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  1. Claudine Verheggen (ed.), Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language at 40.Guido Tana - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (4):331-348.
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  2. Responsibility to Reflect: Doxastic Reflection as Epistemic Responsibility in Democracy.Maddox Larson - manuscript
    In this paper, I argue that responsible knowers are responsive to critical feedback that their reasons for believing in a given proposition or using certain principles of reasoning are inadequate. The project of democracy expects that agents can provide reasons for their beliefs during testimonial exchange. Voters provide reasons to representatives. Representatives provide reasons to voters. Voters provide reasons to each other. And representatives provide reasons to each other. This means that when voters or representatives cannot provide reasons, democratic mechanisms (...)
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  3. Resistance to Evidence, by Mona Simion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024. Pp. xiv + 214. (Review). [REVIEW]Carolina Flores - forthcoming - Mind.
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  4. The value of testimonial-based beliefs in the face of AI-generated quasi-testimony.Felipe Alejandro Álvarez Osorio & Ruth Marcela Espinosa Sarmiento - 2024 - Aufklärung 11 (Especial):25-38.
    The value of testimony as a source of knowledge has been a subject of epistemological debates. The "trust theory of testimony" suggests that human testimony is based on an affective relationship supported by social norms. However, the advent of generative artificial intelligence challenges our understanding of genuine testimony. The concept of "quasi-testimony" seeks to characterize utterances produced by non-human entities that mimic testimony but lack certain fundamental attributes. This article analyzes these issues in depth, exploring philosophical perspectives on testimony and (...)
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  5. Epistemology of Conversation: First essays.Waldomiro J. Silva-Filho (ed.) - 2024 - Cham: Springer.
    Conversation, dialogue, reasonable disagreement, and the acquisition of knowledge through the words of others, all of this has always been at the center of philosophers’ concerns since the emergence of philosophy in Ancient Greece. It is also important to recognize that in contemporary philosophy, marked by the linguistic turn, there is a wealth of intellectual production on ethical, psycho-linguistic, logical-linguistic, and pragmatic aspects of the conversation. Despite all this, this is the first collection of texts dedicated exclusively to the strictly (...)
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  6. Kant’s Account of Epistemic Normativity.Reza Hadisi - 2024 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 106 (3):576-610.
    According to a common interpretation, most explicitly defended by Onora O’Neill and Patricia Kitcher, Kant held that epistemic obligations normatively depend on moral obligations. That is, were a rational agent not bound by any moral obligation, then she would not be bound by any epistemic obligation either. By contrast, in this paper, I argue that, according to Kant, some epistemic obligations are normatively independent from moral obligations, and are indeed normatively absolute. This view, which I call epistemicism, has two parts. (...)
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  7. Review of Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way's Getting Things Right and Daniel Whiting's The Range of Reasons in Ethics and Epistemology[REVIEW]Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - Mind.
    This is a review of two books from Southampton, Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way's Getting Things Right (OUP 2023) and Daniel Whiting's The Range of Reasons in Ethics and Epistemology (OUP 2022).
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  8. (1 other version)The rules and aims of inquiry.Javier Gonzalez de Prado - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    Are norms of inquiry in tension with epistemic norms? I provide a (largely) negative answer, turning to a picture of epistemic practices as rule-governed games. The idea is that, while epistemic norms are correctness standards for the attitudes involved in epistemic games, norms of inquiry derive from the aims of those games. Attitudes that, despite being epistemically correct, are inadvisable regarding the goals of some inquiry are just like bad (but legal) moves in basketball or chess. I further consider cases (...)
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  9. (1 other version)Can We Defend Normative Error Theory?Joshua Taccolini - 2024 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 20 (1):131-154.
    Normative error theorists aim to defend an error theory which says that normative judgments ascribe normative properties, and such properties, including reasons for belief, are never instantiated. Many philosophers have raised objections to defending a theory which entails that we cannot have reason to believe it. Spencer Case objects that error theorists simply cannot avoid self-defeat. Alternatively, Bart Streumer argues that we cannot believe normative error theory but that, surprisingly, this helps its advocates defend it against these objections. I think (...)
