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  1. How the Brain Makes Up the Mind: A Heuristic Approach to the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Dan Bruiger - manuscript
    A solution to the “hard problem” requires taking the point of view of the organism and its sub- agents. The organism constructs phenomenality through acts of fiat, much as we create meaning in language, through the use of symbols that are assigned meaning in the context of an embodied evolutionary history. Phenomenality is a virtual representation, made to itself by an executive agent (the conscious self), which is tasked with monitoring the state of the organism and its environment, planning future (...)
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  2. Walking in the Shoes of the Brain: An "Agent" Approach to Phenomenality and the Problem of Consciousness.Dan J. Bruiger - manuscript
    Abstract: Given an embodied evolutionary context, the (conscious) organism creates phenomenality and establishes a first-person point of view with its own agency, through intentional relations made by its own acts of fiat, in the same way that human observers create meaning in language.
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  3. Extended Cognition, Extended Selection, and Developmental Systems Theory.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    I respond to Karola Stotz's criticisms of my previously published challenges to the inference from developmental systems theory to an extended view of cognition.
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  4. Individual Minds as Groups, Group Minds as Individuals.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    This is a long-abandoned draft, written in 2013, of what was supposed to be a paper for an edited collection (one that, in the end, didn't come together). The paper "Group Minds and Natural Kinds" descends from it.
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  5. Transparency and the Phenomenology of Extended Cognition.Gloria Andrada - forthcoming - Límite: Revista de Filosofía y Psicología.
    Extended cognition brings with it a particular phenomenology. It has been argued that when an artifact is integrated into an agent’s cognitive system, it becomes transparent in use to the cognizing subject. In this paper, I challenge some of the assumptions underlying how the transparency of artifacts is described in extended cognition theory. To this end, I offer two arguments. First, I make room for some forms of conscious thought and attention within extended cognitive routines, and I question the close (...)
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  6. Margins of Me: A Personal Story (Chapter 1 of The Peripheral Mind).István Aranyosi - forthcoming - In The Peripheral Mind. Philosophy of Mind and the Peripheral Nervous System. Oxford University Press.
    The author presents an autobiographical story of serious peripheral motor nerve damage resulting from chemotoxicity induced as a side effect of Hodgkin’s Lymphoma treatment. The first-person, phenomenological account of the condition naturally leads to philosophical questions about consciousness, felt presence of oneself all over and within one’s body, and the felt constitutiveness of peripheral processes to one’s mental life. The first-person data only fit well with a philosophical approach to the mind that takes peripheral, bodily events and states at their (...)
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  7. Toward a Well-Innervated Philosophy of Mind (Chapter 4 of The Peripheral Mind).István Aranyosi - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    The “brain in a vat” thought experiment is presented and refuted by appeal to the intuitiveness of what the author informally calls “the eye for an eye principle”, namely: Conscious mental states typically involved in sensory processes can conceivably successfully be brought about by direct stimulation of the brain, and in all such cases the utilized stimulus field will be in the relevant sense equivalent to the actual PNS or part of it thereof. In the second section, four classic problems (...)
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  8. Sensorimotor Expectations and the Visual Field.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    Sensorimotor expectations concern how visual experience covaries with bodily movement. Sensorimotor theorists argue from such expectations to the conclusion that the phenomenology of vision is constitutively embodied: objects within the visual field are experienced as 3-D because sensorimotor expectations partially constitute our experience of such objects. Critics argue that there are two ways to block the above inference: to explain how we visually experience objects as 3-D, one may appeal to such non-bodily factors as expectations about movements of objects, not (...)
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  9. Loving and Knowing: Reflections for an Engaged Epistemology.Hanne De Jaegher - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    In search of our highest capacities, cognitive scientists aim to explain things like mathematics, language, and planning. But are these really our most sophisticated forms of knowing? In this paper, I point to a different pinnacle of cognition. Our most sophisticated human knowing, I think, lies in how we engage with each other, in our relating. Cognitive science and philosophy of mind have largely ignored the ways of knowing at play here. At the same time, the emphasis on discrete, rational (...)
