View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

71 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
1 — 50 / 71
  1. added 2019-03-07
    The Joint Aggregation of Beliefs and Degrees of Belief.Paul D. Thorn - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    The article proceeds upon the assumption that the beliefs and degrees of belief of rational agents satisfy a number of constraints, including: consistency and deductive closure for belief sets, conformity to the axioms of probability for degrees of belief, and the Lockean Thesis concerning the relationship between belief and degree of belief. Assuming that the beliefs and degrees of belief of both individuals and collectives satisfy the preceding three constraints, I discuss what further constraints may be imposed on the aggregation (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2019-03-04
    Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Belief is a familiar attitude: taking something to be the case or regarding it as true. But we are more confident in some of our beliefs than in others. For this reason, many epistemologists appeal to a second attitude, called credence, similar to a degree of confidence. This raises the question: how do belief and credence relate to each other? On a belief-first view, beliefs are more fundamental and credences are a species of beliefs, e.g. beliefs about probabilities. On a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2019-01-24
    The Relation Between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - manuscript
    Agents are often assumed to have degrees of belief (“credences”) and also binary beliefs (“beliefs simpliciter”). How are these related to each other? A much-discussed answer asserts that it is rational to believe a proposition if and only if one has a high enough degree of belief in it. But this answer runs into the “lottery paradox”: the set of believed propositions may violate the key rationality conditions of consistency and deductive closure. In earlier work, we showed that this problem (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2018-12-12
    How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I show how dualism can (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2018-11-26
    A Defense of Belief-Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2018 - In João Luis Pereira Ourique (ed.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the Brazilian Society of Analytic Philosophy. Pelotas, Brazil: pp. 77-78.
    I defend belief-credence dualism, the view that we have both beliefs and credences and both attitudes are equally fundamental. First, I explain belief, credence, and three views on their relationship. Then, I argue for dualism. I do so first by painting a picture of the mind on which belief and credence are two cognitive tools that we use for different purposes. Finally, I respond to two objections to dualism. I conclude that dualism is a promising view, and one that both (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2018-11-22
    Inquiry and the Doxastic Attitudes.Michele Palmira - forthcoming - Synthese:1-27.
    In this paper I take up the question of the nature of the doxastic attitudes we entertain while inquiring into some matter. Relying on a distinction between two stages of open inquiry, I urge to acknowledge the existence of a distinctive attitude of cognitive inclination towards a proposition qua answer to the question one is inquiring into. I call this attitude “hypothesis”. Hypothesis, I argue, is a sui generis doxastic attitude which differs, both functionally and normatively, from suspended judgement, full (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2018-11-22
    Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):179-196.
    This paper addresses a largely neglected question in ongoing debates over disagreement: what is the relation, if any, between disagreements involving credences and disagreements involving outright beliefs? The first part of the paper offers some desiderata for an adequate account of credal and full disagreement. The second part of the paper argues that both phenomena can be subsumed under a schematic definition which goes as follows: A and B disagree if and only if the accuracy conditions of A's doxastic attitude (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. added 2018-10-08
    Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    I explore how rational belief and rational credence relate to evidence. I begin by looking at three cases where rational belief and credence seem to respond differently to evidence: cases of naked statistical evidence, lotteries, and hedged assertions. I consider an explanation for these cases, namely, that one ought not form beliefs on the basis of statistical evidence alone, and raise worries for this view. Then, I suggest another view that explains how belief and credence relate to evidence. My view (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2018-09-01
    Great Expectations: Belief and the Case for Pragmatic Encroachment.Dorit Ganson - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2018-09-01
    Deliberation and Pragmatic Belief.Brad Armendt - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    To what extent do our beliefs, and how strongly we hold them, depend upon how they matter to us, on what we take to be at stake on them? The idea that beliefs are sometimes stake-sensitive (Armendt 2008, 2013) is further explored here, with a focus on whether beliefs may be stake-sensitive and rational. In contexts of extended deliberation about what to do, beliefs and assessments of options interact. In some deliberations, a belief about what you will do may rationally (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2018-08-15
    Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    It seems obvious that when higher-order evidence makes it rational for one to doubt that one’s own belief on some matter is rational, this can undermine the rationality of that belief. This is known as higher-order defeat. However, despite its intuitive plausibility, it has proved puzzling how higher-order defeat works, exactly. To highlight two prominent sources of puzzlement, higher-order defeat seems to defy being understood in terms of conditionalization; and higher-order defeat can sometimes place agents in what seem like epistemic (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2018-07-26
    A New Puzzle About Belief and Credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. added 2018-07-18
    On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    The Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism assumes Ramsey's Thesis (RT), which purports to determine the prices an agent is rationally required to pay for a bet. Recently, a new objection to Ramsey's Thesis has emerged (Hedden 2013, Wronski & Godziszewski 2017, Wronski 2018)--I call this the Expected Utility Objection. According to this objection, it is Maximise Subjective Expected Utility (MSEU) that determines the prices an agent is required to pay for a bet, and this often disagrees with Ramsey's Thesis. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2018-07-16
    Comparativism and the Measurement of Partial Belief.Edward J. R. Elliott - manuscript
    Comparativism is the view that comparative beliefs (e.g., believing p to be more likely than q) are more fundamental than partial beliefs (e.g., believing p to some degree x), with the latter explicable as theoretical constructs designed to facilitate reasoning about patterns within systems of comparative beliefs that exist under special conditions. In this paper, I fi rst outline several varieties of comparativism, including two `Ramseyan' varieties which generalise the standard `probabilistic' approaches. I then provide a general critique that applies (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2018-07-16
    Impossible Worlds and Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
    One response to the problem of logical omniscience in standard possible worlds models of belief is to extend the space of worlds so as to include impossible worlds. It is natural to think that essentially the same strategy can be applied to probabilistic models of partial belief, for which parallel problems also arise. In this paper, I note a difficulty with the inclusion of impossible worlds into probabilistic models. Under weak assumptions about the space of worlds, most of the propositions (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. added 2018-06-11
    Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, doxastic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential rationality. I argue that each debate is constrained in particular ways, depending on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that (i) epistemologists should pay (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. added 2018-06-03
    How Do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - forthcoming - Noûs.
    According to an increasingly popular epistemological view, people need outright beliefs in addition to credences to simplify their reasoning. Outright beliefs simplify reasoning by allowing thinkers to ignore small error probabilities. What is outright believed can change between contexts. It has been claimed that thinkers manage shifts in their outright beliefs and credences across contexts by an updating procedure resembling conditionalization, which I call pseudo-conditionalization (PC). But conditionalization is notoriously complicated. The claim that thinkers manage their beliefs via PC is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. added 2018-05-08
    Avoiding Certain Frustration, Reflection, and the Cable Guy Paradox.Brian Kierland, Bradley Monton & Samuel Ruhmkorff - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):317 - 333.
    We discuss the cable guy paradox, both as an object of interest in its own right and as something which can be used to illuminate certain issues in the theories of rational choice and belief. We argue that a crucial principle—The Avoid Certain Frustration (ACF) principle—which is used in stating the paradox is false, thus resolving the paradox. We also explain how the paradox gives us new insight into issues related to the Reflection principle. Our general thesis is that principles (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. added 2018-04-25
    Belief, Credence, and Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Religious Studies:1-13.
    In this article, I argue that faith’s going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith’s epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction to rational faith. I argue that if faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence, faith can go beyond the evidence and still be epistemically rational.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2018-02-17
    Reply to Crupi Et Al.'s ‘Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence’.Franz Huber - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):213-215.
    Crupi et al. propose a generalization of Bayesian confirmation theory that they claim to adequately deal with confirmation by uncertain evidence. Consider a series of points of time t0, . . . , ti, . . . , tn such that the agent’s subjective probability for an atomic proposition E changes from Pr0 at t0 to . . . to Pri at ti to . . . to Prn at tn. It is understood that the agent’s subjective probabilities change for (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2018-02-08
    Some Connections Between Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Nonadditive Probability.Philippe Mongin - 1992 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), Patrick Suppes: Scientific Philosopher. Dordrecht: Kluwer. pp. 135-171.