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  10. Awareness By Degree.Paul Silva Jr & Robert Weston Siscoe - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Do factive mental states come in degrees? If so, what is their underlying structure, and what is their theoretical significance? Many have observed that ‘knows that’ is not a gradable verb and have taken this to be strong evidence that propositional knowledge does not come in degrees. This paper demonstrates that the adjective ‘aware that’ passes all the standard tests of gradability, and thus strongly motivates the idea that it refers to a factive mental state that comes in degrees. We (...)
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  11. Sosa’s virtue account vs. responsibilism.Xingming Hu - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-16.
    I first present a brief interpretation of Sosa’s virtue epistemology by showing how it is arguably better than Goldman’s process reliabilism, why Sosa distinguishes between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and how Sosa’s recent account of knowing full well can deal with pragmatic encroachment. Then, I raise two worries about Sosa’s account: (a) Sosa’s claim that one might have animal knowledge without knowing reflectively or knowing full well implies that one’s true belief might manifest both competence and luck, which seems (...)
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  12. Epistemic ownership and the practical/epistemic parallelism.Jesús Navarro - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):163.
    We may succed in the fulfilment of our desires but still fail to properly own our practical life, perhaps because we acted as addicts, driven by desires that are alien to our will, or as “wantons,” satisfying the desires that we simply happen to have (Frankfurt, 1988 ). May we equally fail to own the outcomes of our epistemic life? If so, how may we attain epistemic ownership over it? This paper explores the structural parallellism between practical and epistemic rationality, (...)
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  13. Zetetic indispensability and epistemic justification.Mikayla Kelley - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):671-688.
    Robust metanormative realists think that there are irreducibly normative, metaphysically heavy normative facts. One might wonder how we could be epistemically justified in believing that such facts exist. In this paper, I offer an answer to this question: one’s belief in the existence of robustly real normative facts is epistemically justified because so believing is indispensable to being a successful inquirer for creatures like us. The argument builds on Enoch's (2007, 2011) deliberative indispensability argument for Robust Realism but avoids relying (...)
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  14. Normativity and Concepts of Bodily Sensations.Kevin Reuter - forthcoming - Studia Philosophica: Jahrbuch Der Schweizerischen Philosoph Ischen Gesellschaft, Annuaire de la Société Suisse de Philosphie .
    This paper challenges the philosophical assumption that bodily sensations are free from normative constraints. It examines the normative status of bodily sensations through two studies: a corpus-linguistic analysis and an experimental investigation. The corpus analysis shows that while emotions are frequently subject to normative judgments concerning their appropriateness, similar attitudes are less evident towards bodily sensations like feelings of pain, hunger and cold. In contrast, however, the experimental study reveals notable differences in conceptions of bodily sensations. It finds that sensations (...)
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  15. Kornblith on Epistemic Normativity.Matthew McGrath - forthcoming - In Luis Oliveira & Joshua DiPaolo (eds.), Kornblith and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Kornblith’s “Epistemic Normativity” is a classic in the now voluminous literature on the source of epistemic normativity. His account is as simple as it is bold: the source is desire, not a desire for true belief, or knowledge, but any set of desires. No matter what desires you have, so long as you are a being of a kind that employs beliefs in cost-benefit analysis, certain sorts of truth-centered epistemic norms will have normative force for you. We can distinguish two (...)
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  16. ¿Una base ética implicada en el procedimentalismo epistémico de Estlund?Felipe Alejandro Álvarez Osorio - 2023 - Revista Ethika+ 8:37-52.
    En este artículo se argumenta que el procedimentalismo epistémico de Estlund, en tanto que modelo democrático, requiere de disposiciones éticas mínimas que no son explicitadas en la propuesta. Para mostrar este punto, aborda la propuesta de Estlund desde la noción de modelo democrático de Macpherson. Con esto, se advierte que las disposiciones éticas mínimas que configurarían una base ética implícita en el procedimentalismo epistémico serían tres: una disposición frente al conocimiento que involucra el proceso; otra frente al procedimiento democrático mismo; (...)
