Reconceiving Direction of Fit

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):171-180 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
I argue that the concept of direction of fit is best seen as picking out a certain inferential property of a psychological attitude. The property in question is one that believing shares with assuming and fantasizing and fails to share with desire. Unfortunately, the standard analysis of DOF obscures this fact because it conflates two very different properties of an attitude: that in virtue of which it displays a certain DOF, and that in virtue of which it displays certain revision conditions. I claim that the latter corresponds with the aim of an attitude, not its DOF. In order to remedy this failure of the standard analysis, I offer an alternative account of DOF, which I refer to as the two-content analysis
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-01-11
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Intention.Anscombe, G. E. M.
Intention.Heath, P. L.

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Nature of Desire.Lauria, Federico & Deonna, Julien (eds.)

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
290 ( #15,441 of 50,081 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #35,381 of 50,081 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.