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  1. added 2020-06-29
    Moral Grandstanding as a Threat to Free Expression.Justin Tosi & Brandon Warmke - forthcoming - Social Philosophy and Policy 37 (1).
    Moral grandstanding, or the use of moral talk for self-promotion, is a threat to free expression. When grandstanding is introduced in a public forum, several ideals of free expression are less likely to be realized. Popular views are less likely to be challenged, people are less free to entertain heterodox ideas, and the cost of changing one’s mind goes up.
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  2. added 2020-06-16
    Who Owns Up to the Past? Heritage and Historical Injustice.Erich Hatala Matthes - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1):87-104.
    ‘Heritage’ is a concept that often carries significant normative weight in moral and political argument. In this article, I present and critique a prevalent conception according to which heritage must have a positive valence. I argue that this view of heritage leads to two moral problems: Disowning Injustice and Embracing Injustice. In response, I argue for an alternative conception of heritage that promises superior moral and political consequences. In particular, this alternative jettisons the traditional focus on heritage as a primarily (...)
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  3. added 2020-06-11
    검토살인자 옆집 (The Murderer Next Door) David Buss (2005)(검토 개정 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In 지구상의 지옥에 오신 것을 환영합니다 : 아기, 기후 변화, 비트 코인, 카르텔, 중국, 민주주의, 다양성, 역학, 평등, 해커, 인권, 이슬람, 자유주의, 번영, 웹, 혼돈, 기아, 질병, 폭력, 인공 지능, 전쟁. La Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 317-328.
    이 책은 조금 일자이지만, 살인의 심리학을 구체적으로 다루는 몇 가지 최근 인기있는 책이 있으며, 그것은 몇 달러에 사용할 수있는 빠른 개요입니다, 그래서 여전히 잘 노력 가치가. 그것은 포괄적 인 시도를하지 않으며, 독자가 그의 많은 다른 책과 폭력에 대한 광대 한 문학에서 공백을 채울 것으로 예상과 함께, 장소에서 다소 피상적이다. 업데이트는 예를 들어, 버스, 진화 심리학 의 핸드북 2nd. V1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270-282, 388-389, 545-546, 547, 566 및 버스, 진화 심리학 5 번째 에드. (2015) p 26, 96-97,223, 293-4, 300, (...)
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  4. added 2020-06-10
    Tugend Als Wahrnehmungspotenzial. Der Begriff der Ethischen Wahrnehmung in Tugendethischen Konzeptionen.Andreas Trampota - 2011 - In Dieter Schönecker Elisabeth Heinrich (ed.), Wirklichkeit und Wahrnehmung des Heiligen, Schönen, Guten. Neue Beiträge zur Realismusdebatte. Paderborn: Mentis. pp. 303-321.
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  5. added 2020-06-09
    Vernunft allein bewegt nichts. Hume, Kant und die Externalismus-Internalismus-Debatte.Andreas Trampota - 2012 - In Maria Schwartz Godehard Brüntrup (ed.), Warum wir handeln – Philosophie der Motivation. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. pp. 41-59.
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  6. added 2020-05-28
    Self‐Assessment and Social Practices.Jeremy Fischer - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (2):144-164.
    This article develops and defends a social practice-based theory of personal ideals. After sketching this theory, I show how it undermines the sharp dichotomy between evaluative self-assessment and assessment of one’s social standing that underlies common objections to accounts of pride and shame (such as Rawls’s account of shame) that explain these emotions in terms of personal ideals.
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  7. added 2020-05-11
    Shared Agency and Contralateral Commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.
    My concern here is to motivate some theses in the philosophy of mind concerning the interpersonal character of intentions. I will do so by investigating aspects of shared agency. The main point will be that when acting together with others one must be able to act directly on the intention of another or others in a way that is relevantly similar to the manner in which an agent acts on his or her own intentions. What exactly this means will become (...)
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  8. added 2020-05-08
    Building Machines That Learn and Think About Morality.Christopher Burr & Geoff Keeling - 2018 - In Proceedings of the Convention of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour (AISB 2018). Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour.
