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  1. How the Brain Makes Up the Mind: A Heuristic Approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Dan Bruiger - manuscript
    A solution to the “hard problem” requires taking the point of view of the organism and its sub- agents. The organism constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that are assigned meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history. Phenomenality is a virtual representation, made to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self), which is tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future (...)
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  2. Walking in the Shoes of the Brain: An "Agent" Approach to Phenomenality and the Problem of Consciousness.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    Abstract: Given an embodied evolutionary context, the (conscious) organism creates phenomenality and establishes a first-person point of view with its own agency, through intentional relations made by its own acts of fiat, in the same way that human observers create meaning in language.
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  3. The Intention of Intention.Ramón Casares - manuscript
    For Putnam in "Representation and Reality", there cannot be any intentional science, thus dooming cognitive science. His argument is that intentional concepts are functional, and that functionalism cannot explain anything because "everything has every functional organization", providing a proof. Analyzing his proof, we find that Putnam is assuming an ideal interpreting subject who can compute effortlessly and who is not intentional. But the subject doing science is a human being, and we are not that way. Therefore, in order to save (...)
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  4. Anchoring Empathy in Receptivity.Seisuke Hayakawa & Katsunori Miyahara - manuscript
    In one sense of the term, empathy refers to the act of sharing in another person’s experience of and perspective on the world. According to simulation accounts of empathy, we achieve this by replicating the other’s mind in our imagination. We explore a form of empathy, empathic perspective-taking, that is not adequately captured by existing simulationist approaches. We begin by pointing out that we often achieve empathy (or share in another’s perspective) by listening to the other person. This form of (...)
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  5. Extended Cognition, Extended Selection, and Developmental Systems Theory.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    I respond to Karola Stotz's criticisms of my previously published challenges to the inference from developmental systems theory to an extended view of cognition.
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  6. Individual Minds as Groups, Group Minds as Individuals.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    This is a long-abandoned draft, written in 2013, of what was supposed to be a paper for an edited collection (one that, in the end, didn't come together). The paper "Group Minds and Natural Kinds" descends from it.
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  7. Hostile Scaffolding.Ryan Timms & David Spurrett - manuscript
    Discussion of cognitive scaffolding is dominated by attention to ways that external structure can support cognitive activity or augment an agent’s cognitive capacities. We call instances where the interests of the user are served benign and argue for the possibility of hostile scaffolding. This is scaffolding which depends on the same capacities of an agent to rely on external structure, but that undermines or exploits that agent while serving the interests of another. We offer one defence of hostile scaffolding by (...)
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  8. Transparency and the Phenomenology of Extended Cognition.Gloria Andrada - forthcoming - Límite: Revista de Filosofía y Psicología.
    Extended cognition brings with it a particular phenomenology. It has been argued that when an artifact is integrated into an agent’s cognitive system, it becomes transparent in use to the cognizing subject. In this paper, I challenge some of the assumptions underlying how the transparency of artifacts is described in extended cognition theory. To this end, I offer two arguments. First, I make room for some forms of conscious thought and attention within extended cognitive routines, and I question the close (...)
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  9. Margins of Me: A Personal Story (Chapter 1 of The Peripheral Mind).István Aranyosi - forthcoming - In The Peripheral Mind. Philosophy of Mind and the Peripheral Nervous System. Oxford University Press.
    The author presents an autobiographical story of serious peripheral motor nerve damage resulting from chemotoxicity induced as a side effect of Hodgkin’s Lymphoma treatment. The first-person, phenomenological account of the condition naturally leads to philosophical questions about consciousness, felt presence of oneself all over and within one’s body, and the felt constitutiveness of peripheral processes to one’s mental life. The first-person data only fit well with a philosophical approach to the mind that takes peripheral, bodily events and states at their (...)
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  10. Toward a Well-Innervated Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 4 of The Peripheral Mind).István Aranyosi - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    The “brain in a vat” thought experiment is presented and refuted by appeal to the intuitiveness of what the author informally calls “the eye for an eye principle”, namely: Conscious mental states typically involved in sensory processes can conceivably successfully be brought about by direct stimulation of the brain, and in all such cases the utilized stimulus field will be in the relevant sense equivalent to the actual PNS or part of it thereof. In the second section, four classic problems (...)
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  11. Affective Affordances: Direct Perception Meets Affectivity.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - forthcoming - Perspectivas Filosóficas.