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  17. Discipline and Punish: The translation of the absent or the comment to be translated.Alex Pereira De Araújo - 2021 - Academia Letters 4367:01-05.
    This comment text brings, at the end, a part of Surveiller et Punir (Discipline and Punish), which has not been translated into Portuguese and does not appear in more than 40 editions of the Brazilian translation. It is on the back cover of the original in French, as if it were an afterword, signed by the author himself, Michel Foucault, which more than 40 years ago published by Editions Gallimard, his first copies in February 1975. Two years later, the Brazilian (...)
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  18. Quine'ın Doğallaştırılmış Epistemolojisinin Normatifliği Üzerine (On the Normativity of Quine's Naturalized Epistemology).Mahmut Özer & Eylem Yenisoy Şahin - 2015 - FLSF (Felsefe Ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi) 2015 (20):17-38.
    Normativity of naturalized epistemology is one of the most extensively and hotly debated topics in contemporary epistemology. In order to reveal the relationship between normativity and naturalized epistemology, we firstly conduct an analysis of “Epistemology Naturalized,” the article on which the naturalized epistemology was founded. Then we compare the views which argue that normativity goes by the board with those which defend that normativity is conserved if epistemology is naturalized. Finally, based especially on Quine’s own views, we argue that naturalized (...)
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  19. Police Deception and Dishonesty – The Logic of Lying.Luke William Hunt - 2024 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Cooperative relations steeped in honesty and good faith are a necessity for any viable society. This is especially relevant to the police institution because the police are entrusted to promote justice and security. Despite the necessity of societal honesty and good faith, the police institution has embraced deception, dishonesty, and bad faith as tools of the trade for providing security. In fact, it seems that providing security is impossible without using deception and dishonesty during interrogations, undercover operations, pretextual detentions, and (...)
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  20. The Practical Bearings of Truth as Correspondence.Tom Kaspers - 2023 - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Pragmatists are usually very antagonistic toward the correspondence theory of truth. They contend that the evidence-transcendent standard entailed by the theory is antithetical to the pragmatist methodology of elucidating concepts by exposing their practical bearings. What use could truth be to us if it offers a target we cannot even see? After judging the correspondence theory to be in violation of the Pragmatic Maxim, the pragmatist is prone to banishing it to the wastelands of empty metaphysics, where nothing of practical (...)
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  21. Epistemic Rights, Moral Rights, and The Abuse of Perceived Epistemic Authority.Michel Croce - 2023 - Notizie di Politeia 149:122-126.
    This contribution discusses two aspects of Watson’s account of epistemic rights: namely, the nature of epistemic rights, and a particular form of epistemic rights violation that Watson calls the abuse of perceived epistemic authority. It is argued that Watson’s take on both aspects is unsatisfactory, and some suggestions for an alternative view are offered.
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  22. The Motivation Problem of Epistemic Expressivists.Alexandre Duval & Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (26).
    Many philosophers have adopted epistemic expressivism in recent years. The core commitment of epistemic expressivism is that epistemic claims express conative states. This paper assesses the plausibility of this commitment. First, we raise a new type of problem for epistemic expressivism, the epistemic motivation problem. The problem arises because epistemic expressivists must provide an account of the motivational force of epistemic judgment (the mental state expressed by an epistemic claim), yet various features of our mental economy seem to show that (...)
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  23. Truth and Its Uses: Deflationism and Alethic Pluralism.Tom Kaspers - 2023 - Synthese 202 (130):1-24.
    Deflationists believe that the question “What is truth?” should be answered not by means of a metaphysical inquiry into the nature of truth, but by figuring out what use we make of the concept of truth, and the word ‘true’, in practice. This article accepts this methodology, and it thereby rejects pluralism about truth that is driven by ontological considerations. However, it shows that there are practical considerations for a pluralism about truth, formulated at the level of use. The theory (...)
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  24. Withhold by Default: A Difference Between Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    It may seem that epistemic and practical rationality weigh reasons differently, because ties in practical rationality tend to generate permissions and ties in epistemic rationality tend to generate a requirement to withhold judgment. I argue that epistemic and practical rationality weigh reasons in the same way, but they have different "default biases". Practical rationality is biased toward every option being permissible whereas epistemic rationality is biased toward withholding judgment's being required.