    Lake et al. propose three criteria which, they argue, will bring artificial intelligence (AI) systems closer to human cognitive abilities. In this paper, we explore the application of these criteria to a particular domain of human cognition: our capacity for moral reasoning. In doing so, we explore a set of considerations relevant to the development of AI moral decision-making. Our main focus is on the relation between dual-process accounts of moral reasoning and model-free/model-based forms of machine learning. We also discuss (...)
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  9. added 2020-05-01
    The Challenges of Forgiveness in Context: Introduction to The Moral Psychology of Forgiveness.Kathryn J. Norlock - 2017 - In The Moral Psychology of Forgiveness. London: Rowman & Littlefield, International.
    I offer a brief survey of thematic elements in contemporary literature on forgiveness and then an overview of the responses to that literature comprising the contents of this volume. I concentrate on the extent to which work in moral psychology provides a needed corrective to some excesses in philosophical aversion to empirically informed theorizing. I aim to complicate what has been referred to at times as the standard or classic view, by which philosophers often mean the predominant view of forgiveness (...)
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  10. added 2020-04-20
    The Empirical Case for Folk Indexical Moral Relativism.James R. Beebe - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy 4.
    Recent empirical work on folk moral objectivism has attempted to examine the extent to which folk morality presumes that moral judgments are objectively true or false. Some researchers report findings that they take to indicate folk commitment to objectivism (Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; Wainryb et al., 2004; Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2010, 2012), while others report findings that may reveal a more variable commitment to objectivism (Sarkissian, et al., 2011; Wright, Grandjean, & McWhite, 2013; Wright, McWhite, & Grandjean, 2014; Beebe, (...)
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  11. added 2020-04-14
    Toolmaking and the Origin of Normative Cognition.Jonathan Birch - manuscript
    We are all guided by thousands of norms, but how did our capacity for normative cognition evolve? I propose there is a deep but neglected link between normative cognition and practical skill. In modern humans, complex motor skills and craft skills, such as skills related to toolmaking and tool use, are guided by internally represented norms of correct performance. Moreover, it is plausible that core components of human normative cognition evolved in response to the distinctive demands of transmitting complex motor (...)
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  12. added 2020-04-09
    Learning From Failure: Shame and Emotion Regulation in Virtue as Skill.Matt Stichter - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-14.
    On an account of virtue as skill, virtues are acquired in the ways that skills are acquired. In this paper I focus on one implication of that account that is deserving of greater attention, which is that becoming more skillful requires learning from one’s failures, but that turns out to be especially challenging when dealing with moral failures. In skill acquisition, skills are improved by deliberate practice, where you strive to correct past mistakes and learn how to overcome your current (...)
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  13. added 2020-03-24
    Indoctrination, Moral Instruction, and Nonrational Beliefs.Michael S. Merry - 2005 - Educational Theory 55 (4):399-420.
    The manner in which individuals hold various nonevidentiary beliefs is critical to making any evaluative claim regarding an individual's autonomy. In this essay, I argue that one may be both justified in holding nonrational beliefs of a nonevidentiary sort while also being capable of leading an autonomous life. I defend the idea that moral instruction, including that which concerns explicitly religious content, may justifiably constitute a set of commitments upon which rationality and autonomy are dependent. I situate this discussion against (...)
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  14. added 2020-03-23
    Uncovering the Moral Heuristics of Altruism: A Philosophical Scale.Julian Friedland, Kyle Emich & Benjamin M. Cole - 2020 - PLoS ONE 15 (3).
    Extant research suggests that individuals employ traditional moral heuristics to support their observed altruistic behavior; yet findings have largely been limited to inductive extrapolation and rely on relatively few traditional frames in so doing, namely, deontology in organizational behavior and virtue theory in law and economics. Given that these and competing moral frames such as utilitarianism can manifest as identical behavior, we develop a moral framing instrument—the Philosophical Moral-Framing Measure (PMFM)—to expand and distinguish traditional frames associated and disassociated with observed (...)
