Moral Psychology, Misc

I contend that there are two dogmas that are still popular among philosophers of action: that agents can only desire what they think is good and that they can only intentionally pursue what they think is good. I also argue that both dogmas are false. Broadly, I argue that our best theories of action can explain the possibility of intentionally pursuing what one thinks is not at all good, that we need to allow for the possibility of intentionally pursuing what (...) one think is not at all good, and that if we can intentionally pursue what we think is not at all good then we can desire it on similar grounds. (shrink)

My subject is the theory of blame recently propounded by George Sher in his book, In Praise of Blame. I argue that although Sher has succeeded in capturing a number of genuine features of the concept of blame, there is an important element that he has omitted, which is the fact that necessarily, when A blames B for something and expresses this to B, A will realise that B is likely to find this unpleasant. The inclusion of the latter element (...) renders the question of whether any agent ever deserves blame a more open one than Sher allows. (shrink)

Recent empirical work on folk moral objectivism has attempted to examine the extent to which folk morality presumes that moral judgments are objectively true or false. Some researchers report findings that they take to indicate folk commitment to objectivism (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, 2010, 2012; Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; Wainryb et al., 2004), while others report findings that may reveal a more variable commitment to objectivism (Beebe, 2014; Beebe et al., 2015; Beebe & Sackris, 2016; Sarkissian, et al., 2011; Wright, (...) 2018; Wright, Grandjean, & McWhite, 2013; Wright, McWhite, & Grandjean, 2014). However, the various probes that have been used to examine folk moral objectivism almost always fail to be good direct measures of objectivism. Some critics (Beebe, 2015; Pölzler, 2017, 2018) have suggested that the problems with existing probes are serious enough that they should be viewed as largely incapable of shedding any light on folk metaethical commitments. Building upon the work of Justin Khoo and Joshua Knobe (2018), I argue that many of the existing probes can be seen as good measures of the extent to which people think that the truth of one moral judgment excludes the possibility that a judgment made by a disagreeing party is also true and that the best explanation of the findings obtained using these measures is significant folk support for indexical moral relativism—the view that the content of moral judgments is context-sensitive. If my thesis is correct, many contemporary moral philosophers are deeply mistaken about the metaethical contours of folk morality in one very important respect. (shrink)

The Moral Psychology of Hate provides the first systematic introduction to the moral psychology of hate compiling specially commissioned essays by an international team of scholars with a wide range of disciplinary orientations. In light of the recent revival of interest in emotions in academic philosophy and the current social and political interest in hate, this volume provides arguments for and against the value of hate through a combination of empirical and philosophical methods. The authors examine hate not merely as (...) a destructive feeling but as an emotion of great moral significance that illuminates how we understand each other and ourselves. The book will be of major interest to anyone concerned with the dynamics and the moral and political implications of this most powerful of human emotions. (shrink)

Responsibility as accountability is normally taken to have stricter control conditions than responsibility as attributability. A common way to argue for this claim is to point to differences in the harmfulness of blame involved in these different kinds of responsibility. This paper argues that this explanation does not work once we shift our focus from other-directed blame to self-blame. To blame oneself in the accountability sense is to feel guilt and feeling guilty is to suffer. To blame oneself in the (...) attributability sense, it will be argued, is to feel shame and feeling shame is also to suffer. The different control conditions cannot be explained by a difference in the harm of blame. Instead, this paper argues that accountability and attributability are governed by different kinds of appropriateness: an agent S is accountability blameworthy for X only if S deserves to feel guilty; an agent S is attributability blameworthy for X only if it is fitting that S feels shame for X. (shrink)

