Counterfactuals and their Truthmakers

Polish Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):7-24 (2014)
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This article compares David Lewis’s understanding of counterfactuals with a Platonic theory of counterfactual truthmakers. By pointing to some weaknesses in Lewis’s theory, it will highlight some of the strengths of the Platonic theory. The article will progress in the following way. First, I present David Lewis’s understanding of counterfactuals, and discuss some problems the theory has. Next, I discuss Platonic truthmakers, in general, and then show how this applies to counterfactuals. Finally, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the Platonic theory, and how it is superior to Lewis’s theory.

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Joshua Anderson
Virginia State University


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