    This paper is concerned with representations of belief by means of nonadditive probabilities of the Dempster-Shafer (DS) type. After surveying some foundational issues and results in the D.S. theory, including Suppes's related contributions, the paper proceeds to analyze the connection of the D.S. theory with some of the work currently pursued in epistemic logic. A preliminary investigation of the modal logic of belief functions à la Shafer is made. There it is shown that the Alchourrron-Gärdenfors-Makinson (A.G.M.) logic of belief change (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. added 2018-01-11
    Heart of DARCness.Yang Liu & Huw Price - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
    There is a long-standing disagreement in the philosophy of probability and Bayesian decision theory about whether an agent can hold a meaningful credence about an upcoming action, while she deliberates about what to do. Can she believe that it is, say, 70% probable that she will do A, while she chooses whether to do A? No, say some philosophers, for Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction (DCOP), but others disagree. In this paper, we propose a valid core for DCOP, and identify terminological (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. added 2018-01-05
    Credal Pragmatism.Jie Gao - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
    According to doxastic pragmatism, certain perceived practical factors, such as high stakes and urgency, have systematic effects on normal subjects’ outright beliefs. Endorsement of doxastic pragmatism can be found in Weatherson (2005), Bach (2005, 2008, 2010), Ganson (2008) and Nagel (2008, 2010). Upholders of doxastic pragmatism have so far endorsed a particular version of this view, which we may call threshold pragmatism. This view holds that the sensitivity of belief to the relevant practical factors is due to a corresponding sensitivity (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  24. added 2017-10-19
    A Simpler and More Realistic Subjective Decision Theory.Haim Gaifman & Yang Liu - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4205–4241.
    In his classic book “the Foundations of Statistics” Savage developed a formal system of rational decision making. The system is based on (i) a set of possible states of the world, (ii) a set of consequences, (iii) a set of acts, which are functions from states to consequences, and (iv) a preference relation over the acts, which represents the preferences of an idealized rational agent. The goal and the culmination of the enterprise is a representation theorem: Any preference relation that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. added 2017-09-07
    Lying, Accuracy, and Credence.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):195-198.
    Traditional definitions of lying require that a speaker believe that what she asserts is false. Sam Fox Krauss seeks to jettison the traditional belief requirement in favour of a necessary condition given in a credence-accuracy framework, on which the liar expects to impose the risk of increased inaccuracy on the hearer. He argues that this necessary condition importantly captures nearby cases as lies which the traditional view neglects. I argue, however, that Krauss's own account suffers from an identical drawback of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2017-04-21
    General Dynamic Triviality Theorems.Jeffrey Sanford Russell & John Hawthorne - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (3):307-339.
    Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27. added 2017-04-11
    Beliefs Do Not Come in Degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.
    Philosophers commonly say that beliefs come in degrees. Drawing from the literature, I make precise three arguments for this claim: an argument from degrees of confidence, an argument from degrees of firmness, and an argument from natural language. I show that they all fail. I also advance three arguments that beliefs do not come in degrees: an argument from natural language, an argument from intuition, and an argument from the metaphysics of degrees. On the basis of these arguments, I conclude (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  28. added 2017-03-13
    A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (5):467-506.
    The standard representation theorem for expected utility theory tells us that if a subject’s preferences conform to certain axioms, then she can be represented as maximising her expected utility given a particular set of credences and utilities—and, moreover, that having those credences and utilities is the only way that she could be maximising her expected utility. However, the kinds of agents these theorems seem apt to tell us anything about are highly idealised, being always probabilistically coherent with infinitely precise degrees (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2017-03-06
    Deductive Cogency, Understanding, and Acceptance.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3121-3141.
    Deductive Cogency holds that the set of propositions towards which one has, or is prepared to have, a given type of propositional attitude should be consistent and closed under logical consequence. While there are many propositional attitudes that are not subject to this requirement, e.g. hoping and imagining, it is at least prima facie plausible that Deductive Cogency applies to the doxastic attitude involved in propositional knowledge, viz. belief. However, this thought is undermined by the well-known preface paradox, leading a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. added 2017-02-10
    A Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    In this paper, I present an argument for a rational norm involving a kind of credal attitude called a quantificational credence – the kind of attitude we can report by saying that Lucy thinks that each record in Schroeder’s collection is 5% likely to be scratched. I prove a result called a Dutch Book Theorem, which constitutes conditional support for the norm. Though Dutch Book Theorems exist for norms on ordinary and conditional credences, there is controversy about the epistemic significance (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. added 2017-01-21
    Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.