    In this paper, I explore and examine different ways in which affectivity is related to perception within ecological psychology. I assess whether some of those ways compromise the realist and direct aspects of traditional ecological perception. I sustain that they don’t. Affectivity, at least in some cases, turns the perception of fine-grained affordances possible. For an engaged perceiver, affectivity is not optional.
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  12. Embodied Higher Cognition: Insights From Merleau-Ponty’s Interpretation of Motor Intentionality.Jan Halák - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-29.
    This paper clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s original account of “higher-order” cognition as fundamentally embodied and enacted. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy inspired theories that deemphasize overlaps between conceptual knowledge and motor intentionality or, on the contrary, focus exclusively on abstract thought. In contrast, this paper explores the link between Merleau-Ponty’s account of motor intentionality and his interpretations of our capacity to understand and interact productively with cultural symbolic systems. I develop my interpretation based on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of two neuropathological modifications of motor intentionality, the case (...)
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  13. Dancing-With: A Method for Poetic Social Justice.Joshua M. Hall - forthcoming - In Rebecca L. Farinas, Craig Hanks, Julie C. Van Camp & Aili Bresnahan (eds.), Dance and Philosophy. London:
    This chapter outlines a new theoretical method, which I call “dancing-with,” emerging from the process of writing my dissertation and the book manuscript that followed it. Defined formally, a given theorist X can be said to “dance-with” with a second theorist Y insofar as X “choreographs” an interpretation of Y which is both true to Y and Y’s historical communities, and also meaningful and actionable (i.e. facilitating social justice) for X and X’s historical communities. In this pursuit, the method of (...)
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  14. Phenomenological Physiotherapy: Extending the Concept of Bodily Intentionality.Halák Jan & Petr Kříž - forthcoming - Medical Humanities:1-14.
    This study clarifies the need for a renewed account of the body in physiotherapy to fill sizable gaps between physiotherapeutical theory and practice. Physiotherapists are trained to approach bodily functioning from an objectivist perspective; however, their therapeutic interactions with patients are not limited to the provision of natural-scientific explanations. Physiotherapists’ practice corresponds well to theorisation of the body as the bearer of original bodily intentionality, as outlined by Merleau-Ponty and elaborated upon by enactivists. We clarify how physiotherapeutical practice corroborates Merleau-Ponty’s (...)
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  15. How to Understand the Body with the Body. Phenomenological Contribution to Overcoming the Limits of Mechanistic Paradigm in Physiotherapy.Petr Kříž & Jan Halák - forthcoming - Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science.
    [In Czech] This article aims to explain how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of embodiment contributes to the theory and practice of physiotherapy. The mechanistic conception of the body, to which physiotherapy usually refers, assumes a universal model of its functioning and interprets its relationship to the environment causally. In fact, however, it does not allow a satisfactory explanation of the efficiency of the therapeutic methods used in practice. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of motor intentionality points to the fact that the body (...)
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  16. James, Nonduality, and the Dynamics of Pure Experience.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In Lee A. Mcbride Iii & Erin McKenna (eds.), Pragmatist Feminism and the Work of Charlene Haddock Seigfried.
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  17. Watsuji's Phenomenology of Aidagara: An Interpretation and Application to Psychopathology.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In S. Taguchi & Andrea Altobrando (eds.), Tetsugaku Companion to Phenomenology and Japanese Philosophy. Springer. pp. 165-181.
    I discuss Watsuji’s characterization of aidagara or “betweenness”. First, I develop a phenomenological reading of aidagara. I argue that the notion can help illuminate aspects of our embodied subjectivity and its interrelation with the world and others. Along the way, I also indicate how the notion can be fruitfully supplemented by different sources of empirical research. Second, I put aidagara to work in the context of psychopathology. I show how disruptions of aidagara in schizophrenia not only affirm the foundational role (...)
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  18. Affordances and Absence in Psychopathology.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In Affordances in Everyday Life - A Multidisciplinary Collection of Essays,.
    Affordances are action-possibilities, ways of relating to and acting on our world. A theory of affordances helps us understand how we have bodily access to our world and what it means to enjoy such access. But what happens to bodies when this access is somehow ruptured or impeded? This question is relevant to psychopathology. People with psychiatric disorders often describe feeling as though they’ve lost access to affordances that others take for granted. Focusing on schizophrenia, depression, and autistic spectrum disorder, (...)
