The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence

Synthese 195 (4):1827-1848 (2018)
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Abstract
In this paper, I present and defend a novel account of doubt. In Part 1, I make some preliminary observations about the nature of doubt. In Part 2, I introduce a new puzzle about the relationship between three psychological states: doubt, belief, and confidence. I present this puzzle because my account of doubt emerges as a possible solution to it. Lastly, in Part 3, I elaborate on and defend my account of doubt. Roughly, one has doubt if and only if one believes one might be wrong; I argue that this is superior to the account that says that one has doubt if and only if one has less than the highest degree of confidence.
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ANDTNO-11
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First archival date: 2016-12-21
Latest version: 7 (2016-12-26)
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Modals.Yalcin, Seth

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Citations of this work BETA
Faith, Belief and Fictionalism.Malcolm, Finlay & Scott, Michael

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2016-12-21

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