Transparency and the Phenomenology of Extended Cognition

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Extended cognition brings with it a particular phenomenology. It has been argued that when an artifact is integrated into an agent’s cognitive system, it becomes transparent in use to the cognizing subject. In this paper, I challenge some of the assumptions underlying how the transparency of artifacts is described in extended cognition theory. To this end, I offer two arguments. First, I make room for some forms of conscious thought and attention within extended cognitive routines, and I question the close association drawn between attention and effort. Second, I vindicate the importance of paying careful attention to individual differences and the diverse ways in which bodies and technologies can be experienced. I end by offering some hints toward an alternative, and more accurate, account of the phenomenology of extended cognition.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-12-14
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
79 ( #48,675 of 2,449,002 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
21 ( #30,421 of 2,449,002 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.