In contemporary Western moral philosophy literature that discusses the Chinese ethical tradition, it is a commonplace practice to use the Chinese term daode 道德 as a technical translation of the English term moral. The present study provides some empirical evidence showing a discrepancy between the terms moral and daode. There is a much more pronounced difference between prototypically immoral and prototypically uncultured behaviors in English (USA) than between prototypically bu daode 不道德 and prototypically bu wenming 不文明 behaviors in Mandarin Chinese (...) (Mainland China). If the Western concept of immorality is defined in contraposition to things that are matters of etiquette or conventional norms and thus tied to a more or less tangible moral / conventional distinction, then we are dealing with a different structure in Mandarin Chinese – the prototypically bu daode and bu wenming behaviors seem to largely overlap. We also discuss whether bu lunli 不倫理 and bu hefa 不合法 can be considered adequate candidates for translation of immorality and we answer in the negative. (shrink)

This is the introductory chapter to The Moral Psychology of Boredom (Rowman & Littlefield, 2021). It discusses the various ways in which boredom is morally significant and offers a summary of the experiential profile of boredom.

Traditionally, those writing on blame have been concerned with blaming others, including when one has the standing to blame others. Yet some alleged problems for such accounts of standing arise when we focus on self-blame. First, if hypocrites lack the standing to blame others, it might seem that they also lack the standing to blame themselves. But this would lead to a bootstrapping problem, wherein hypocrites can only regain standing by doing that which they lack the standing to do. Second, (...) in addition to hypocrites, there may be hypercrites, who blame themselves more severely than others. Leading accounts for why hypocrites lack standing to blame others would also seem to imply that hypercrites lack the standing to blame others, but some may find this counterintuitive. We argue that neither of these problems from self-blame poses a unique threat to leading accounts of standing. (shrink)

In this chapter we focus on the structure of close personal relations and diagnose how these relationships are disrupted by addiction. We draw upon Peter Strawson’s landmark paper ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (2008, first published 1962) to argue that loved ones of those with addiction veer between, (1) reactive attitudes of blame and resentment generated by disappointed expectations of goodwill and reciprocity, and (2) the detached objective stance from which the addicted person is seen as less blameworthy but also as less (...) fit for ordinary interpersonal relationships. We examine how these responses, in turn, shape the addicted person’s view of themselves, their character and their capacities, and provide a negative narrative trajectory that impedes recovery. We close with a consideration of how these effects might be mitigated by adopting less demanding variations of the participant stance. (shrink)

In this paper I suggest that there is a way to make sense of blameworthiness for morally problematic actions even when there is no bad will behind such actions. I am particularly interested in cases where an agent acts in a biased way, and the explanation is socialization and false belief rather than bad will on the part of the agent. In such cases, I submit, we are pulled in two directions: on the one hand non-culpable ignorance is usually an (...) excuse, but in the case of acting in a biased way we feel some pull to find the agent blameworthy. I argue that agents are sometimes blameworthy, (where I really mean that they are blameworthy, and not just that it is permissible to reproach them), even if they do not have any bad will. I argue that although the paradigmatic account of blameworthiness is based on quality of will, we can and should be willing to allow that there are non-paradigmatic cases. I argue that the zone of responsibility can be extended to include acts that we are not fully in control of, and acts whose moral status we are non-culpably ignorant about at the time of acting. This extension of responsibility happens through a voluntary taking of responsibility. I argue that there are certain conditions under which we should take responsibility, and that when we do so, we genuinely are responsible. (shrink)

There is a wide range of things we do out of emotion. For example, we smile with pleasure, our voices drop when we are sad, we recoil in shock or jump for joy, we apologize to others out of remorse. It is uncontroversial that some of these behaviors are actions. Clearly, apologizing is an action if anything is. Things seem less clear in the case of other emotional behaviors. Intuitively, the drop in a sad person’s voice is something that happens (...) to her, rather than something she actively performs. Perhaps more interestingly, even jumping for joy can seem a problematic case: although its execution involves the active performance of certain movements, it has been argued to contrast, e.g., with an act of apology, in that it is not performed in order to achieve some end, such as repairing a relationship. This can make this behavior seem considerably different from paradigm actions. Our central concern in this paper is with which emotional behaviors should be classed as actions and why... (shrink)