    Decision-making typically requires judgments about causal relations: we need to know the causal effects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. We investigate how several individuals' causal judgments can be aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments, and identify the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce the problem of causal-network aggregation. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. added 2017-01-16
    Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian James Weatherson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.
    In previous work I’ve defended an interest-relative theory of belief. This paper continues the defence. It has four aims. -/- 1. To offer a new kind of reason for being unsatis ed with the simple Lockean reduction of belief to credence. 2. To defend the legitimacy of appealing to credences in a theory of belief. 3. To illustrate the importance of theoretical, as well as practical, interests in an interest-relative account of belief. 4. To revise my account to cover propositions (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33. added 2016-12-21
    The Nature of Doubt and a New Puzzle About Belief, Doubt, and Confidence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1827-1848.
    In this paper, I present and defend a novel account of doubt. In Part 1, I make some preliminary observations about the nature of doubt. In Part 2, I introduce a new puzzle about the relationship between three psychological states: doubt, belief, and confidence. I present this puzzle because my account of doubt emerges as a possible solution to it. Lastly, in Part 3, I elaborate on and defend my account of doubt. Roughly, one has doubt if and only if (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  34. added 2016-12-13
    The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016.Michael Starks - 2016 - Michael Starks.
    This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and the most important and longest within the last year. Also I have edited them to bring them up to date (2016). The copyright page has the date of this first edition and new editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2016-12-01
    A Theory of Bayesian Groups.Franz Dietrich - manuscript
    A group is often construed as a single agent with its own probabilistic beliefs (credences), which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance through averaging. In their celebrated contribution “Groupthink”, Russell et al. (2015) apply the Bayesian paradigm to groups by requiring group credences to undergo a Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever the individual credences undergo a Bayesian revision based on this information. Bayesians should often strengthen this requirement by extending it to non-public (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. added 2016-09-28
    Imprecise Probability and Higher Order Vagueness.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):257-273.
    There is a trade-off between specificity and accuracy in existing models of belief. Descriptions of agents in the tripartite model, which recognizes only three doxastic attitudes—belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment—are typically accurate, but not sufficiently specific. The orthodox Bayesian model, which requires real-valued credences, is perfectly specific, but often inaccurate: we often lack precise credences. I argue, first, that a popular attempt to fix the Bayesian model by using sets of functions is also inaccurate, since it requires us to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. added 2016-08-27
    Against Deductive Closure.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):103-119.
    The present article illustrates a conflict between the claim that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences, and a very inclusive claim about the factors that are sufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions. Inasmuch as it is implausible to hold that the factors listed here are insufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions, we have good reason to deny that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  38. added 2016-08-27
    On the False Ontological Consensus.Mudyń Krzysztof - 2015 - Polish Psychological Bulletin 46 (2):160-173.
    The objective of the research was to check whether False Consensus Effect (FCE), shown in much research,is also valid for ontological decisions. Test participants, faced with an ontological dilemma, made a choice three times,which of the 3 item set (Cracow City, Me myself, the Universe) refers to something most real. The research conducted first among psychology students (N=116), then replicated on mathematics students (N=126) and middle-aged people (N=106). Results: 1) All groups chose the Universe most seldom (4%-11% subjects), the remaining (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2016-08-16
    Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2016 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  40. added 2016-06-28
    Preface Writers Are Consistent.Roger Clarke - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    The preface paradox does not show that it can be rational to have inconsistent beliefs, because preface writers do not have inconsistent beliefs. I argue, first, that a fully satisfactory solution to the preface paradox would have it that the preface writer's beliefs are consistent. The case here is on basic intuitive grounds, not the consequence of a theory of rationality or of belief. Second, I point out that there is an independently motivated theory of belief – sensitivism – which (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. added 2016-04-22
    Lying and Certainty.Neri Marsili - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford University Press. pp. 170-182.
