Truthmakers

Edited by Jamin Asay (University of Hong Kong)
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  1. added 2020-07-08
    Review of "Truth". [REVIEW]Benjamin W. Jarvis - 2013 - Essays in Philosophy 14 (2):13.
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  2. added 2020-06-01
    Truthmaker Semantics for Natural Language: Attitude Verbs, Modals, and Intensional Transitive Verbs.Friederike Moltmann - forthcoming - Theoretical Linguistics.
    This paper gives an outline of truthmaker semantics for natural language against the background of standard possible-worlds semantics. It develops a truthmaker semantics for attitude reports and deontic modals based on an ontology of attitudinal and modal objects and on a semantic function of clauses as predicates of such objects. It also présents new motivations for 'object-based truthmaker semantics' from intensional transitive verbs such as ‘need’, ‘look for’, ‘own’, and ‘buy’ and gives an outline of their semantics.
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  3. added 2020-03-17
    O dilema presentista.Matheus Diesel Werberich - 2019 - Em Curso 6 (1):105-114.
    The aim of the present paper is to show that presentism cannot answer the truthmaker objection in a satisfactory manner. For such, two main categories of presentist solutions were studied: the first kind states that truthmakers can’t provide any objection to presentism, while the second type tries to ground past truths by postulating new ontological categories, which were rejected, mainly because of their use of ad hoc ontologies. Also, I showed how the presentist should adopt antirealism about the past in (...)
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  4. added 2020-01-21
    Truthmaking.Kelly Trogdon - forthcoming - In Michael J. Raven (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding. Routledge.
    Discussion of grounding-theoretic accounts of truthmaking in terms of the theoretical role of “catching cheaters”.
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  5. added 2019-11-26
    On Weak Truthmaking.Nicola Guarino, Daniele Porello & Giancarlo Guizzardi - 2019 - In Adrien Barton, Selja Seppälä & Daniele Porello (eds.), Proceedings of the Joint Ontology Workshops 2019. CEUR Workshop Proceedings.
    Informally speaking, a truthmaker is something in the world in virtue of which the sentences of a language can be made true. This fundamental philosophical notion plays a central role in applied ontology. In particular, a recent nonorthodox formulation of this notion proposed by the philosopher Josh Parsons, which we labelled weak truthamking, has been shown to be extremely useful in addressing a number of classical problems in the area of Conceptual Modeling. In this paper, after revisiting the classical notion (...)
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  6. added 2019-11-20
    Introducción a la Metafísica.Samuele Chilovi - forthcoming - In D. Lagier & G. Lariguet (eds.), Filosofía para Juristas. Una Introducción.
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  7. added 2019-11-07
    Taking the Metaphysics of Knowledge Seriously: A Response to the Paper of Sven Bernecker.Joachim Horvath - 2015 - In Andreas Speer, Wolfram Hogrebe & Markus Gabriel (eds.), Das Neue Bedürfnis Nach Metaphysik / the New Desire for Metaphysics. De Gruyter. pp. 181-188.
    In his “On the Metaphysics of Knowledge” (this volume), Sven Bernecker presents a novel ‘identificationist’ account of knowledge. In this paper, I will not directly address the epistemological adequacy of Bernecker’s identificationism. Rather, I want to focus on its substantial metaphysical commitments, especially on the problematic idea that our epistemic reasons identify the truthmaker of our respective belief when we know something. My conclusion will be that being a truthmaker for p is metaphysically more demanding than being an epistemic reason (...)
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  8. added 2019-11-07
    Moments as Truth Makers.Peter Simons - 1982 - In Werner Leinfellner (ed.), Language and Ontology. Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky. pp. 159-161.
    Russell wrote in 1918 in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism: -/- When I speak of a fact ... I mean the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false. If I say 'It is raining', what I say is true in a certain condition of weather and is false in other conditions of the weather. The condition of weather that makes my state­ment true (or false as the case may be), is what I should call a 'fact'. If (...)
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  9. added 2019-10-10
    On Armstrong’s Difficulties with Adequate Truthmaking Restrictions.Brannon McDaniel - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:145-156.
