- Two-Context Probabilism and the Dissolution of the 'Lottery' Problem.Gregor Flock - manuscriptdetails
- On Accuracy and Coherence with Infinite Opinion Sets.Mikayla Kelley - manuscriptdetails
- The Limits of Partial Doxasticism.Facundo M. Alonso - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
- Moral Hazard, the Savage Framework, and State-Dependent Utility.Jean Baccelli - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
- The Problem of State-Dependent Utility: A Reappraisal.Jean Baccelli - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axz024.details
- How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs: Probability, Quasi-Dogmatism and Contextualism.Stefano Bonzio, Gustavo Cevolani & Tommaso Flaminio - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.details
- A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.details
- The Relation Between Degrees of Belief and Binary Beliefs: A General Impossibility Theorem.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - forthcoming - In Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief. Essays on the Lottery Paradox.details
- Comparativism and the Measurement of Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-28.details
- Betting Against the Zen Monk: On Preferences and Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.details
- What is 'Real' in Interpersonal Comparisons of Confidence.Edward J. R. Elliott - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
- Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge.details
- Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
- Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.details
- The Epistemology of Disagreement: Why Not Bayesianism?Thomas Mulligan - forthcoming - Episteme.details
- Accuracy-Dominance and Conditionalization.Michael Nielsen - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.details
- On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Noûs.details
- How Can Experiences Explain Uncertainty?Susanna Siegel - forthcoming - Mind and Language.details
- A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence.David Builes - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):113-127.details
- ‘Ramseyfying’ Probabilistic Comparativism.Edward Elliott - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (4):727-754.details
- The Logic of Conditional Belief.Benjamin Eva - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):759-779.details
- Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence.Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2020 - Theoria 86 (4):500-527.details
- Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
- Teaching & Learning Guide For: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6).details
- The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
- Two-State Solution to the Lottery Paradox.Artūrs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
- Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
- Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
- Reasons Fundamentalism and Rational Uncertainty – Comments on Lord, The Importance of Being Rational.Julia Staffel - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):463-468.details
- The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief.Paul D. Thorn - 2020 - Synthese 197 (12):5389-5409.details
- Deliberation and Pragmatic Belief.Brad Armendt - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.details
- Sure-Wins Under Coherence: A Geometrical Perspective.Stefano Bonzio, Tommaso Flaminio & Paolo Galeazzi - 2019 - In Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty. ECSQARU 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.details
- A Theory of Bayesian Groups.Franz Dietrich - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):708-736.details
- Impossible Worlds and Partial Belief.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Synthese 196 (8):3433-3458.details
- Great Expectations: Belief and the Case for Pragmatic Encroachment.Dorit Ganson - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.details
- Credal Pragmatism.Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617.details
- How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
- Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
- Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
- Belief, Credence, and Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (2):153-168.details
- Heart of DARCness.Yang Liu & Huw Price - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):136-150.details
- Immoral Lies and Partial Beliefs.Neri Marsili - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-11.details
- A New Puzzle About Belief and Credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
- Counterexamples to Some Characterizations of Dilation.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2019 - Erkenntnis:1-12.details
- Credences and Suspended Judgments as Transitional Attitudes.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):281-294.details
- How Do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
- Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.details
- Lying, Accuracy and Credence.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):195-198.details
- Deductive Cogency, Understanding, and Acceptance.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3121-3141.details
- From Degrees of Belief to Binary Beliefs: Lessons From Judgment-Aggregation Theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (5):225-270.details
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