    In the philosophical literature on the definition of lying, the analysis is generally restricted to cases of flat-out belief. This chapter considers the complex phenomenon of lies involving partial beliefs – beliefs ranging from mere uncertainty to absolute certainty. The first section analyses lies uttered while holding a graded belief in the falsity of the assertion, and presents a revised insincerity condition, requiring that the liar believes the assertion to be more likely to be false than true. The second section (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. added 2016-04-20
    What is (Dis)Agreement?Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):223-236.
    When do we agree? The answer might once have seemed simple and obvious; we agree that p when we each believe that p. But from a formal epistemological perspective, where degrees of belief are more fundamental than beliefs, this answer is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, there is reason to suppose that it is false; degrees of belief about p might differ when beliefs simpliciter on p do not. On the other hand, even if it is true, it is too (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. added 2016-01-13
    Frank Plumpton Ramsey.Brad Armendt - 2005 - In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge. pp. 671-681.
    On the work of Frank Ramsey, emphasizing topics most relevant to philosophy of science.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. added 2015-12-25
    Reliabilism and the Suspension of Belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):362-377.
    What are the conditions under which suspension of belief—or suspension, for short—is justified? Process reliabilists hold that our beliefs are justified if and only if these are produced or sustained by reliable cognitive processes. But they have said relatively little about suspension. Perhaps they think that we may easily extend an account of justified belief to deal with justified suspension. But it's not immediately clear how we may do so; in which case, evidentialism has a distinct advantage over reliabilism. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. added 2015-11-13
    How Might Degrees of Belief Shift? On Action Conflicting with Professed Beliefs.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):732-742.
    People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions. But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. added 2015-09-13
    Stake-Invariant Belief.Brad Armendt - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):29-43.
    What can rational deliberation indicate about belief? Belief clearly influences deliberation. The principle that rational belief is stake-invariant rules out at least one way that deliberation might influence belief. The principle is widely, if implicitly, held in work on the epistemology of categorical belief, and it is built into the model of choice-guiding degrees of belief that comes to us from Ramsey and de Finetti. Criticisms of subjective probabilism include challenges to the assumption of additive values (the package principle) employed (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  47. added 2015-09-12
    Pragmatic Interests and Imprecise Belief.Brad Armendt - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):758-768.
    Does the strength of a particular belief depend upon the significance we attach to it? Do we move from one context to another, remaining in the same doxastic state concerning p yet holding a stronger belief that p in one context than in the other? For that to be so, a doxastic state must have a certain sort of context-sensitive complexity. So the question is about the nature of belief states, as we understand them, or as we think a theory (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. added 2015-09-12
    Dutch Books, Additivity, and Utility Theory.Brad Armendt - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):1-20.
    One guide to an argument's significance is the number and variety of refutations it attracts. By this measure, the Dutch book argument has considerable importance.2 Of course this measure alone is not a sure guide to locating arguments deserving of our attention—if a decisive refutation has really been given, we are better off pursuing other topics. But the presence of many and varied counterarguments at least suggests that either the refutations are controversial, or that their target admits of more than (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  49. added 2015-08-20
    The Tale of Bella and Creda.Scott Sturgeon - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Some philosophers defend the view that epistemic agents believe by lending credence. Others defend the view that such agents lend credence by believing. It can strongly appear that the disagreement between them is notational, that nothing of substance turns on whether we are agents of one sort or the other. But that is demonstrably not so. Only one of these types of epistemic agent, at most, could manifest a human-like configuration of attitudes; and it turns out that not both types (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  50. added 2015-06-17
    Acceptance, Aggregation and Scoring Rules.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):201-217.
    As the ongoing literature on the paradoxes of the Lottery and the Preface reminds us, the nature of the relation between probability and rational acceptability remains far from settled. This article provides a novel perspective on the matter by exploiting a recently noted structural parallel with the problem of judgment aggregation. After offering a number of general desiderata on the relation between finite probability models and sets of accepted sentences in a Boolean sentential language, it is noted that a number (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
1 — 50 / 71