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  25. Twisted ways to speak our minds, or ways to speak our twisted minds?Luis Rosa - 2024 - In Waldomiro J. Silva-Filho (ed.), Epistemology of Conversation: First essays. Cham: Springer.
    There are many ways in which a speaker can confuse their audience. In this paper, I will focus on one such way, namely, a way of talking that seems to manifest a cross-level kind of cognitive dissonance on the part of the speaker. The goal of the paper is to explain why such ways of talking sound so twisted. The explanation is two-pronged, since their twisted nature may come either from the very mental states that the speaker thereby makes manifest, (...)
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  26. The Deontic Primacy of Actions?Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (10):521-549.
    Why ought we to perform the actions that we ought to perform? We can categorize the various answers to this question depending on whether they hold that the oughts governing actions are explained by the oughts governing non-actions. In this essay, I show how a handful of plausible claims from normative ethics, moral psychology, and the philosophy of action entail the conclusion that what an agent ought to do is explained by the attitudes she ought to have.
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  27. Introduction.Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-10.
    This collection of newly commissioned essays, edited by NYU philosophers Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke, resumes the current surge of interest in the proper explication of the notion of a priori. The authors discuss the relations of the a priori to the notions of definition, meaning, justification, and ontology, explore how the concept figured historically in the philosophies of Leibniz, Kant, Frege, and Wittgenstein, and address its role in the contemporary philosophies of logic, mathematics, mind, and science. The editors’ Introduction (...)
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  28. Partial Relationships and Epistemic Injustice.Ji-Young Lee - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (3):543-556.
    In moral and political philosophy, topics like the distributive inequities conferred via special partial relationships – family relationships, for example – have been frequently debated. However, the epistemic dimensions of such partiality are seldom discussed in the ethical context, and the topic of partial relationships rarely feature in the realm of social epistemology. My view is that the role of partial relationships is worth exploring to enrich our understanding of epistemic injustice and its transmission. I claim that epistemic features typical (...)
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  29. Why think that belief is evidence-responsive?Carolina Flores - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.
    The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...)
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  30. Norm Conflicts and Epistemic Modals.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen & John Cantwell - 2023 - Cognitive Psychology 145 (101591):1-30.
    Statements containing epistemic modals (e.g., “by spring 2023 most European countries may have the Covid-19 pandemic under control”) are common expressions of epistemic uncertainty. In this paper, previous published findings (Knobe & Yalcin, 2014; Khoo & Phillips, 2018) on the opposition between Contextualism and Relativism for epistemic modals are re-examined. It is found that these findings contain a substantial degree of individual variation. To investigate whether participants differ in their interpretation of epistemic modals, an experiment with multiple phases and sessions (...)
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  31. Good guesses as accuracy-specificity tradeoffs.Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2025-2050.
    Guessing is a familiar activity, one we engage in when we are uncertain of the answer to a question under discussion. It is also an activity that lends itself to normative evaluation: some guesses are better than others. The question that interests me here is what makes for a good guess. In recent work, Dorst and Mandelkern have argued that good guesses are distinguished from bad ones by how well they optimize a tradeoff between accuracy and specificity. Here I argue (...)
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  32. Epistemic Akrasia: Irrational or Worse.Eyal Tal - manuscript
    Epistemically akratic agents believe both p and that believing p is irrational for them. Some of the costs of thinking that epistemic akrasia can be rational are clear. It is hypocritical, and outright weird, to have beliefs that we consider irrational, let alone to reason with or act on those beliefs. However, as Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2020) and Brian Weatherson (2019) have argued, the weirdness of akrasia does not obviously tell against its rationality. Here I argue that views permitting epistemic akrasia (...)
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  33. Meta‐Skepticism.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):541-565.
    The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge-like concepts that there are. If this is correct, it follows that even if our beliefs satisfy our concept of knowledge, there are many other relevantly similar concepts that they fail to satisfy. And this might give us pause. After all, we might (...)
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  34. Meta‐Skepticism.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):541-565.