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  10. Dancing-With: A Method for Poetic Social Justice.Joshua M. Hall - forthcoming - In Rebecca L. Farinas, Craig Hanks, Julie C. Van Camp & Aili Bresnahan (eds.), Dance and Philosophy. London:
    This chapter outlines a new theoretical method, which I call “dancing-with,” emerging from the process of writing my dissertation and the book manuscript that followed it. Defined formally, a given theorist X can be said to “dance-with” with a second theorist Y insofar as X “choreographs” an interpretation of Y which is both true to Y and Y’s historical communities, and also meaningful and actionable (i.e. facilitating social justice) for X and X’s historical communities. In this pursuit, the method of (...)
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  11. Direct Social Perception.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In Albert Newen, Leon de Bruin & Gallagher Shaun (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition.
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  12. Watsuji's Phenomenology of Aidagara: An Interpretation and Application to Psychopathology.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In S. Taguchi & Andrea Altobrando (eds.), Tetsugaku Companion to Phenomenology and Japanese Philosophy. Springer. pp. 165-181.
    I discuss Watsuji’s characterization of aidagara or “betweenness”. First, I develop a phenomenological reading of aidagara. I argue that the notion can help illuminate aspects of our embodied subjectivity and its interrelation with the world and others. Along the way, I also indicate how the notion can be fruitfully supplemented by different sources of empirical research. Second, I put aidagara to work in the context of psychopathology. I show how disruptions of aidagara in schizophrenia not only affirm the foundational role (...)
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  13. Music as Affective Scaffolding.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In David Clarke, Ruth Herbert & Eric Clarke (eds.), Music and Consciousness II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    For 4E cognitive science, minds are embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended. Proponents observe that we regularly ‘offload’ our thinking onto body and world: we use gestures and calculators to augment mathematical reasoning, and smartphones and search engines as memory aids. I argue that music is a beyond-the-head resource that affords offloading. Via this offloading, music scaffolds access to new forms of thought, experience, and behaviour. I focus on music’s capacity to scaffold emotional consciousness, including the self-regulative processes constitutive of emotional (...)
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  14. Musical Scaffolding and the Pleasure of Sad Music: Comment on “An Integrative Review of the Enjoyment of Sadness Associated with Music".Joel Krueger - forthcoming - Physics of Life Reviews.
    Why is listening to sad music pleasurable? Eerola et al. convincingly argue that we should adopt an integrative framework — encompassing biological, psycho-social, and cultural levels of explanation — to answer this question. I agree. The authors have done a great service in providing the outline of such an integrative account. But in their otherwise rich discussion of the psycho-social level of engagements with sad music, they say little about the phenomenology of such experiences — including features that may help (...)
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  15. Embodiment and Affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia: A Phenomenological Analysis.Joel Krueger & Mads Gram Henriksen - forthcoming - In J. Aaron Simmons & James Hackett (eds.), Phenomenology for the 21st Century. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In this comparative study, we examine experiential disruptions of embodiment and affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We suggest that using phenomenological resources to explore these experiences may help us better understand what it’s like to live with these conditions, and that such an understanding may have significant therapeutic value. Additionally, we suggest that this sort of phenomenologically-informed comparative analysis can shed light on the importance of embodiment and affectivity for the constitution of a sense of self and interpersonal relatedness (...)
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  16. Towards a Wide Approach to Improvisation.Joel Krueger & Alessandro Salice - forthcoming - In J. McGuirk, S. Ravn & S. Høffding (eds.), Improvisation: The Competence(s) of Not Being in Control. New York, NY, USA:
    This paper pursues two main aims. First, it distinguishes two kinds of improvisation: expert and inexpert. Expert improvisation is a (usually artistic) practice that the agent consciously sets as their goal and is evaluated according to (usually artistic) standards of improvisation. Inexpert improvisation, by contrast, supports and structures the agent’s action as it moves them towards their (usually everyday life) goals and is evaluated on its success leading the agent to the achievement of those goals. The second aim is to (...)