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  19. Music as Affective Scaffolding.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In David Clarke, Ruth Herbert & Eric Clarke (eds.), Music and Consciousness II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    For 4E cognitive science, minds are embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. Proponents observe that we regularly ‘offload’ our thinking onto body and world: we use gestures and calculators to augment mathematical reasoning, and smartphones and search engines as memory aids. I argue that music is a beyond-the-head resource that affords offloading. Via this offloading, music scaffolds access to new forms of thought, experience, and behaviour. I focus on music’s capacity to scaffold emotional consciousness, including the self-regulative processes constitutive of emotional (...)
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  20. Direct Social Perception.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In Albert Newen, Leon de Bruin & Gallagher Shaun (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition.
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  21. Musical Scaffolding and the Pleasure of Sad Music: Comment on “An Integrative Review of the Enjoyment of Sadness Associated with Music".Joel Krueger - forthcoming - Physics of Life Reviews.
    Why is listening to sad music pleasurable? Eerola et al. convincingly argue that we should adopt an integrative framework — encompassing biological, psycho-social, and cultural levels of explanation — to answer this question. I agree. The authors have done a great service in providing the outline of such an integrative account. But in their otherwise rich discussion of the psycho-social level of engagements with sad music, they say little about the phenomenology of such experiences — including features that may help (...)
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  22. Embodiment and Affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia: A Phenomenological Analysis.Joel Krueger & Mads Gram Henriksen - forthcoming - In J. Aaron Simmons & James Hackett (eds.), Phenomenology for the 21st Century. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In this comparative study, we examine experiential disruptions of embodiment and affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We suggest that using phenomenological resources to explore these experiences may help us better understand what it’s like to live with these conditions, and that such an understanding may have significant therapeutic value. Additionally, we suggest that this sort of phenomenologically-informed comparative analysis can shed light on the importance of embodiment and affectivity for the constitution of a sense of self and interpersonal relatedness (...)
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  23. Towards a Wide Approach to Improvisation.Joel Krueger & Alessandro Salice - forthcoming - In J. McGuirk, S. Ravn & S. Høffding (eds.), Improvisation: The Competence(s) of Not Being in Control. New York, NY, USA:
    This paper pursues two main aims. First, it distinguishes two kinds of improvisation: expert and inexpert. Expert improvisation is a (usually artistic) practice that the agent consciously sets as their goal and is evaluated according to (usually artistic) standards of improvisation. Inexpert improvisation, by contrast, supports and structures the agent’s action as it moves them towards their (usually everyday life) goals and is evaluated on its success leading the agent to the achievement of those goals. The second aim is to (...)
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  24. Losing Social Space: Phenomenological Disruptions of Spatiality and Embodiment in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia.Joel Krueger & Amanda Taylor Aiken - forthcoming - In Jack Reynolds & Ricky Sebold (eds.), Phenomenology and Science. Palgracve Macmillan.
    We argue that a phenomenological approach to social space, as well as its relation to embodiment and affectivity, is crucial for understanding how the social world shows up as social in the first place—that is, as affording different forms of sharing, connection, and relatedness. We explore this idea by considering two cases where social space is experientially disrupted: Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We show how this altered sense of social space emerges from subtle disruptions of embodiment and affectivity characteristic of (...)
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  25. Materialized Oppression in Medical Tools and Technologies.Shen-yi Liao & Vanessa Carbonell - forthcoming - American Journal of Bioethics:1-15.
    It is well-known that racism is encoded into the social practices and institutions of medicine. Less well-known is that racism is encoded into the material artifacts of medicine. We argue that many medical devices are not merely biased, but materialize oppression. An oppressive device exhibits a harmful bias that reflects and perpetuates unjust power relations. Using pulse oximeters and spirometers as case studies, we show how medical devices can materialize oppression along various axes of social difference, including race, gender, class, (...)
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  26. On Biologising Racism.Raamy Majeed - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    To biologise racism is to treat racism as a neurological phenomenon susceptible to biochemical intervention. In 'Race on the Brain: What Implicit Bias Gets Wrong About the Struggle for Racial Injustice', Kahn (2018) critiques cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists for framing racism in a way that tends to biologise racism, which he argues draws attention and resources away from non-individualistic solutions to racial inequality. In this paper I argue the psychological sciences can accommodate several of Kahn’s criticisms by adopting a situated (...)
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  27. Group Minds and Natural Kinds.Robert D. Rupert - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies.