    The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge-like concepts that there are. If this is correct, it follows that even if our beliefs satisfy our concept of knowledge, there are many other relevantly similar concepts that they fail to satisfy. And this might give us pause. After all, we might (...)
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  35. Meta‐Skepticism.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):541-565.
    The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge-like concepts that there are. If this is correct, it follows that even if our beliefs satisfy our concept of knowledge, there are many other relevantly similar concepts that they fail to satisfy. And this might give us pause. After all, we might (...)
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  36. Whose Responsibility is it Anyway?Accountability and Standpoints for Disaster Risk Reduction in Nepal.Sheena Ramkumar - 2022 - Dissertation, Durham University
    Generalisation, universal knowledge claims, and recommendations within disaster studies are problematic because they lead to miscommunication and the misapplication of actionable knowledge. The consequences and impacts thereof are not often considered by experts; forgone as irrelevant to the academic division of labour. There is a disconnect between expert assertions for disaster risk reduction (DRR) and their practical suitability for laypersons. Experts currently assert independently of the context within which protective action measures (PAMs) are to be used, measures unconnected to the (...)
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  37. Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.
    When a belief has been influenced, in part or whole, by factors that, by the believer's own lights, do not bear on the truth of the believed proposition, we can say that the belief has been, in a sense, arbitrarily formed. Can such beliefs ever be rational? It might seem obvious that they can't. After all, belief, supposedly, “aims at the truth.” But many epistemologists have come to think that certain kinds of arbitrary beliefs can, indeed, be rational. In this (...)
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  38. A defense of the veritist account of the goal of inquiry.Xingming Hu - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Veritists hold that the goal of inquiry is true belief, while justificationists contend that the goal of inquiry is justified belief. Recently, Christoph Kelp makes two new objections to both veritism and justificationism. Further, he claims that the two objections suggest that the goal of inquiry is knowledge. This paper defends a sophisticated version of veritism against Kelp's two objections.
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  39. Bioética e consenso. Uma análise da teoria principialista.Marta Dias Barcelos - 2022 - Cascais: Princípia Editora.
    «A experiência global e partilhada da pandemia obrigou-nos a focar a natureza – simultaneamente pública e ética – das decisões em saúde e fez sobressair a importância do consenso. Esta exigência – agora tão visível – vinha-se fazendo sentir há décadas. Prova disso é que cresceu exponencialmente a literatura que se debruça sobre as implicações antropológicas e éticas dos grandes âmbitos da cultura mais diretamente vinculados ao mundo da tecnologia, das biotecnologias à inteligência artificial. Uma das áreas em que a (...)
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  40. Luck and the Value of Communication.Megan Hyska - 2023 - Synthese 201 (96):1-19.
    Those in the Gricean tradition take it that successful human communication features an audience who not only arrives at the intended content of the signal, but also recognizes the speaker’s intention that they do so. Some in this tradition have also argued that there are yet further conditions on communicative success, which rule out the possibility of communicating by luck. Supposing that both intention-recognition and some sort of anti-luck condition are correctly included in an analysis of human communication, this article (...)
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  41. The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument.YiLi Zhou & Rhys Borchert - 2023 - Philosophy 98 (2):215-241.
    Many moral error theorists reject moral realism on the grounds that moral realism implies the existence of categorical normativity, yet categorical normativity does not exist. Call this the Metaphysical Argument. In response, some moral realists have emphasized a parity between moral normativity and epistemic normativity. They argue that if one kind of normativity is rejected, then both must be rejected. Therefore, one cannot be a moral error theorist without also being an epistemic error theorist. Call this the Parity Argument. In (...)
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  42. Review of Daniel Whiting's The Range of Reasons: In Ethics and Epistemology[REVIEW]Nathaniel Sharadin - 2023 - Ethics 133 (3):461-465.
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  43. Quine, Laudan ve Doğallaştırılmış Epistemolojinin Normatifliği Sorunu (Quine, Laudan, and the Normativity Problem of Naturalized Epistemology).Mahmut Özer - 2022 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 12 (12:4):913-937.
    Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized” is the locus classicus of naturalism in epistemology. Many traditional epistemologists criticized the naturalization of epistemology specifically targeting this article. The critics argue that Quine abolishes the normativity of epistemology. For he proposes epistemology as a chapter of psychology. Laudan, like Quine, believes that epistemology should be naturalized. However, he criticizes Quine’s project of naturalization for similar reasons as Quine’s critics. Instead, he proposes a new project that he calls “normative naturalism”. In this work, I will first (...)
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  44. Ambiguous Statements about Akrasia.Luis Rosa - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):581-601.
    Epistemologists take themselves to disagree about whether there are situations where it is rational for one to believe that p and rational for one to believe that one’s evidence does not support p (rational akrasia). The embedded sentence ‘one’s evidence does not support p’ can be interpreted in two ways, however, depending on what the semantic contribution of ‘one’s evidence’ is taken to be. ‘One’s evidence’ might be seen as a sheer indexical or as a descriptive singular term. The first (...)
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  45. How Values Shape the Machine Learning Opacity Problem.Emily Sullivan - 2022 - In Insa Lawler, Kareem Khalifa & Elay Shech (eds.), Scientific Understanding and Representation: Modeling in the Physical Sciences. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 306-322.
    One of the main worries with machine learning model opacity is that we cannot know enough about how the model works to fully understand the decisions they make. But how much is model opacity really a problem? This chapter argues that the problem of machine learning model opacity is entangled with non-epistemic values. The chapter considers three different stages of the machine learning modeling process that corresponds to understanding phenomena: (i) model acceptance and linking the model to the phenomenon, (ii) (...)
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  46. Evidence and Epistemic Normativity.Daniel Buckley - 2022 - Dissertation, Indiana University, Bloomington
    Evidence is often taken to be “normative” for doxastic agents. For instance, we are told to apportion our beliefs to the evidence, to not believe a claim without seeking out countervailing evidence, and so on. But what accounts for the normativity of evidence? This dissertation is devoted to answering this question. In order to answer it, I develop a novel approach to the theory of epistemic normativity. According to my approach, epistemic norms structure a social practice of epistemic accountability. This (...)
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  47. Justification Without Excuses: A Defense of Classical Deontologism.Blake McAllister - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):353-366.
    Arguably, the original conception of epistemic justification comes from Descartes and Locke, who thought of justification deontologically. Moreover, their deontological conception was especially strict: there are no excuses for unjustified beliefs. Call this the “classical deontologist” conception of justification. As the original conception, we ought to accept it unless proven untenable. Nowadays, however, most have abandoned classical deontologism as precisely that—untenable. It stands accused of requiring doxastic voluntarism and normative transparency. My goal is to rescue classical deontologism from these accusations. (...)
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  48. Introduction to the special issue “alethic pluralism and the normativity of truth”.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4):309-310.
    In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative property, it cannot be as metaphysically insubstantive as deflationists claim.1 This argument has been taken, together with the scope problem,2 as one of the main motivations for alethic pluralism.3 We offer a reconstruction of Wright’s Inflationary Argument (henceforth IA) aimed at highlighting what are the steps required to establish its inflationary conclusion. We argue that if a certain metaphysical and epistemological view of a given subject matter (...)
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  49. Bad Concepts, Bilateral Contents.Michael Deigan - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8:595-614.
    I argue that one need not be an inferentialist in order to model inconsistent concepts, contrary to what some have thought. Representationalists can do so by adopting a form of bilateralism about contents. It remains unclear, however, why conceptual inconsistency would constitute a defect to be eliminated, rather than a vindication of dialetheism to be embraced. I suggest some answers to explore that involve accepting a descriptive form of dialetheism but denying its normative forms.
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  50. Epistemic Atonement.Elise Woodard - 2023 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 18. Oxford University Press.
    When we think about agents who change a long-standing belief, we sometimes have conflicting reactions. On the one hand, such agents often epistemically improve. For example, their new belief may be better supported by the evidence or closer to the truth. On the other hand, such agents are often subject to criticism. Examples include politicians who change their minds on whether climate change is occurring or whether vaccines cause autism. What explains this criticism, and is it ever justified? To answer (...)
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