    D. M. Armstrong rejects various ontologies that posit truths without truthmakers. But, lest proponents of such questionable ontologies postulate suspicious truthmakers in a bid to regain ontological respectability, Armstrong requires a plausible restriction on truthmaking that eliminates such ontologies. I discuss three different candidate restrictions: categorical, natural, and intrinsic difference-making. While the categorical and natural restrictions eliminate the questionable ontologies, they also eliminate Armstrong’s own ontology. The intrinsic difference-making restriction, on the other hand, fails to eliminate any of them. Thus (...)
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  10. added 2019-09-19
    Truthmaking and the Mysteries of Emergence.Kevin Morris - 2018 - In Elly Vintiadis & Constantinos Mekios (eds.), Brute Facts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The concept of truthmaking, the idea that when a statement is true, there is typically something about the world in virtue of which it is true, has garnered much interest in recent metaphysics. Often, the motivation has been the thought that truthmaking can provide a new perspective on an important issue. This paper evaluates the claim that truthmaking can play a substantive role in defining an unproblematic notion of emergence. For despite playing an important role in philosophical discourse over the (...)
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  11. added 2019-09-12
    Presentism and Cross-Time Relations.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2019 - In Patrick Blackburn, Per Hasle & Peter Ohrstrom (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Time: Further Themes from Prior, Vol. 2. Aalborg, Denmark: pp. 53–72.
    This paper is a partial defence of presentism against the argument from cross-time relations. It is argued, first, that the Aristotelian view of causation and persistence does not really depict these phenomena in terms of relations between entities existing at different times, and indeed excludes the possibility of such cross-time relations obtaining. Second, it is argued that to reject the existence of the past—and thereby be unable to ground the truth of claims about the past—does not lead to any absurd (...)
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  12. added 2019-08-26
    Truthmakers Against Correspondence.Jamin Asay - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (2):271-293.
    Many philosophers think truthmaker theory offers a correspondence theory of truth. Despite the similarities, however, this identification cannot be correct. Truthmaker theory offers no theory of truth, nor can it be employed to offer an acceptable substantive theory of truth. Instead, truthmaker theory takes truth for granted. Though truthmaker theory is not a correspondence theory, it shares with it the same motivational basis—that truth is worldly—and better accounts for what is pre-theoretically compelling about correspondence theories. As a result, those at (...)
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  13. added 2019-08-06
    A Short Argument for Truthmaker Maximalism.Mark Jago - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):40-44.
    Each truth has a truthmaker: an entity in virtue of whose existence that truth is true. So say truthmaker maximalists. Arguments for maximalism are hard to find, whereas those against are legion. Most accept that maximalism comes at a significant cost, which many judge to be too high. The scales would seem to be balanced against maximalism. Yet, as I show here, maximalism can be derived from an acceptable premise which many will pre-theoretically accept.
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  14. added 2019-07-13
    Truth­-Makers.Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith - 2009 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.
    During the realist revival in the early years of this century, philosophers of various persuasions were concerned to investigate the ontology of truth. That is, whether or not they viewed truth as a correspondence, they were interested in the extent to which one needed to assume the existence of entities serving some role in accounting for the truth of sentences. Certain of these entities, such as the Sätze an sich of Bolzano, the Gedanken of Frege, or the propositions of Russell (...)
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  15. added 2019-04-04
    Presentism Without Truth-Makers.Barry Ward - forthcoming - Chronos.
    We construct a presentist semantics on which there are no truth-makers for past and future tensed statements. The semantics is not an expressivist or projectivist one, and is not susceptible to the semantical difficulties that confront such theories. We discuss how the approach handles some standard concerns with presentism.
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  16. added 2019-03-19
    Review of Douglas Edwards, The Metaphysics of Truth. [REVIEW]Mark Jago - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):970–976.
    The Metaphysics of Truth, by EdwardsDouglas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 208.
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  17. added 2019-01-22
    Truth and Truthmakers. [REVIEW]Peter Alward - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (17):74-78.
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  18. added 2019-01-19
    Much Ado About Aboutness.Sam Baron, Reginald Mary Chua, Kristie Miller & James Norton - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-29.