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  15. added 2020-03-20
    Moral Luck and Moral Performance.Hallvard Lillehammer - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    The aims of this paper are fourfold. The first aim is to characterize two distinct forms of circumstantial moral luck and illustrate how they are implicitly recognized in pre-theoretical moral thought. The second aim is to identify a significant difference between the ways in which these two kinds of circumstantial luck are morally relevant. The third aim is to show how the acceptance of circumstantial moral luck relates to the acceptance of resultant moral luck. The fourth aim is to defuse (...)
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  16. added 2020-03-10
    Making Peace with Moral Imperfection.Camil Golub - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (2).
    How can we rationally make peace with our past moral failings, while committing to avoid similar mistakes in the future? Is it because we cannot do anything about the past, while the future is still open? Or is it that regret for our past mistakes is psychologically harmful, and we need to forgive ourselves in order to be able to move on? Or is it because moral mistakes enable our moral growth? I argue that these and other answers do not (...)
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  17. added 2020-02-17
    Derivation of Morality From Prudence.Marcus Arvan - 2020 - In Neurofunctional Prudence and Morality: A Philosophical Theory. New York: Routledge. pp. 60-94.
    This chapter derives and refines a novel normative moral theory and descriptive theory of moral psychology--Rightness as Fairness--from the theory of prudence defended in Chapter 2. It briefly summarizes Chapter 2’s finding that prudent agents typically internalize ‘moral risk-aversion’. It then outlines how this prudential psychology leads prudent agents to want to know how to act in ways they will not regret in morally salient cases, as well as to regard moral actions as the only types of actions that satisfy (...)
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  18. added 2020-02-17
    Neurofunctional Prudence and Morality: A Philosophical Theory.Marcus Arvan - 2020 - New York, USA: Routledge.
    This book outlines a unified theory of prudence and morality that merges a wide variety of findings in behavioral neuroscience with philosophically sophisticated normative theorizing. Chapter 1 lays out the emerging behavioral neuroscience of prudence and morality. Chapter 2 then outlines a new theory of prudence as fairness to oneself across time. Chapter 3 then derives a revised version of my 2016 moral theory--Rightness as Fairness--from this theory of prudence, showing how the theory of prudence defends Rightness as Fairness against (...)
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  19. added 2020-02-17
    Wittgenstein and the Challenge of Global Ethics.Julian Friedland - 2011 - In Claus Dierksmeier, Michael Pirson, Wolfgang Amann, Heiko Spitzeck & Ernst von Kimakowitz (eds.), Humanistic Ethics in the Age of Globality. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 210-22.
    This paper describes Wittgenstein's pre-theoretical transcendentalist conception of ethics and the challenge it presents for the kind of global cosmopolitan perspective required of any multinational social responsibility strategy. It is argued that this challenge can be overcome through establishing a sense of solidarity with all stakeholders via a corporate social compact rooted in what Wittgenstein refers to as spontaneous agreement and sympathy. Contemporary examples of successful strategies are provided.
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  20. added 2020-02-16
    One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I defend the widely-held view that morally worthy action need not be motivated by a desire to promote rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of luck that their (...)
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  21. added 2020-02-03
    Book Review: Clean Hands? Philosophical Lessons From Scrupulosity by Jesse S. Summers and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. [REVIEW]Pei-Hua Huang - forthcoming - Journal of Applied Philosophy.
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  22. added 2020-02-01
    Surviving Homophobia: Overcoming Evil Environments.Claudia Card - 2018 - In Shlomit Harrosh & Roger Crisp (eds.), Moral Evil in Practical Ethics. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 145-164.
    Thinking of the evils of homophobia and what is needed to survive them requires acknowledging a new category of evil besides the evils of individual deeds, social practices and social structures. That further category is evil social environments. Building on the work of Jeremy Waldron on the harm in hate speech, this chapter extends that account to certain hate crimes that, like the written word, send a lingering social message. The cases of four women survivors of homophobia are then examined (...)