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  17. Losing Social Space: Phenomenological Disruptions of Spatiality and Embodiment in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia.Joel Krueger & Amanda Taylor Aiken - forthcoming - In Jack Reynolds & Ricky Sebold (eds.), Phenomenology and Science. Palgracve Macmillan.
    We argue that a phenomenological approach to social space, as well as its relation to embodiment and affectivity, is crucial for understanding how the social world shows up as social in the first place—that is, as affording different forms of sharing, connection, and relatedness. We explore this idea by considering two cases where social space is experientially disrupted: Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We show how this altered sense of social space emerges from subtle disruptions of embodiment and affectivity characteristic of (...)
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  18. Oppressive Things.Shen-yi Liao & Bryce Huebner - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In analyzing oppressive systems like racism, social theorists have articulated accounts of the dynamic interaction and mutual dependence between psychological components, such as individuals’ patterns of thought and action, and social components, such as formal institutions and informal interactions. We argue for the further inclusion of physical components, such as material artifacts and spatial environments. Drawing on socially situated and ecologically embedded approaches in the cognitive sciences, we argue that physical components of racism are not only shaped by, but also (...)
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  19. On Biologising Racism.Raamy Majeed - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    To biologise racism is to treat racism as a neurological phenomenon susceptible to biochemical intervention. In 'Race on the Brain: What Implicit Bias Gets Wrong About the Struggle for Racial Injustice', Kahn (2018) critiques cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists for framing racism in a way that tends to biologise racism, which he argues draws attention and resources away from non-individualistic solutions to racial inequality. In this paper I argue the psychological sciences can accommodate several of Kahn’s criticisms by adopting a situated (...)
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  20. Thinking Embodiment with Genetics: Epigenetics and Postgenomic Biology in Embodied Cognition and Enactivism.Maurizio Meloni & Jack Reynolds - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    The role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the precise nature and scope of that contribution remain contentious. As a result, most philosophers working on embodiment—e.g. those in embodied cognition, enactivism, and ‘4e’ cognition—interact with the life sciences as part of their interdisciplinary agenda. Despite this, a detailed engagement with emerging findings in epigenetics and post-genomic biology has been missing from proponents of this embodied turn. Surveying this research provides an opportunity to (...)
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  21. Visual Acquaintance, Action & The Explanatory Gap.Thomas Raleigh - forthcoming - Synthese:1-26.
    Much attention has recently been paid to the idea, which I label ‘External World Acquaintance’ (EWA), that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is partially constituted by external features. One motivation for EWA which has received relatively little discussion is its alleged ability to help deal with the ‘Explanatory Gap’ (e.g. Fish 2008, 2009, Langsam 2011, Allen 2016). I provide a reformulation of this general line of thought, which makes clearer how and when EWA could help to explain the specific (...)
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  22. Heidegger, Embodiment, And Disability.Joel Michael Reynolds - forthcoming - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy.
    Most interpretations of Heidegger’s reflections on the body maintain that—whether early, middle, or late in the Gesamtausgabe—Dasein’s or the mortal’s openness to being/beyng is the ground of the fleshly or bodily (das Leibliche), but not the reverse. In this paper, I argue that there is evidence from Heidegger’s own oeuvre demonstrating that this relationship is instead mutually reciprocal. That is to say, I contend that corporeal variability is constitutive of Dasein’s openness to being just as Dasein’s openness to being is (...)
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  23. What Is a Cognitive System?Robert D. Rupert - forthcoming - Cognitive Semantics 5.