When one is going through a personal hardship, it is often comforting, or emotionally helpful, to hear from someone else who has gone through something similar. This is a common, familiar human phenomenon, but this chapter argues that it is philosophically puzzling. Unless one is in some sort of moment of vice, one would not want the other person to have suffered the hardship, and one should be pained to hear that they have. And yet the phenomenon is that hearing (...) about their similar hardship makes one feel better, rather than worse. Why is that? The chapter considers a range of intuitive replies. It argues that while each might be part of the story, none resolves the puzzle. There remains a question as to why the phenomenon does not reflect a vice of insufficient care or concern for others. It then considers two possible answers, drawing on ideas from Adams and Bommarito, but argues that neither are satisfactory. The aim of the chapter is to bring out the puzzle and show that it is difficult to resolve. But it ends with a suggestion for a resolution. (shrink)

Having positive moral traits is central to one’s sense of self, and people generally are motivated to maintain a positive view of the self in the present. But it remains unclear how people foster a positive, morally good view of the self in the present. We suggest that recollecting and reflecting on moral and immoral actions from the personal past jointly help to construct a morally good view of the current self in complementary ways. More specifically, across four studies we (...) investigated the extent to which people believe they have changed over time after recollecting their own moral or immoral behaviors from the personal past. Our results indicate that recollecting past immoral actions is associated with stronger impressions of dissimilarity and change in the sense of self over time than recollecting past moral actions. These effects held for diverse domains of morality (i.e., honesty/dishonesty, helping/harming, fairness/unfairness, and loyalty/disloyalty), and they remained even after accounting for objective, calendar time. Further supporting a motivational explanation, these effects held when people recollected their own past actions but not when they recollected the actions of other people. (shrink)

People seem more divided than ever before over social and political issues, entrenched in their existing beliefs and unwilling to change them. Empirical research on mechanisms driving this resistance to belief change has focused on a limited set of well-known, charged, contentious issues and has not accounted for deliberation over reasons and arguments in belief formation prior to experimental sessions. With a large, heterogeneous sample (N = 3,001), we attempt to overcome these existing problems, and we investigate the causes and (...) consequences of resistance to belief change for five diverse and less contentious socio-political issues. After participants chose initially to support or oppose a given socio-political position, they were provided with reasons favoring their chosen position (affirming reasons), reasons favoring the other, unchosen position (conflicting reasons), or all reasons for both positions (reasons for both sides). Our results indicate that participants are more likely to stick with their initial decisions than to change them no matter which reasons are considered, and that this resistance to belief change is likely due to a motivated, biased evaluation of the reasons to support their initial beliefs (prior-belief bias). More specifically, they rated affirming reasons more favorably than conflicting reasons—even after accounting for reported prior knowledge about the issue, the novelty of the reasons presented, and the reported strategy used to make the initial decision. In many cases, participants who did not change their positions tended to become more confident in the superiority of their positions after considering many reasons for both sides. (shrink)

I argue that the phenomenon underlying Bernard Williams’ (1976) “agent-regret” is considerably broader than appreciated by Williams and others. Agent-regret— an anguished response that agents have for harms they have caused, even if faultlessly— I maintain, is a species of a more general response to harms that need not be one’s fault, but which nonetheless impact one’s practical identity in a special way. This broader genus includes as a species what I call “relation-regret”, a pained response to harm caused by (...) a person to whom one is intimately related, as a co-member of a group partly constitutive of one’s practical identity (e.g. one’s family). After providing an account of the moral psychology of relation-regret, I attend to its normative significance, proposing in particular that acceptance of relation-regret provides us with reasons for accepting a novel form of moral luck, namely associative luck: the luck of being vulnerable to responsibility-responses in virtue of one’s attachments to others, despite one’s personal faultlessness. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that there is what has been called a non-hypocrisy norm on the appropriateness of moral blame; roughly, one has standing to blame only if one is not guilty of the very offence one seeks to criticize. Our acceptance of this norm is embodied in the common retort to criticism, “Who are you to blame me?”. But there is a paradox lurking behind this commonplace norm. If it is always inappropriate for x to blame y for a (...) wrong that x has committed, then all cases in which x blames x (i.e. cases of self-blame) are rendered inappropriate. But it seems to be ethical common-sense that we are often, sadly, in position (indeed, excellent, privileged position) to blame ourselves for our own moral failings. And thus we have a paradox: a conflict between the inappropriateness of hypocritical blame, and the appropriateness of self-blame. We consider several ways of resolving the paradox, and contend none is as defensible as a position that simply accepts it: we should never blame ourselves. In defending this startling position, we defend a crucial distinction between self-blame and guilt. (shrink)