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  23. added 2019-12-21
    Nietzsche Contra Sublimation.Eli I. Lichtenstein - forthcoming - Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    Many commentators have claimed that Nietzsche views the “sublimation” (Sublimierung) of drives as a positive achievement. Against this tradition, I argue that, on the dominant if not universal Nietzschean use of Sublimierung and its cognates, sublimation is just a broad psychological analogue of the traditional (al)chemical process: the “vaporization” of drives into a finer or lighter state, figuratively if not literally. This can yield ennobling elevation, or purity in a positive sense—the intensified “sublimate” of an unrefined original sample. But it (...)
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  24. added 2019-12-16
    "Shining Lights, Even in Death": What Metal Gear Can Teach Us About Morality.Ryan Wasser - 2019 - Digital Commons @ West Chester University.
    Morality has always been a pressing issue in video game scholarship, but became more contentious after “realistic” violence in games became possible. However, few studies concern themselves with how players experience moral dilemmas in games, choosing instead to focus on the way games affect postplay behavior. In my thesis I discuss the moral choices players encounter in the Metal Gear series of games; then, I analyze and compare the responses of players with and without martial career experiences. My argument is (...)
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  25. added 2019-10-27
    The Creeps as a Moral Emotion.Jeremy Fischer & Rachel Fredericks - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (6):191-217.
    Creepiness and the emotion of the creeps have been overlooked in the moral philosophy and moral psychology literatures. We argue that the creeps is a morally significant emotion in its own right, and not simply a type of fear, disgust, or anger (though it shares features with those emotions). Reflecting on cases, we defend a novel account of the creeps as felt in response to creepy people. According to our moral insensitivity account, the creeps is fitting just when its object (...)
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  26. added 2019-10-21
    Hypocrisy as Either Deception or Akrasia.Christopher Bartel - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (2):269-281.
    The intuitive, folk concept of hypocrisy is not a unified moral category. While many theorists hold that all cases of hypocrisy involve some form of deception, I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I argue for a disjunctive account of hypocrisy whereby all cases of “hypocrisy” involve either the deceiving of others about the sincerity of an agent's beliefs or the lack of will to carry through with the demands of an agent's sincere beliefs. Thus, all cases of (...)
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  27. added 2019-10-16
    Moral Grandstanding in Public Discourse: Status-Seeking Motives as a Potential Explanatory Mechanism in Predicting Conflict.Joshua B. Grubbs, Brandon Warmke, Justin Tosi, A. Shanti James & W. Keith Campbell - 2019 - PLoS ONE 14 (10).
    Public discourse is often caustic and conflict-filled. This trend seems to be particularly evident when the content of such discourse is around moral issues (broadly defined) and when the discourse occurs on social media. Several explanatory mechanisms for such conflict have been explored in recent psychological and social-science literatures. The present work sought to examine a potentially novel explanatory mechanism defined in philosophical literature: Moral Grandstanding. According to philosophical accounts, Moral Grandstanding is the use of moral talk to seek social (...)
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  28. added 2019-10-10
    Blame as a Volitional Activity.Neal Tognazzini - manuscript
    Blame is fascinating yet elusive, and it is both of these things because it is so complex. It seems to have a cognitive aspect (the belief that someone has done wrong, perhaps), but it also seems to have an emotional aspect (resentment at being disrespected, perhaps). And then of course there is the outside-of-the-head aspect of blame, which manifests itself in rebukes and reprimands, accusations and distrust, cold shoulders and estrangement. Still, accounts of blame that identify it with beliefs or (...)
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  29. added 2019-10-10
    On Losing One's Moral Voice.Neal Tognazzini - manuscript
    Although it is widely accepted that hypocritical blamers lack the standing to blame others who have committed similar wrongs, an account of what it is that’s lost when someone loses their standing to blame remains elusive. When moral address is inappropriate because it is or would be hypocritical, what is the precise nature of the complaint that the blamed party is entitled to raise, and that so often gets voiced as “I don’t have to take that from you”? In this (...)
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  30. added 2019-10-04
    Silence & Salience: On Being Judgmental.Neal Tognazzini - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Ernst Gerhard (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 256-269.
