Why Don’t Philosophers Do Their Intuition Practice?

Acta Analytica 34 (3):257-269 (2019)
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Abstract
I bet you don’t practice your philosophical intuitions. What’s your excuse? If you think philosophical training improves the reliability of philosophical intuitions, then practicing intuitions should improve them even further. I argue that philosophers’ reluctance to practice their intuitions highlights a tension in the way that they think about the role of intuitions in philosophy.
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Archival date: 2019-04-23
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Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.Weinberg, Jonathan M.; Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen
Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters?Weinberg, Jonathan M.; Gonnerman, Chad; Buckner, Cameron & Alexander, Joshua

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2018-12-29

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