    A theory of cognitive systems individuation is presented and defended. The approach has some affinity with Leonard Talmy's Overlapping Systems Model of Cognitive Organization, and the paper's first section explores aspects of Talmy's view that are shared by the view developed herein. According to the view on offer -- the conditional probability of co-contribution account (CPC) -- a cognitive system is a collection of mechanisms that contribute, in overlapping subsets, to a wide variety of forms of intelligent behavior. Central to (...)
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  24. Group Minds and Natural Kinds.Robert D. Rupert - forthcoming - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies.
    The claim is frequently made that structured collections of individuals who are themselves subjects of mental and cognitive states – such collections as courts, countries, and corporations – can be, and often are, subjects of mental or cognitive states. And, to be clear, advocates for this so-called group-minds hypothesis intend their view to be interpreted literally, not metaphorically. The existing critical literature casts substantial doubt on this view, at least on the assumption that groups are claimed to instantiate the same (...)
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  25. Why Behaviorism and Anti-Representationalism Are Untenable.Markus E. Schlosser - forthcoming - Journal of Mind and Behavior.
    It is widely thought that philosophical behaviorism is an untenable and outdated theory of mind. It is generally agreed, in particular, that the view generates a vicious circularity problem. There is a standard solution to this problem for functionalism, which utilizes the formulation of Ramsey sentences. I will show that this solution is also available for behaviorism if we allow quantification over the causal bases of behavioral dispositions. Then I will suggest that behaviorism differs from functionalism mainly in its commitment (...)
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  26. Automata, Man-Machines and Embodiment: Deflating or Inflating Life?Charles T. Wolfe - forthcoming - In A. Radman & H. Sohn (eds.), Critical and Clinical Cartographies; Embodiment /Technology /Care /Design. 010.
    Early modern automata, understood as efforts to ‘model’ life, to grasp its singular properties and/or to unveil and demystify its seeming inaccessibility and mystery, are not just fascinating liminal, boundary, hybrid, crossover or go-between objects, while they are all of those of course. They also pose a direct challenge to some of our common conceptions about mechanism and embodiment. They challenge the simplicity of the distinction between a purported ‘mechanistic’ worldpicture, its ontology and its goals, and on the other hand (...)
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  27. Grounding Cognition: Heterarchical Control Mechanisms in Biology.William Bechtel & Leonardo Bich - 2021 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 376 (1820).
    We advance an account that grounds cognition, specifically decision-making, in an activity all organisms as autonomous systems must perform to keep themselves viable—controlling their production mechanisms. Production mechanisms, as we characterize them, perform activities such as procuring resources from their environment, putting these resources to use to construct and repair the organism's body and moving through the environment. Given the variable nature of the environment and the continual degradation of the organism, these production mechanisms must be regulated by control mechanisms (...)
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  28. Love In-Between.Laura Candiotto & Hanne De Jaegher - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics:1-24.
    In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the “I love to you” of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands love as unity, we conceptualise loving as an existential engagement in a dialectic of encounter, in continuous processes of becoming-in-relation. In these processes, desire acquires a certain prominence as the need to know more. We build on Irigaray’s account of love to present a phenomenology (...)
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  29. The Shared Know-How in Linguistic Bodies.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2021 - Filosofia Unisinos 22 (1):94-101.
    The authors of *Linguistic Bodies* appeal to shared know-how to explain the social and participatory interactions upon which linguistic skills and agency rest. However, some issues lurk around the notion of shared know-how and require attention and clarification. In particular, one issue concerns the agent behind the shared know-how, a second one concerns whether shared know-how can be reducible to individual know-how or not. In this paper, I sustain that there is no single answer to the first issue; depending on (...)
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  30. Rejecting Dreyfus’ Introspective ‘Phenomenology’. The Case for Phenomenological Analysis.Alexander A. Jeuk - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):117-137.