Addiction and certain varieties of interpersonal attachment share strikingly similar psycho-behavioral structures. Neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers have often adduced such similarities between addiction and attachment to argue that many typical cases of romantic love represent addictions to one’s partner and thus might be appropriate candidates for medical treatment. In this paper, I argue for the relatively neglected thesis that some paradigmatic cases of addiction are aptly characterized as emotional attachments to their objects. This has implications for how we should understand (...) the nature of addiction and for the ethics of attachment more broadly. (shrink)

We are all guided by thousands of norms, but how did our capacity for normative cognition evolve? I propose there is a deep but neglected link between normative cognition and practical skill. In modern humans, complex motor skills and craft skills, such as toolmaking, are guided by internally represented norms of correct performance. Moreover, it is plausible that core components of human normative cognition evolved as a solution to the distinctive problems of transmitting complex motor skills and craft skills, especially (...) skills related to toolmaking, through social learning. If this is correct, the expansion of the normative domain beyond technique to encompass more abstract norms of fairness, reciprocity, ritual and kinship involved the elaboration of a basic platform for the guidance of skilled action by technical norms. This article motivates and defends this “skill hypothesis” for the origin of normative cognition and sets out various ways in which it could be empirically tested. (shrink)

Do we love for reasons? It can seem as if we do, since most cases of non‐familial love seem *selective*: coming to love a non‐family‐member often begins with our being drawn to them for what they are like. I argue, however, that we can vindicate love's selectivity, even if we maintain that there are no reasons for love; indeed, that gives us a simpler, and hence better, explanation of love's selectivity. We don't, in short, come to love *for* reasons. That (...) which seemed like evidence for thinking that there are reasons for love, then, turns out to militate against that view: how can these purported reasons be reasons for love, if they don't engender (in virtue of rationalizing) it? (shrink)

I discuss what I call practical Moore sentences: sentences like ‘You must close your door, but I don’t know whether you will’, which combine an order together with an avowal of agnosticism about whether the order will be obeyed. I show that practical Moore sentences are generally infelicitous. But this infelicity is surprising: it seems like there should be nothing wrong with giving someone an order while acknowledging that you do not know whether it will obeyed. I suggest that this (...) infelicity points to a striking psychological fact, with potentially broad ramifications concerning the structure of norms of speech acts: namely, when giving an order, we must act as if we believe we will be obeyed. (shrink)

Active white ignorance is accompanied by an epistemic and affective insensitivity that allows American white people to avoid the negative affect that might typically accompany harmdoing. Resisting active ignorance about racism and white supremacy, therefore, often gives rise to shame. Yet, thinkers have debated the value of shame for white people’s antiracism. This article asserts that shame is an appropriate response for white people recognizing our culpability for and complicity in racist injustices and violence. However, the article exposes problems with (...) philosophical accounts of white shame, and draws on recent psychological research to show that contextual factors actually determine whether shame can support white antiracism. The article proposes a role for shame in what José Medina calls an “ethics and epistemology of discomfort,” arguing that there are conditions under which shame may encourage the sustained self-interrogation, sensitivity, and humility required if white people are to contribute meaningfully to antiracist action. (shrink)