    The claim is frequently made that structured collections of individuals who are themselves subjects of mental and cognitive states – such collections as courts, countries, and corporations – can be, and often are, subjects of mental or cognitive states. And, to be clear, advocates for this so-called group-minds hypothesis intend their view to be interpreted literally, not metaphorically. The existing critical literature casts substantial doubt on this view, at least on the assumption that groups are claimed to instantiate the same (...)
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  28. Automata, Man-Machines and Embodiment: Deflating or Inflating Life?Charles T. Wolfe - forthcoming - In A. Radman & H. Sohn (eds.), Critical and Clinical Cartographies; Embodiment /Technology /Care /Design. 010.
    Early modern automata, understood as efforts to ‘model’ life, to grasp its singular properties and/or to unveil and demystify its seeming inaccessibility and mystery, are not just fascinating liminal, boundary, hybrid, crossover or go-between objects, while they are all of those of course. They also pose a direct challenge to some of our common conceptions about mechanism and embodiment. They challenge the simplicity of the distinction between a purported ‘mechanistic’ worldpicture, its ontology and its goals, and on the other hand (...)
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  29. Both Physical and Virtual: On Immediacy in Esports.David Ekdahl - 2022 - Frontiers in Sports and Active Living 4.
    This article strives to make novel headway in the debate concerning esports' relationship to sports by focusing on the relationship between esports and physicality. More precisely, the aim of this article is to critically assess the claim that esports fails to be sports because it is never properly “direct” or “immediate” compared to physical sports. To do so, I focus on the account of physicality presented by Jason Holt, who provides a theoretical framework meant to justify the claim that esports (...)
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  30. Corpo Funzionale E Corpo Senziente. La Tesi Forte Del Carattere Incarnato Della Mente in Fenomenologia.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2022 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 13 (1):41-56.
    In questo lavoro distinguo tra due versioni della tesi del carattere incarnato della mente: “debole” e “forte”. Secondo la versione debole, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo che si muove ed agisce nell’ambiente, ossia un corpo funzionale. Secondo la versione forte, invece, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo non solo funzionale ma anche senziente, ossia: il corpo come sede della sensibilità o coscienza fenomenica. Sostengo che alcuni approcci all’interno della “scienza cognitiva incarnata” (...)
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  31. Fenomenologia enattiva. Mente, coscienza e natura.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2022 - Milan: Mimesis.
    Qual è il rapporto tra la mente cosciente e la natura? A tale questione fondamentale si può rispondere in modi molto diversi, a seconda di come si concepiscono sia la mente che la natura. Questo lavoro offre una risposta originale, integrando la fenomenologia husserliana e la concezione enattiva all’interno di una prospettiva unitaria chiamata fenomenologia enattiva. Nel percorso qui sviluppato, il lettore troverà un’analisi ricca e aggiornata di alcune tra le questioni più dibattute nella filosofia della mente e nelle scienze (...)
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  32. Enacting Environments: From Umwelts to Institutions.Mog Stapleton - 2022 - In Karyn Lai (ed.), Knowers and Knowledge in East-West Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham: pp. 159-189.
    What we know is enabled and constrained by what we are. Extended and enactive approaches to cognitive science explore the ways in which our embodiment enables us to relate to the world. On these accounts, rather than being merely represented in the brain, the world and our activity in it plays an on-going role in our perceptual and cognitive processes. In this chapter I outline some of the key influences on extended and enactive philosophy and cognitive science in order to (...)
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  33. Grounding Cognition: Heterarchical Control Mechanisms in Biology.William Bechtel & Leonardo Bich - 2021 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 376 (1820).
    We advance an account that grounds cognition, specifically decision-making, in an activity all organisms as autonomous systems must perform to keep themselves viable—controlling their production mechanisms. Production mechanisms, as we characterize them, perform activities such as procuring resources from their environment, putting these resources to use to construct and repair the organism's body and moving through the environment. Given the variable nature of the environment and the continual degradation of the organism, these production mechanisms must be regulated by control mechanisms (...)
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  34. Stereotyping as Discrimination: Why Thoughts Can Be Discriminatory.Erin Beeghly - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (6):547-563.
    .Can we treat people in a discriminatory way in virtue of how we think about them? In this essay, I argue that the answer is yes. According to the constitutive claim, stereotyping constitutes discrimination, either sometimes or always. This essay defends the constitutive claim and explores the deeper justifications for it. I also sketch the constitutive claim’s larger ethical significance. One upshot is that we can wrongfully discriminate against (or in favor of) others in thought, even if we keep our (...)