    This chapter explores the concept of judgmentalism: what it is and why it’s morally problematic. After criticizing an account offered by Gary Watson, the paper argues for a broader understanding of what it is to be judgmental, encompassing not just the overall beliefs that we form about someone else, but also the very pattern of our thoughts about those with whom we are involved in interpersonal relationships. The thesis is that to care about someone is to be oriented toward them, (...)
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  31. added 2019-09-28
    The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel Miller - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one’s moral standing to blame. According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N. Yet this condition is seldom argued for. Macalester Bell points out that the fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet explain why hypocritical blame is standingless blame. (...)
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  32. added 2019-09-14
    More or Less Within My Power: Nature, Virtue, and the Modern Stoic.Christian Coseru - 2018 - Reason Papers 40 (2):8-18.
    Can the Stoic conception of what is within our power be adapted to fit our scientifically informed view of nature in general and of human nature in particular? This paper argues that it can, but not without a revision of the Stoic’s classical dichotomy of power principle, namely that some things are up to us, while others are beyond our control. Given the extent to which the Stoic way of life flows from a certain conception of what is real, a (...)
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  33. added 2019-09-09
    Forgiving While Resenting: Justifying Elective Forgiveness.Cristina Roadevin - 2018 - Ethical Perspectives 25 (2):257-284.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of forgiveness in which the victim is warranted in forgiving only if the wrongdoer makes amends for the wrong done. According to such an account, forgiveness is made rational by the wrongdoer apologizing. But this account creates a puzzle because it seems to render cases of undeserved elective forgiveness (where there is no apology or repentance) unjustified. My aim in the present contribution is to argue that electively forgiving unrepentant wrongdoers can be justified if we accept (...)
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  34. added 2019-09-07
    The Limits Of Human Nature.Keith Horton - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):452-470.
    It has become increasingly common recently to construe human natureas setting some pretty stringent limits to moral endeavour. Many consequentialists, in particular, take considerations concerning human nature to defeat certain demanding norms that would otherwise follow from their theory.One argument is that certain commitments ground psychological incapacitiesthat prevent us from doing what would maximize the good. Another is that we would be likely to suffer some kind of psychological demoralization if we tried to become significantly more selfless. I argue that (...)
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  35. added 2019-08-29
    Do We Love For Reasons?Yongming Han - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Do we love for reasons? It can seem as if we do, since most cases of non‐familial love seem *selective*: coming to love a non‐family‐member often begins with our being drawn to them for what they are like. I argue, however, that we can vindicate love's selectivity, even if we maintain that there are no reasons for love; indeed, that gives us a simpler, and hence better, explanation of love's selectivity. We don't, in short, come to love *for* reasons. That (...)
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  36. added 2019-08-15
    O Princípio de Reciprocidade: conceitos, exemplos, princípios e como evitá-lo.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - manuscript
    O PRINCÍPIO DE RECIPROCIDADE: CONCEITO, EXEMPLOS, PRINCÍPIOS E COMO EVITÁ-LO -/- THE RECIPROCITY PRINCIPLE: CONCEPT, EXAMPLES, PRINCIPLES AND HOW TO AVOID IT -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - CAP-UFPE/IFPE-BJ/UFRPE. eisaque335@gmail.com ou eics@discente.ifpe.edu.br WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- PREMISSA -/- Desde a infância, somos ensinados a sermos gratos e devolver os favores que eles nos fizeram. Nós temos essa regra tão internalizada que funciona em muitos casos automaticamente. O problema é que existem pessoas, empresas e associações que usam essa regra contra nós, (...)
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  37. added 2019-07-07
    Folk Moral Objectivism and its Measurement.Lieuwe Zijlstra - 2019 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 84.