    Strong non-maximalism holds that some truths require no ontological ground of any sort. Strong non-maximalism allows one to accept that some propositions are true without being forced to endorse any corresponding ontological commitments. We show that there is a version of truthmaker theory available—anti-aboutness truthmaking—that enjoys the dialectical benefits of the strong non-maximalist’s position. According to anti-aboutness truthmaking, all truths require grounds, but a proposition need not be grounded in the very thing(s) that the proposition is about. We argue that (...)
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  19. added 2018-12-30
    Barry Smith an Sich.Gerald J. Erion & Gloria Zúñiga Y. Postigo (eds.) - 2017 - Cosmos + Taxis.
    Festschrift in Honor of Barry Smith on the occasion of his 65th Birthday. Published as issue 4:4 of the journal Cosmos + Taxis: Studies in Emergent Order and Organization. Includes contributions by Wolfgang Grassl, Nicola Guarino, John T. Kearns, Rudolf Lüthe, Luc Schneider, Peter Simons, Wojciech Żełaniec, and Jan Woleński.
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  20. added 2018-12-30
    Relationships and Events: Towards a General Theory of Reification and Truthmaking.Nicola Guarino & Giancarlo Guizzardi - 2016 - In Advances in Artificial Intelligence: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence. pp. 237-249.
    We propose a novel ontological analysis of relations and relationships based on a re-visitation of a classic problem in the practice of knowledge repre- sentation and conceptual modeling, namely relationship reification. Our idea is that a relation holds in virtue of a relationship's existence. Relationships are therefore truthmakers of relations. In this paper we present a general theory or reification and truthmaking, and discuss the interplay between events and rela- tionships, suggesting that relationships are the focus of events, which emerge (...)
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  21. added 2018-12-17
    On the Metaphysics of Knowledge.Sven Bernecker - 2015 - In Markus Gabriel, Wolfram Hogrebe & Andreas Speer (eds.), Das Neue Bedürfnis Nach Metaphysik / the New Desire for Metaphysics. De Gruyter. pp. 161-180.
    This paper argues for an overlooked dimension in the metaphysical microstructure of knowledge. The connection between knowledge and truth is even deeper than generally acknowledged. Knowledge, I argue, supervenes not only on a specific (namely modal) relation between the proposition p’s truth and an agent’s belief that p, but also on specific relations between the proposition’s truthmaker and the belief’s justification-maker. S knows that p only if the states of affairs referred to by S’s reasons for believing that p are (...)
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  22. added 2018-12-17
    La vérité et le champ visuel.Barry Smith - 2002 - In Jean-Michel Roy, Jean Francisco J. Varela & Bernard Pachoud (eds.), Naturaliser la phénoménologie: Husserlianisme et science cognitive. Paris: CNRS Editions. pp. 411-426.
    La présente étude utilise les outils du domaine de la méréotopologie (la théorie des parts, ensembles et frontières) pour élaborer les implications de certaines analogies entre la 'psychologie écologique' de J.J.Gibson et la phénoménologie de Edmund Husserl. On présentera une théorie ontologique de frontières spatiales et des entités possédant une extension spatiale. S'en rapportant aux exemples de la sphère de géographie, on démontre qu'aussi bien les frontières que les entités à extension spatiale appartiennent à deux vastes catégories: des objets qui (...)
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  23. added 2018-11-15
    Essential Truths and Their Truth-Grounds.Robert Michels - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:790-815.
    This paper motivates and defends a principle which captures a systematic connection between essence, truth, and grounding. It says that if a proposition expresses an essential truth, i.e., if it is true in virtue of the nature of some objects, then there are grounds for its truth which involve these objects. Together with the assumption that a fact can only be grounded in facts which are relevant to it, this principle is then applied in an argument against the monotonicity of (...)
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  24. added 2018-09-20
    Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):1-21.
    In this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a ‘deflationary’ attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflationary truth and deflationary truthmaking, and then show how the latter can be found in (...)
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  25. added 2018-08-27
    Three Problems with Metaethical Minimalism.Raff Donelson - 2018 - Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (1):125-131.
    Metaethical minimalism. sometimes called quietism, is the view that first-order moral judgments can be true but nothing makes them true. This article raises three worries for that view. First, minimalists have no good reason to insist that moral judgments can be true. Second, minimalism, in abandoning the requirement that true judgments need to have truthmakers, leads to a problematic proliferation of truths. Third, most versions of minimalism entail a disjointed and therefore unacceptable theory of language and thought.
