Are Desires Beliefs about Normative Reasons?

Analytic Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract
There has been an ongoing debate about whether desires are beliefs. Call the claim that they are the desire-as-belief thesis (DAB). This paper sets out to impugn the two versions of DAB that have enjoyed the most support in the philosophical literature: the guise of the good and the guise of reasons accounts. According to the guise of the good version of DAB, the desire to X is identical to the belief that X is good. According to the guise of reasons version of DAB, the desire to X is identical to the belief that one has a normative reason to X. My paper presents a pair of objections to DAB: the first specifically targets the guise of reasons account defended by Alex Gregory, while the second aims to undermine DAB more generally.
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Archival date: 2019-05-19
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2019-05-19

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