Gender Identity and Exclusion: A Reply to Jenkins

Ethics 127 (4):883-895 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A theory of gender ought to be compatible with trans-inclusive definitions of gender identity terms, such as ‘woman’ and ‘man’. Appealing to this principle of trans-inclusion, Katharine Jenkins argues that we ought to endorse a dual social position and identity theory of gender. Here, I argue that Jenkins’s dual theory of gender fails to be trans-inclusive for the following reasons: it cannot generate a definition of ‘woman’ that extends to include all trans women, and it understands transgender gender identity through a cisgender frame.

Author's Profile

Matthew Andler
Saint Louis University, Madrid Campus

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-03-16

Downloads
2,795 (#2,249)

6 months
474 (#2,445)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?