advance three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees: an argument from natural language, an argument from intuition, and an argument from the metaphysics of degrees. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that beliefs do not come in degrees.
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First archival date: 2017-04-12
Latest version: 5 (2017-05-06)
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