Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):904-911 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have an unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.

Author's Profile

James Andow
University of East Anglia

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-01-08

Downloads
726 (#10,084)

6 months
30 (#34,064)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?