The thesis investigates the implications for moral philosophy of research in psychology. In addition to an introduction and concluding remarks, the thesis consists of four chapters, each exploring various more specific challenges or inputs to moral philosophy from cognitive, social, personality, developmental, and evolutionary psychology. Chapter 1 explores and clarifies the issue of whether or not morality is innate. The chapter’s general conclusion is that evolution has equipped us with a basic suite of emotions that shape our moral judgments in (...) important ways. Chapter 2 presents and investigates the challenge presented to deontological ethics by Joshua Greene’s so-called dual process theory. The chapter partly agrees with his conclusion that the dual process view neutralizes some common criticisms against utilitarianism founded on deontological intuitions, but also points to avenues left to explore for deontologists. Chapter 3 focuses on Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer’s suggestion that utilitarianism is less vulnerable to so-called evolutionary debunking than other moral theories. The chapter is by and large critical of their attempt. In the final chapter 4, attention is directed at the issue of whether or not social psychology has shown that people lack stable character traits, and hence that the virtue ethical view is premised on false or tenuous assumptions. Though this so-called situationist challenge at one time seemed like a serious threat to virtue ethics, the chapter argues for a moderate position, pointing to the fragility of much of the empirical research invoked to substantiate this challenge while also suggesting revisions to the virtue-ethical view as such. (shrink)

This chapter derives and refines a novel normative moral theory and descriptive theory of moral psychology--Rightness as Fairness--from the theory of prudence defended in Chapter 2. It briefly summarizes Chapter 2’s finding that prudent agents typically internalize ‘moral risk-aversion’. It then outlines how this prudential psychology leads prudent agents to want to know how to act in ways they will not regret in morally salient cases, as well as to regard moral actions as the only types of actions that satisfy (...) this prudential interest. It then uses these findings to defend a new derivation of my (2016) theory of morality, Rightness as Fairness, showing how the derivation successfully defends Rightness as Fairness against a variety of objections. The chapter also details how this book’s theory helps to substantiate the claim that Rightness as Fairness unifies a variety of competing moral frameworks: deontology, consequentialism, contractualism, and virtue ethics. Finally, the chapter shows how Chapter 2’s theory of prudence entails some revisions to Rightness as Fairness, including the adoption of a series of Rawlsian original positions to settle moral and social-political issues under ideal and nonideal circumstances—thus entailing a unified normative and descriptive psychological framework for prudence, morality, and justice. (shrink)

This book outlines a unified theory of prudence and morality that merges a wide variety of findings in behavioral neuroscience with philosophically sophisticated normative theorizing. Chapter 1 lays out the emerging behavioral neuroscience of prudence and morality. Chapter 2 then outlines a new theory of prudence as fairness to oneself across time. Chapter 3 then derives a revised version of my 2016 moral theory--Rightness as Fairness--from this theory of prudence, showing how the theory of prudence defends Rightness as Fairness against (...) various critiques and unifies prudence, morality, and justice. Chapter 4 then argues that this theory explains a variety of normative philosophical and empirical neuroscientific phenomena better than alternatives. Finally, Chapter 5 responds to potential objections and explores future research avenues. (shrink)

Introduction The Defining Issues Test (DIT) aimed to measure one’s moral judgment development in terms of moral reasoning. The Neo-Kohlbergian approach, which is an elaboration of Kohlbergian theory, focuses on the continuous development of postconventional moral reasoning, which constitutes the theoretical basis of the DIT. However, very few studies have directly tested the internal structure of the DIT, which would indicate its construct validity. Objectives Using the DIT-2, a later revision of the DIT, we examined whether a bi-factor model or (...) 3-factor CFA model showed a better model fit. The Neo-Kohlbergian theory of moral judgment development, which constitutes the theoretical basis for the DIT-2, proposes that moral judgment development occurs continuously and that it can be better explained with a soft-stage model. Given these assertions, we assumed that the bi-factor model, which considers the Schema-General Moral Judgment (SGMJ), might be more consistent with Neo-Kohlbergian theory. Methods We analyzed a large dataset collected from undergraduate students. We performed confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) via weighted least squares. A 3-factor CFA based on the DIT-2 manual and a bi-factor model were compared for model fit. The three factors in the 3-factor CFA were labeled as moral development schemas in Neo-Kohlbergian theory (i.e., personal interests, maintaining norms, and postconventional schemas). The bi-factor model included the SGMJ in addition to the three factors. Results In general, the bi-factor model showed a better model fit compared with the 3-factor CFA model although both models reported acceptable model fit indices. Conclusion We found that the DIT-2 scale is a valid measure of the internal structure of moral reasoning development using both CFA and bi-factor models. In addition, we conclude that the soft-stage model, posited by the Neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral judgment development, can be better supported with the bi-factor model that was tested in the present study. (shrink)