    Experimental philosophers and psychologists investigate whether people perceive moral judgments to be objectively true or false. Existing research focuses on a single dimension of ‘perceived objectivity’. The present research examines whether multiple dimensions of folk moral objectivity underlie moral judgments. It also examines whether such dimensions relate to perceived objectivity, tolerance, and people’s behavioral intentions to punish norm-violators. Exploratory factor analysis on twenty ethical items revealed three different ways of perceiving moral truth (Independent Truth, Universal Truth, Divine Truth), which each (...)
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  38. added 2019-06-29
    Betraying Trust.Collin O'Neil - 2017 - In Paul Faulkner & Thomas W. Simpson (eds.), The Philosophy of Trust. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 70-89.
    Trust not only disposes us to feel betrayed, trust can be betrayed. Understanding what a betrayal of trust is requires understanding how trust can ground an obligation on the part of the trusted person to act specifically as trusted. This essay argues that, since trust cannot ground an appropriate obligation where there is no prior obligation, a betrayal of trust should instead be conceived as the violation of a trust-based obligation to respect an already existing obligation. Two forms of trust (...)
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  39. added 2019-06-11
    Faces of Irrationality in Euripides: On Medea's Irrationality.Daniel Simão Nascimento - 2018 - O Que Nos Faz Pensar 43 (27):237-272.
    In Nascimento (2015) I criticized the thesis defended in Irwin (1983) according to which two of the most famous characters in Euripides’ plays, Phaedra and Medea, could be said to exemplify akratic behavior and, in the case of Phaedra, even to explain it. In that article, I’ve pointed out several weakness in these thesis in order to justify my disagreement. I also suggested that, although there was no reason why we should stop looking for examples and explanations of akratic behavior (...)
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  40. added 2019-06-05
    Monkeys, Men, and Moral Responsibility: A Neo-Aristotelian Case for a Qualitative Distinction.Paul Carron - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1):151-161.
    This essay is a Neo-Aristotelian critique of Frans de Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism. For a sentimentalist, moral judgments are rooted in reactive attitudes such as empathy, and De Waal argues that higher primates have the capacity for empathy—they can read other agent’s minds and react appropriately. De Waal concludes that the building blocks of human morality—primarily empathy—are present in primate social behavior. I will engage de Waal from within the sentimentalist tradition itself broadly construed and the Aristotelian virtue tradition more (...)
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  41. added 2019-06-05
    Introduction: Justice and Disadvantages During Childhood: What Does the Capability Approach Have to Offer?Gottfried Schweiger, Gunter Graf & Mar Cabezas - 2016 - Ethical Perspectives 23 (1):73 - 99.
    Justice for children and during childhood and the particular political, social and moral status of children has long been a neglected issue in ethics, and in social and political philosophy. The application of general, adult-oriented theories of justice to children can be regarded as particularly problematic. Philosophers have only recently begun to explore what it means to consider children as equals, what goods are especially valuable to them, and what are the obligations of justice different agents have toward children. In (...)
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  42. added 2019-06-05
    Agreement as the Convergence of Will: A Consensualistic Approach to Negotiation.Arvanitis Alexios - 2015 - New Ideas in Psychology 37:24-32.
    Negotiation is often treated as an attempt to reconcile conflicting interests. Instead, I define negotiation as an attempt to produce a convergence of will. Based on a distinction initially made by Rawls (1955), I draw attention away from summary rules that are introduced during negotiation, including win-win interest prescriptions, and put the emphasis on the practice rules that are validated by the final agreement. The term convergence of will refers to the co-adoption of practice rules that define the interaction that (...)
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  43. added 2019-05-28
    Divine Forgiveness and Mercy in Evolutionary Perspective.Isaac Wiegman - 2017 - In Matthew Nelson Hill & Wm Curtis Holtzen (eds.), Connecting Faith and Science. Claremont: Claremont Press. pp. 189-220.
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  44. added 2019-05-27
    Which Emotional Behaviors Are Actions?Jean Moritz Müller & Hong Yu Wong - forthcoming - In Andrea Scarantino (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. New York City, New York, USA:
    There is a wide range of things we do out of emotion. For example, we smile with pleasure, our voices drop when we are sad, we recoil in shock or jump for joy, we apologize to others out of remorse. It is uncontroversial that some of these behaviors are actions. Clearly, apologizing is an action if anything is. Things seem less clear in the case of other emotional behaviors. Intuitively, the drop in a sad person’s voice is something that happens (...)