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  26. added 2018-08-07
    Is a Metaphysical Theory of Truthmakers Possible?Josh Parsons - manuscript
    Truthmaker theorists typically claim not only that all truths have truthmakers (Truthmaker Maximalism), but also that there is some enlightening metaphysical theory to be given of the nature of those truthmakers (e.g. that they are Armstrongian states of affairs, or tropes, or concrete individuals). Call this latter thesis the "Material Theory Thesis" (it is the thesis that there is some true material theory of truthmakers). I argue that the Material Theory Thesis is inconsistent with Truthmaker Maximalism.
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  27. added 2018-06-05
    The Universe As We Find It. By John Heil. [REVIEW]Tuomas E. Tahko - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):1095-1098.
    Book review of 'The Universe As We Find It' (2012, OUP). By John Heil.
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  28. added 2018-04-24
    God as Ultimate Truthmaker.Paul Clavier - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (1):67-80.
    Theories of truthmaking have been introduced quite recently in epistemology. Having little to do with truth serums, or truths drugs, their concern is to define truth in terms of a certain relation between truthbearers and truthmakers. Those theories make an attempt to remedy what is supposed to be lacking in classical theories of truth, especially in Alfred Tarski’s semantic theory.
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  29. added 2018-02-27
    Molnar on Truthmakers for Negative Truths.Nils Kürbis - 2018 - Metaphysica 19 (2):251-257.
    Molnar argues that the problem of truthmakers for negative truths arises because we tend to accept four metaphysical principles that entail that all negative truths have positive truthmakers. This conclusion, however, already follows from only three of Molnar´s metaphysical principles. One purpose of this note is to set the record straight. I provide an alternative reading of two of Molnar´s principles on which they are all needed to derive the desired conclusion. Furthermore, according to Molnar, the four principles may be (...)
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  30. added 2018-01-28
    Relevance Without Minimality.Stephen Yablo - forthcoming - In Andy Egan & Dirk Kindermann (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  31. added 2018-01-23
    The New Growing Block Theory Vs Presentism.Kristie Miller - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):223-251.
    It was once held to be a virtue of the growing block theory that it combines temporal dynamism with a straightforward account of in virtue of what past-tensed propositions are true, and an explanation for why some future-tensed propositions are not true (assuming they are not). This put the growing block theory ahead of its principal dynamist rival: presentism. Recently, new growing block theorists have suggested that what makes true, past-tensed propositions, is not the same kind of thing as what (...)
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  32. added 2018-01-23
    II—Resemblance Nominalism, Conjunctions and Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):21-38.
    The resemblance nominalist says that the truthmaker of 〈Socrates is white〉 ultimately involves only concrete particulars that resemble each other. Furthermore he also says that Socrates and Plato are the truthmakers of 〈Socrates resembles Plato〉, and Socrates and Aristotle those of 〈Socrates resembles Aristotle〉. But this, combined with a principle about the truthmakers of conjunctions, leads to the apparently implausible conclusion that 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle〉 and 〈Socrates resembles Plato and Plato resembles Aristotle〉 have the same truthmakers, (...)
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  33. added 2018-01-23
    Chapter 5: Intensional Transitive Verbs and Their 'Objects'.Friederike Moltmann - 2013 - In Abstract Objects and the semantics of Natural Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This chapter gives a truthmaker-based account of the semantics of 'reifying' quantifiers like 'something' when they act as complements of intensional transitive verbs ('need', 'look for'). It argues that such quantifiers range over 'variable satisfiers' of the attitudinal object described by the verb (e.g. the need or the search).
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  34. added 2017-12-15
    The Scope of the Truthmakers Requirement.Adam Lovett - 2014 - Romanian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2):23-39.
    Truths require truthmakers, many think. In this paper I will discuss the scope of this requirement. Truthmaker maximalism is the claim that, necessarily, all truths require truthmakers. I shall argue against this claim. I shall argue against it on the basis of its implications. I shall first consider its implications when applied to synthetic, contingent propositions. If the truthmaker requirement applies to these propositions, so I shall argue, it is not possible for there to be nothing, and it is not (...)