According to Westermarck’s widely accepted explanation of the incest taboo, cultural prohibitions on sibling sex are rooted in an evolved biological disposition to feel sexual aversion toward our childhood coresidents. Bernard Williams posed the “representation problem” for Westermarck’s theory: the content of the hypothesized instinct is different from the content of the incest taboo —thus the former cannot be causally responsible for the latter. Arthur Wolf posed the related “moralization problem”: the instinct concerns personal behavior whereas the prohibition concerns everyone. (...) This paper reviews possible ways of defending Westermarck’s theory from the representation and moralization problems, and concludes that the theory is untenable. A recent study purports to support Westermarck’s account by showing that unrelated children raised in the same peer groups on kibbutzim feel sexual aversion toward each other and morally oppose third-party intra-peer-group sex, but this study has been misinterpreted. I argue that the representation and moralization problems are general problems that could potentially undermine many popular evolutionary explanations of social/moral norms. The cultural evolution of morality is not tightly constrained by our biological endowment in the way some philosophers and evolutionary psychologists believe. (shrink)

Creepiness and the emotion of the creeps have been overlooked in the moral philosophy and moral psychology literatures. We argue that the creeps is a morally significant emotion in its own right, and not simply a type of fear, disgust, or anger (though it shares features with those emotions). Reflecting on cases, we defend a novel account of the creeps as felt in response to creepy people. According to our moral insensitivity account, the creeps is fitting just when its object (...) is agential activity that is insensitive to basic moral considerations. When, only when, and insofar as someone is disposed to such insensitivity, they are a creep. Such insensitivity, especially in extreme forms, raises doubts about creeps’ moral agency. We distinguish multiple types of insensitivity, respond to concerns that feeling the creeps is itself objectionable, and conclude with a discussion of epistemic issues relating to the creeps. (shrink)

Extant research suggests that individuals employ traditional moral heuristics to support their observed altruistic behavior; yet findings have largely been limited to inductive extrapolation and rely on relatively few traditional frames in so doing, namely, deontology in organizational behavior and virtue theory in law and economics. Given that these and competing moral frames such as utilitarianism can manifest as identical behavior, we develop a moral framing instrument—the Philosophical Moral-Framing Measure (PMFM)—to expand and distinguish traditional frames associated and disassociated with observed (...) altruistic behavior. The validation of our instrument based on 1015 subjects in 3 separate real stakes scenarios indicates that heuristic forms of deontology, virtue-theory, and utilitarianism are strongly related to such behavior, and that egoism is an inhibitor. It also suggests that deontic and virtue-theoretical frames may be commonly perceived as intertwined and opens the door for new research on self-abnegation, namely, a perceived moral obligation toward suffering and self-denial. These findings hold the potential to inform ongoing conversations regarding organizational citizenship and moral crowding out, namely, how financial incentives can undermine altruistic behavior. (shrink)

The present work posits that social motives, particularly status seeking in the form of moral grandstanding, are likely at least partially to blame for elevated levels of affective polarization and ideological extremism in the U.S. In Study 1, results from both undergraduates (N = 981; Mean age = 19.4; SD = 2.1; 69.7% women) and a cross-section of U.S. adults matched to 2010 census norms (N = 1,063; Mean age = 48.20, SD = 16.38; 49.8% women) indicated that prestige-motived grandstanding (...) was consistently and robustly related to more extreme ideological views on a variety of issues. In Study 2, results from a weighted, nationally-representative cross-section of U.S. adults (N = 2,519; Mean age = 47.5, SD = 17.8; 51.4% women) found that prestige motivated grandstanding was reliably related to both ideological extremism and affective polarization. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new framework for thinking about hope, with certain unexpected consequences. Specifically, I argue that a shift in focus from locutions like “x hopes that” and “x is hoping that” to “x is hopeful that” and “x has hope that” can improve our understanding of hope. This approach, which emphasizes hopefulness as the central concept, turns out to be more revealing and fruitful in tackling some of the issues that philosophers have raised about hope, such as the (...) question of how hope can be distinguished from despair or how people can have differing strengths in hope. It also allows us to see that many current accounts of hope, far from being rivals, are actually compatible with one another. (shrink)