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  35. Love In-Between.Laura Candiotto & Hanne De Jaegher - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (4):1-24.
    In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the “I love to you” of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands love as unity, we conceptualise loving as an existential engagement in a dialectic of encounter, in continuous processes of becoming-in-relation. In these processes, desire acquires a certain prominence as the need to know more. We build on Irigaray’s account of love to present a phenomenology (...)
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  36. Materializing Systemic Racism, Materializing Health Disparities.Vanessa Carbonell & Shen-yi Liao - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics 21 (9):16-18.
    The purpose of cultural competence education for medical professionals is to ensure respectful care and reduce health disparities. Yet as Berger and Miller (2021) show, the cultural competence framework is dated, confused, and self-defeating. They argue that the framework ignores the primary driver of health disparities—systemic racism—and is apt to exacerbate rather than mitigate bias and ethnocentrism. They propose replacing cultural competence with a framework that attends to two social aspects of structural inequality: health and social policy, and institutional-system activity; (...)
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  37. The Shared Know-How in Linguistic Bodies.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2021 - Filosofia Unisinos 22 (1):94-101.
    The authors of *Linguistic Bodies* appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest. However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that there is no single answer to the first issue; depending on (...)
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  38. Loving and knowing: reflections for an engaged epistemology.Hanne De Jaegher - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):847-870.
    In search of our highest capacities, cognitive scientists aim to explain things like mathematics, language, and planning. But are these really our most sophisticated forms of knowing? In this paper, I point to a different pinnacle of cognition. Our most sophisticated human knowing, I think, lies in how we engage with each other, in our relating. Cognitive science and philosophy of mind have largely ignored the ways of knowing at play here. At the same time, the emphasis on discrete, rational (...)
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  39. Editors' Introduction to Tasks, Tools, and Techniques.Wayne D. Gray, François Osiurak & Richard Heersmink - 2021 - Topics in Cognitive Science 13 (4):1-8.
    Tasks, tools, and techniques that we perform, use, and acquire, define the elements of expertise which we value as the hallmarks of goal-driven behavior. Somehow, the creation of tools enables us to define new tasks, or is it that the envisioning of new tasks drives us to invent new tools? Or maybe it is that new tools engender new techniques which then result in new tasks? This jumble of issues will be explored and discussed in this diverse collection of papers. (...)
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  40. La parole opérante comme spécification de l'intentionnalité motrice chez Merleau-Ponty.Jan Halák - 2021 - Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Philosophia 66 (2 supplement):107-119.
    [In French] This paper outlines Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of higher-order cognition as a fundamentally embodied process that is enacted by motor subject situated in natural and cultural environment. More specifically, I exemplify Merleau-Ponty’s interdisciplinary approach to cognition on his interpretations of motor intentionality, operative speech, and mathematical reasoning, which are based on neuropathology, linguistics, and gestalt psychology, respectively. In this analysis, I aim to show that the body is involved in cognition as an operator of the phenomenal structuration of the environment (...)
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  41. Revisiting Husserl’s Concept of Leib Using Merleau‐Ponty’s Ontology.Jan Halák - 2021 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):309-341.
    This article reconsiders Husserl’s concept of Leib in light of Merleau‐Ponty’s interpretation of the human body as an ontologically significant phenomenon. I first analyze Husserl’s account of the body as a “two‐fold unity” and demonstrate the problematic nature of its four implications, namely, the ambiguous ontological status of the body as subject‐object, the view of “my body” as “my object,” the preconstitutive character of the unity of the body, and the restriction of the constitution of the body to touch alone. (...)
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  42. Body Schema Dynamics in Merleau-Ponty.Jan Halák - 2021 - In Yochai Ataria, Shogo Tanaka & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions. pp. 33-51.
    This chapter presents an account of Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the body schema as an operative intentionality that is not only opposed to, but also complexly intermingled with, the representation-like grasp of the world and one’s own body, or the body image. The chapter reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s position primarily based on his preparatory notes for his 1953 lecture ‘The Sensible World and the World of Expression’. Here, Merleau-Ponty elaborates his earlier efforts to show that the body schema is a perceptual ground against (...)
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  43. Varieties of Artifacts: Embodied, Perceptual, Cognitive, and Affective.Richard Heersmink - 2021 - Topics in Cognitive Science (4):1-24.