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  35. added 2017-12-10
    La verità e il campo visivo.Barry Smith - 1999 - Paradigmi 17:49-62.
    L'articolo usa la teoria delle parti, del tutto e dei contomi per elaborare alcune relazioni cruciali tra la «psicologia ecologica» di J.J. Gibson e la fenomenologia di Husserl. Presenta, inoltre, una teoria ontologica dei contomi spaziali e delle entita spazialmente estese, applicandola al cam po visivo, qui concepito come un' entita spazialmente estesa dipendente dal soggetto che percepisce. Su questa base e possibile formulare un nuovo tipo di definizione teoretico-correspondentista della verita per gli enunciati del linguaggio naturale.
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  36. added 2017-11-23
    The Role of Truth in Psychological Science.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Theory and Psychology 28 (3):382-397.
    In a recent paper, Haig and Borsboom explore the relevance of the theory of truth for psychological science. Although they conclude that correspondence theories of truth are best suited to offer the resources for making sense of scientific practice, they leave open the possibility that other theories might accomplish those same ends. I argue that deflationary theories of truth, which deny that there is any substantive property that unifies the class of truths, makes equally good sense of scientific practice as (...)
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  37. added 2017-11-20
    Challenging the Grounding Objection to Presentism.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (1):87-107.
    The grounding objection to presentism rests on two premises: (i) every true proposition P has a truthmaker T, and (ii) some claims about the future and past are obviously true. However, if the future and past do not exist, there can be no truthmakers for future and past tensed expressions. Presentists tend not to challenge the premises of the objection. Instead they argue that the present contains all the truthmakers we need. Presentists should challenge the premises instead. First, finding truthmakers (...)
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  38. added 2017-08-05
    Une théorie unifiée de la vérité et de la référence.Barry Smith & Berit Brogaard - 2004 - In J. M. Monnoyer (ed.), La Structure du Monde: Objets, Propriétés, États du Choses. Paris: Vrin. pp. 141-184.
    The truthmaker theory rests on the thesis that the link between a true judgment and that in the world to which it corresponds is not a one-to-one but rather a one-to-many relation. An analogous thesis in relation to the link between a singular term and that in the world to which it refers is already widely accepted. This is the thesis to the effect that singular reference is marked by vagueness of a sort that is best understood in supervaluationist terms. (...)
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  39. added 2017-07-21
    Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and the AHA! Experience.John Joseph Dorsch - 2016 - Phenomenology and Mind 10:108-121.
    Elijah Chudnoff’s case for irreducible cognitive phenomenology hinges on seeming to see the truth of a mathematical proposition (Chudnoff 2015). In the following, I develop an augmented version of Chudnoff’s case, not based on seeming to see, or intuition, but based on being in a state with presentational phenomenology of high-level content. In contrast to other cases for cognitive phenomenology, those based on Strawson’s case (Strawson 2011), I argue that the case presented here is able to withstand counterarguments, which attempt (...)
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  40. added 2017-03-24
    We Don’T Need No Explanation.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):903-921.
    Explanation has played myriad roles in truthmaker theory. The notion of explanation is sometimes thought to give content to the very idea of truthmaking, and is sometimes used as a weapon to undermine the entire point of truthmaker theory. I argue that the notion of explanation is dialectically useless in truthmaker theory: while it’s true that truthmaking offers a form of explanation, this claim is theoretically unilluminating, and leaves truthmaker theorists vulnerable to various kinds of attack. I advocate an alternative (...)
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  41. added 2017-02-05
    Algumas observações introdutórias sobre o princípio de veritação.César Schirmer dos Santos - 2016 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 20 (2):201-214.
    The truth-making principle is one of the main subjects in contemporary meta- physics, and this paper is an elementar exposition of the main issues of the on-going debate. I will proceed as follows. First, I will expose the basics, including the principle’s range, the main kinds of truth-making, the main interpretations of the principle, and some applications. Second, I will expose some technical issues about ontological commitment, reification, necessity, reality, and truth.
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  42. added 2017-01-03
    Grounding the Unreal.Louis DeRosset - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):535-563.