    I argue that Hubert Dreyfus’ work on embodied coping, the intentional arc, solicitations and the background as well as his anti-representationalism rest on introspection. I denote with ‘introspection’ the methodological malpractice of formulating ontological statements about the conditions of possibility of phenomena merely based on descriptions. In order to illustrate the insufficiencies of Dreyfus’ methodological strategy in particular and introspection in general, I show that Heidegger, to whom Dreyfus constantly refers as the foundation of his own work, derives ontological statements (...)
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  31. The Ethics of Speculative Anticipation and the Covid-19 Pandemic.Catherine Kendig & Wenda K. Bauchspies - 2021 - Hypatia 36 (1):228-236.
    This paper explores the role of speculative anticipation in ethics during the COVID-19 pandemic and provides a structure to think about ethical decision-making in times of extreme uncertainty. We identify three different but interwoven domains within which speculative anticipation can be found: global, local, and projective anticipation. Our analysis aims to open possibilities of seeing the situatedness of others both locally and globally in order to address larger social issues that have been laid bare by the presence of SARS-CoV-2. Our (...)
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  32. Teaching Dance and Philosophy to Non Majors: The Integration of Movement Practices and Thought Experiments to Articulate Big Ideas.Megan Brunsvold Mercedes & Kristopher G. Phillips - 2021 - In Rebecca Farinas & Julie Van Camp (eds.), The Bloomsbury Handbook of Dance and Philosophy. London, UK: pp. 20-35.
    Philosophers sometimes wonder whether academic work can ever be truly interdisciplinary. Whether true interdisciplinarity is possible is an open question, but given current trends in higher education, it seems that at least gesturing toward such work is increasingly important. This volume serves as a testament to the fact that such work can be done. Of course, while it is the case that high-level theoretical work can flourish at the intersection of dance and philosophy, it remains to be seen how we (...)
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  33. Social Affordance.Eros Carvalho - 2020 - Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior.
    A short entry on social affordance. Social affordances are possibilities for social interaction or possibilities for action that are shaped by social practices and norms.
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  34. Sintonizando com o mundo: uma abordagem ecológica das habilidades sensoriomotoras.Eros Carvalho - 2020 - In Giovanni Rolla & Gerson Araújo Neto (eds.), Ciência e Conhecimento. Teresina: pp. 81-108.
    In this chapter, I put forward and sustain an articulation of the notion of bodily skill based on ecological psychology, and I show how it is relevant for the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about the skillful coping and also for the debate about whether know-how is reducible or not to propositional knowledge. The right metaphor to understand bodily skills is not the computer metaphor but the radio metaphor. These skills results from a process of organism attunement to its environment.
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  35. An Enactive-Ecological Approach to Information and Uncertainty.Eros Moreira de Carvalho & Giovanni Rolla - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:1-11.
    Information is a central notion for cognitive sciences and neurosciences, but there is no agreement on what it means for a cognitive system to acquire information about its surroundings. In this paper, we approximate three influential views on information: the one at play in ecological psychology, which is sometimes called information for action; the notion of information as covariance as developed by some enactivists, and the idea of information as minimization of uncertainty as presented by Shannon. Our main thesis is (...)
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  36. O desafio da integração explanatória para o enativismo: escalonamento ascendente ou descendente.Eros Carvalho & Giovanni Rolla - 2020 - Prometheus 33:161-181.
    Enactivism is a family of theories that construe action as constitutive of cognition and reject the need to postulate representations in order to explain all cognitive activities. Acknowledging a biologically basic, non-representational mode of cognition, however, raises the question of how to explain higher or more complex cognitive acts, what we call explanatory integration challenge. In this paper, we critically discuss some attempts to meet that challenge through scaling up basic cognition and through scaling down complex cognition within the enactivist (...)
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  37. Lost in the Socially Extended Mind: Genuine Intersubjectivity and Disturbed Self-Other Demarcation in Schizophrenia.Tom Froese & Joel Krueger - 2020 - In Christian Tewes & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), Time and Body: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches. Cambridge, UK: pp. 318-340.