    The primary goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive overview and analysis of the various relations between material artifacts and the embodied mind. A secondary goal of this essay is to identify some of the trends in the design and use of artifacts. First, based on their functional properties, I identify four categories of artifacts co-opted by the embodied mind, namely (1) embodied artifacts, (2) perceptual artifacts, (3) cognitive artifacts, and (4) affective artifacts. These categories can overlap and (...)
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  44. Rejecting Dreyfus’ Introspective ‘Phenomenology’. The Case for Phenomenological Analysis.Alexander A. Jeuk - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):117-137.
    I argue that Hubert Dreyfus’ work on embodied coping, the intentional arc, solicitations and the background as well as his anti-representationalism rest on introspection. I denote with ‘introspection’ the methodological malpractice of formulating ontological statements about the conditions of possibility of phenomena merely based on descriptions. In order to illustrate the insufficiencies of Dreyfus’ methodological strategy in particular and introspection in general, I show that Heidegger, to whom Dreyfus constantly refers as the foundation of his own work, derives ontological statements (...)
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  45. The Ethics of Speculative Anticipation and the Covid-19 Pandemic.Catherine Kendig & Wenda K. Bauchspies - 2021 - Hypatia 36 (1):228-236.
    This paper explores the role of speculative anticipation in ethics during the COVID-19 pandemic and provides a structure to think about ethical decision-making in times of extreme uncertainty. We identify three different but interwoven domains within which speculative anticipation can be found: global, local, and projective anticipation. Our analysis aims to open possibilities of seeing the situatedness of others both locally and globally in order to address larger social issues that have been laid bare by the presence of SARS-CoV-2. Our (...)
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  46. Oppressive Things.Shen-yi Liao & Bryce Huebner - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):92-113.
    In analyzing oppressive systems like racism, social theorists have articulated accounts of the dynamic interaction and mutual dependence between psychological components, such as individuals’ patterns of thought and action, and social components, such as formal institutions and informal interactions. We argue for the further inclusion of physical components, such as material artifacts and spatial environments. Drawing on socially situated and ecologically embedded approaches in the cognitive sciences, we argue that physical components of racism are not only shaped by, but also (...)
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  47. Teaching Dance and Philosophy to Non Majors: The Integration of Movement Practices and Thought Experiments to Articulate Big Ideas.Megan Brunsvold Mercedes & Kristopher G. Phillips - 2021 - In Rebecca Farinas & Julie Van Camp (eds.), The Bloomsbury Handbook of Dance and Philosophy. London, UK: pp. 20-35.
    Philosophers sometimes wonder whether academic work can ever be truly interdisciplinary. Whether true interdisciplinarity is possible is an open question, but given current trends in higher education, it seems that at least gesturing toward such work is increasingly important. This volume serves as a testament to the fact that such work can be done. Of course, while it is the case that high-level theoretical work can flourish at the intersection of dance and philosophy, it remains to be seen how we (...)
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  48. Visual Acquaintance, Action & The Explanatory Gap.Thomas Raleigh - 2021 - Synthese:1-26.
    Much attention has recently been paid to the idea, which I label ‘External World Acquaintance’ (EWA), that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is partially constituted by external features. One motivation for EWA which has received relatively little discussion is its alleged ability to help deal with the ‘Explanatory Gap’ (e.g. Fish 2008, 2009, Langsam 2011, Allen 2016). I provide a reformulation of this general line of thought, which makes clearer how and when EWA could help to explain the specific (...)
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  49. Heidegger, Embodiment, and Disability.Joel Michael Reynolds - 2021 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (1):183-201.
    Most interpreters of Heidegger’s reflections on the body maintain that—whether early, middle, or late in the Gesamtausgabe—Dasein’s or the mortal’s openness to being/beyng is the ground of the fleshly or bodily, but not the reverse. In this paper, I argue that there is evidence from Heidegger’s own oeuvre demonstrating that this relationship is instead mutually reciprocal. That is to say, I contend that corporeal variability is constitutive of Dasein’s openness to being just as Dasein’s openness to being is constitutive of (...)
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  50. Kinetic Memories. An Embodied Form of Remembering the Personal Past.Marina Trakas - 2021 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 42 (2):139-174.
    Despite the popularity that the embodied cognition thesis has gained in recent years, explicit memories of events personally experienced are still conceived as disembodied mental representations. It seems that we can consciously remember our personal past through sensory imagery, through concepts, propositions and language, but not through the body. In this article, I defend the idea that the body constitutes a genuine means of representing past personal experiences. For this purpose, I focus on the analysis of bodily movements associated with (...)
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