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  45. added 2019-05-02
    Is Meat the New Tobacco? Regulating Food Demand in the Age of Climate Change.Lingxi Chenyang - 2019 - Environmental Law Reporter 49.
    Switching from a meat-heavy to a plant-based diet is one of the highest-impact lifestyle changes for climate mitigation and adaptation. Conventional demand-side energy policy has focused on increasing consumption of efficient machines and fuels. Regulating food demand has key advantages. First, food consumption is biologically constrained, thus switching to more efficient foods avoids unintended consequences of switching to more efficient machines, like higher overall energy consumption. Second, food consumption, like smoking, is primed for norm- shifting because it occurs in socially (...)
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  46. added 2019-04-27
    Measuring Moral Reasoning Using Moral Dilemmas: Evaluating Reliability, Validity, and Differential Item Functioning of the Behavioral Defining Issues Test (bDIT).Youn-Jeng Choi, Hyemin Han, Kelsie J. Dawson, Stephen J. Thoma & Andrea L. Glenn - 2019 - European Journal of Developmental Psychology 16 (5):622-631.
    We evaluated the reliability, validity, and differential item functioning (DIF) of a shorter version of the Defining Issues Test-1 (DIT-1), the behavioral DIT (bDIT), measuring the development of moral reasoning. 353 college students (81 males, 271 females, 1 not reported; age M = 18.64 years, SD = 1.20 years) who were taking introductory psychology classes at a public University in a suburb area in the Southern United States participated in the present study. First, we examined the reliability of the bDIT (...)
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  47. added 2019-04-11
    Love, Anger, and Racial Injustice.Myisha Cherry - 2019 - In Adrienne Martin (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
    Luminaries like Martin Luther King, Jr. urge that Black Americans love even those who hate them. This can look like a rejection of anger at racial injustice. We see this rejection, too, in the growing trend of characterizing social justice movements as radical hate groups, and people who get angry at injustice as bitter and unloving. Philosophers like Martha Nussbaum argue that anger is backward-looking, status focused, and retributive. Citing the life of the Prodigal Son, the victims of the Charleston (...)
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  48. added 2019-03-23
    Elizabeth Anscombe e la svolta normativa del 1958.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2010 - In Juan Andrés Mercado (ed.), Elisabeth Anscombe e la psicologia morale. Roma, Italy: Armando. pp. 43-80.
    I discuss the three theses defended by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. I argue that: a) her answer to the question "why should I be moral?" requires a solution of the problem of theodicy and ignores any attempts to save the moral point of view without recourse to divine retribution; b) her notion of divine law is an odd one, more neo-Augustinian than Biblical or Scholastic; c) her image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism is the impoverished image manufactured by consequentialist (...)
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  49. added 2019-03-15
    Anscombe on the Philosophy of Psychology as Propaedeutic to Ethics.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2014 - In Matteo Galletti (ed.), La mente morale. Persone, ragioni, virtù. Rome, Italy: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura. pp. 17-62.
    The chapter reconstructs and criticizes one of Anscombe's famous three these, namely the claim that a ‘philosophy of psychology’ is a preliminary task to the construction of any possible ethical theory, or that moral philosophy ‘should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking’. The claim is that Anscombe’s idea of a philosophy of psychology cannot be simply identified with that of moral psychology with which we are familiar (...)
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  50. added 2019-03-07
    Practical Moore Sentences.Matthew Mandelkern - forthcoming - Noûs.
    I discuss what I call practical Moore sentences: sentences like ‘You must close your door, but I don’t know whether you will’, which combine an order together with an avowal of agnosticism about whether the order will be obeyed. I show that practical Moore sentences are generally infelicitous. But this infelicity is surprising: it seems like there should be nothing wrong with giving someone an order while acknowledging that you do not know whether it will obeyed. I suggest that this (...)
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