    Much of the characteristic symptomatology of schizophrenia can be understood as resulting from a pervasive sense of disembodiment. The body is experienced as an external machine that needs to be controlled with explicit intentional commands, which in turn leads to severe difficulties in interacting with the world in a fluid and intuitive manner. In consequence, there is a characteristic dissociality: Others become problems to be solved by intellectual effort and no longer present opportunities for spontaneous interpersonal alignment. This dissociality goes (...)
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  38. Reasoning's Relation to Bodily Action.David Jenkins - 2020 - Ratio 33 (2):87-96.
    Recent philosophical work on the relation between reasoning and bodily action is dominated by two views. It is orthodox to have it that bodily actions can be at most causally involved in reasoning. Others have it that reasoning can constitutively involve bodily actions, where this is understood as a matter of non‐mental bodily events featuring as constituents of practical reasoning. Reflection on cases of reasoning out‐loud suggests a neglected alternative on which both practical and theoretical reasoning can have bodily actions (...)
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  39. Extended Cognition, The New Mechanists’ Mutual Manipulability Criterion, and The Challenge of Trivial Extendedness.Beate Krickel - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (4):539–561.
    Many authors have turned their attention to the notion of constitution to determine whether the hypothesis of extended cognition (EC) is true. One common strategy is to make sense of constitution in terms of the new mechanists’ mutual manipulability account (MM). In this paper I will show that MM is insufficient. The Challenge of Trivial Extendedness arises due to the fact that mechanisms for cognitive behaviors are extended in a way that should not count as verifying EC. This challenge can (...)
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  40. Schizophrenia and the Scaffolded Self.Joel Krueger - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):597-609.
    A family of recent externalist approaches in philosophy of mind argues that our psychological capacities are synchronically and diachronically “scaffolded” by external resources. I consider how these “scaffolded” approaches might inform debates in phenomenological psychopathology. I first introduce the idea of “affective scaffolding” and make some taxonomic distinctions. Next, I use schizophrenia as a case study to argue—along with others in phenomenological psychopathology—that schizophrenia is fundamentally a self-disturbance. However, I offer a subtle reconfiguration of these approaches. I argue that schizophrenia (...)
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  41. Merleau-Ponty.Joel Krueger - 2020 - In Thomas Szanto & Hilge Landweer (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions. Routledge. pp. 197-206.
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  42. Steering Away From Multiple Realization.Anco Peeters - 2020 - Adaptive Behavior 28 (1):29-30.
    Mario Villalobos and Pablo Razeto-Barry argue that enactivists should understand living beings not as autopoietic systems, but as autopoietic bodies. In doing so, they surrender the principle of multiple realizability of the spatial location of living beings. By way of counterexample, I argue that more motivation is required before this principle is surrendered.
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  43. HOW FAR DOES THE BODY SCHEMA GO? EXTENDED BODY SCHEMA.Gerónimo Rangel - 2020 - Anuario Humanitas 1 (47):103-133.
    This work aims to uphold that a subject‘s body schema can be extended beyond their physical body, that is, external artifacts, such as tools, can be a part of the said body schema. To support this thesis, a new definition of ―body schema‖ is proposed. It starts by pointing out that body schema as a sub-personal sensorimotor is a necessary condition, albeit not a sufficient one, besides pursuing to include environmental interactions as a sufficient condition. Together, these elements favor the (...)
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  44. ¿Hasta dónde llega el esquema corporal? Esquema corporal extendido.Gerónimo Rangel - 2020 - Anuario Humanitas 1 (47):103-133.
    This work aims to uphold that a subject‘s body schema can be extended beyond their physical body, that is, that external artifacts, such as tools, can be a part of the said body schema. To support this thesis a new definition of ―body schema‖ is proposed, one that starts by pointing out that body schema as a sub-personal sensorimotor is a necessary condition, albeit not a sufficient one, besides pursuing to include environmental interactions as a sufficient condition. Together, these elements (...)