    The scientific successes of the last 400 years strongly suggest a picture on which our scientific theories exhibit a layered structure of dependence and determination. Economics is dependent on and determined by psychology; psychology in its turn is, plausibly, dependent on and determined by biology; and so it goes. It is tempting to explain this layered structure of dependence and determination among our theories by appeal to a corresponding layered structure of dependence and determination among the entities putatively treated by (...)
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  43. added 2016-12-12
    Truthmaking and Fundamentality.A. R. J. Fisher - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):448-473.
    I apply the notion of truthmaking to the topic of fundamentality by articulating a truthmaker theory of fundamentality according to which some truths are truth-grounded in certain entities while the ones that don't stand in a metaphysical-semantic relation to the truths that do. I motivate this view by critically discussing two problems with Ross Cameron's truthmaker theory of fundamentality. I then defend this view against Theodore Sider's objection that the truthmaking approach to fundamentality violates the purity constraint. Truthmaker theorists can (...)
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  44. added 2016-12-08
    The Disjunction and Conjunction Theses.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):427-443.
    This paper is a response to replies by Dan López de Sa and Mark Jago to my ‘Truthmaking, Entailment, and the Conjuction Thesis’. In that paper, my main aim was to argue against the Entailment Principle by arguing against the Conjunction Thesis, which is entailed by the Entailment Principle. In the course of so doing, although not essential for my project in that paper, I defended the Disjunction Thesis. López de Sa has objected both to my defence of the Disjunction (...)
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  45. added 2016-11-15
    Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions.Mark Jago - 2017 - Argumenta 2 (2):293-308.
    Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness.
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  46. added 2016-10-14
    Run Aground: Kit Fine’s Critique of Truthmaker Theory.Jamin Asay - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268):443-463.
    Kit Fine, the leading proponent of the metaphysical project of grounding theory, has offered a number of potentially devastating objections to truthmaker theory, the branch of metaphysics dedicated to exploring the ontological grounds for truths. In this paper I show what presuppositions about truthmaker theory Fine’s objections are based upon, and why they are false. I discuss four objections that Fine raises, and demonstrate how truthmaker theorists may respond to them. I then showcase the positive contribution that truthmaker theory can (...)
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  47. added 2016-09-11
    Thisnesses, Propositions, and Truth.David Ingram - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):442-463.
    Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, should accept a thisness ontology, since it can do considerable work in defence of presentism. In this paper, I propose a version of presentism that involves thisnesses of past and present entities and I argue this view solves important problems facing standard versions of presentism.
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  48. added 2016-08-23
    The Facts About Truthmaking: An Argument for Truthmaker Necessitarianism.Jamin Asay - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3:493-500.
    Truthmaker necessitarianism is the view that an object is a truthmaker for a truth-bearer only if it is impossible for the object to exist and the truth-bearer be false. While this thesis is widely regarded as truthmaking "orthodoxy", it is rarely explicitly defended. In this paper I offer an argument in favor of necessitarianism that raises the question of what the truthmakers are for the truths about truthmaking. The supposed advantages of non-necessitarianism dissolve once we take these truths into account.
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  49. added 2016-08-19
    Aboutness: Towards Foundations for the Information Artifact Ontology.Werner Ceusters & Barry Smith - 2015 - In Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Biomedical Ontology (ICBO). CEUR vol. 1515. pp. 1-5.
    The Information Artifact Ontology (IAO) was created to serve as a domain‐neutral resource for the representation of types of information content entities (ICEs) such as documents, data‐bases, and digital im‐ages. We identify a series of problems with the current version of the IAO and suggest solutions designed to advance our understanding of the relations between ICEs and associated cognitive representations in the minds of human subjects. This requires embedding IAO in a larger framework of ontologies, including most importantly the Mental (...)
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  50. added 2016-08-01
    Fundamentality And Modal Freedom.Jennifer Wang - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):397-418.
    A fundamental entity is an entity that is ‘ontologically independent’; it does not depend on anything else for its existence or essence. It seems to follow that a fundamental entity is ‘modally free’ in some sense. This assumption, that fundamentality entails modal freedom (or ‘FEMF’ as I shall label the thesis), is used in the service of other arguments in metaphysics. But as I will argue, the road from fundamentality to modal freedom is not so straightforward. The defender of FEMF (...)
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