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  45. Ecological-Enactive Scientific Cognition: Modeling and Material Engagement.Giovanni Rolla & Felipe Novaes - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1:1-19.
    Ecological-enactive approaches to cognition aim to explain cognition in terms of the dynamic coupling between agent and environment. Accordingly, cognition of one’s immediate environment (which is sometimes labeled “basic” cognition) depends on enaction and the picking up of affordances. However, ecological-enactive views supposedly fail to account for what is sometimes called “higher” cognition, i.e., cognition about potentially absent targets, which therefore can only be explained by postulating representational content. This challenge levelled against ecological-enactive approaches highlights a putative explanatory gap between (...)
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  46. Putting Autopoietic Bodies Under Pressure.Mog Stapleton - 2020 - Adaptive Behavior 28 (1):45-46.
    This commentary puts pressure on the “resistance to dissipation” criterion for Villalobos and Razeto-Barry’s conception of “autopoietic bodies.” It argues that resistance to dissipation can only be assessed against the backdrop of certain background conditions. If this is right then it is no longer so clear that systems not considered as autopoietic bodies but merely as autopoietic systems do not fulfill the requirements of being an autopoietic body. -/- .
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  47. The Cognitive Phenomenology Argument for Disembodied AI Consciousness.Cody Turner - 2020 - In Steven Gouveia (ed.), The Age of Artificial Intelligence: An Exploration. Wilmington, DE: Vernon Press. pp. 111-132.
    In this chapter I offer two novel arguments for what I call strong primitivism about cognitive phenomenology, the thesis that there exists a phenomenology of cognition that is neither reducible to, nor dependent upon, sensory phenomenology. I then contend that strong primitivism implies that phenomenal consciousness does not require sensory processing. This latter contention has implications for the philosophy of artificial intelligence. For if sensory processing is not a necessary condition for phenomenal consciousness, then it plausibly follows that AI consciousness (...)
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  48. Weather-Wise? Sporting Embodiment, Weather Work and Weather Learning in Running and Triathlon.Jacquelyn Allen-Collinson, George Jennings, Anu Vaittinen & Helen Owton - 2019 - International Review for the Sociology of Sport 54 (7):777-792.
    Weather experiences are currently surprisingly under-explored and under-theorised in sociology and sport sociology, despite the importance of weather in both routine, everyday life and in recreational sporting and physical–cultural contexts. To address this lacuna, we examine here the lived experience of weather, including ‘weather work’ and ‘weather learning’, in our specific physical–cultural worlds of distance-running, triathlon and jogging in the United Kingdom. Drawing on a theoretical framework of phenomenological sociology, and the findings from five separate auto/ethnographic projects, we explore the (...)
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  49. Socially Extending the Mind Through Social Affordances.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2019 - In Steven Gouveia & Manuel Curado (eds.), Automata's Inner Movie: Science and Philosophy of Mind. "Delaware, USA": Vernon Press. pp. 193-212.
    The extended mind thesis claims that at least some cognitive processes extend beyond the organism’s brain in that they are constituted by the organism’s actions on its surrounding environment. A more radical move would be to claim that social actions performed by the organism could at least constitute some of its mental processes. This can be called the socially extended mind thesis. Based on the notion of affordance as developed in the ecological psychology tradition, I defend the position that perception (...)
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  50. Andy Clark and His Critics.Matteo Colombo, Elizabeth Irvine & Mog Stapleton (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford University Press.
    In this volume, a range of high-profile researchers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and empirical cognitive science, critically engage with Clark's work across the themes of: Extended, Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, and Affective Minds; Natural Born Cyborgs; and Perception, Action, and Prediction. Daniel Dennett provides a foreword on the significance of Clark's work, and Clark replies to each section of the book, thus advancing current literature with original contributions that will form the basis for new discussions, debates and (...)
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