Many commentators have claimed that Nietzsche views the “sublimation” (Sublimierung) of drives as a positive achievement. Against this tradition, I argue that, on the dominant if not universal Nietzschean use of Sublimierung and its cognates, sublimation is just a broad psychological analogue of the traditional (al)chemical process: the “vaporization” of drives into a finer or lighter state, figuratively if not literally. This can yield ennobling elevation, or purity in a positive sense—the intensified “sublimate” of an unrefined original sample. But it (...) can also yield drives that are attenuated or otherworldly, in a pejorative sense. One (but only one) kind of Nietzschean sublimation is the “translation” of drives to “imaginative and spiritual” (Imaginative und Seelische) modes of expression. I con­clude that, despite certain appearances to the contrary, Nietzsche ultimately values basic drives’ powerful expression, without preferring either that this occur specifically as “higher culture” or as “savage” natural impulse. (shrink)

The aims of this paper are fourfold. The first aim is to characterize two distinct forms of circumstantial moral luck and illustrate how they are implicitly recognized in pre-theoretical moral thought. The second aim is to identify a significant difference between the ways in which these two kinds of circumstantial luck are morally relevant. The third aim is to show how the acceptance of circumstantial moral luck relates to the acceptance of resultant moral luck. The fourth aim is to defuse (...) a legitimate concern about accepting the existence of circumstantial moral luck, namely the fact that its existence implies substantial moral risks. (shrink)

The philosophy of hope centers on two interlocking sets of questions. The first concerns the nature of hope. Specific questions here include how to analyze hope, how hope motivates us, and whether there is only one type of hope. The second set concerns the value of hope. Key questions here include whether and when it is good to hope and whether there is a virtue of hope. Philosophers of hope tend to proceed from the first set of questions to the (...) second. This is a natural approach, for one might expect that you must develop a basic understanding of what hope is before you can determine its value. The structure of this chapter thus follows this approach. But readers should not be misled: there is in fact a good deal of feedback between the two sets of questions. A theory of hope is more plausible to the extent that it fits well with plausible ideas about the value of hope. So the movement from hope’s nature to its value is one of emphasis rather than a strict, step-wise process. (shrink)

We sometimes fail unwittingly to do things that we ought to do. And we are, from time to time, culpable for these unwitting omissions. We provide an outline of a theory of responsibility for unwitting omissions. We emphasize two distinctive ideas: (i) many unwitting omissions can be understood as failures of appropriate vigilance, and; (ii) the sort of self-control implicated in these failures of appropriate vigilance is valuable. We argue that the norms that govern vigilance and the value of self-control (...) explain culpability for unwitting omissions. (shrink)

According to non-cognitivism, moral sentences and judgements do not aim to represent how things morally are. This paper presents an empirical argument against this view. We begin by showing that non-cognitivism entails the prediction that after some reflection competent ordinary speakers’ semantic intuitions favor that moral sentences and judgements do not aim to represent how things morally are. At first sight, this prediction may seem to have been confirmed by previous research on folk metaethics. However, a number of methodological worries (...) lead us to doubt this interpretation. We, therefore, conducted a psychological study that alleviates these worries as far as possible. It turned out that competent ordinary speakers’ reflective semantic intuitions dominantly fail to favor that moral sentences do not aim to represent how things morally are. This challenge to non-cognitivism is defended and supplemented by considering deflationary theories of moral truth and middle ground theories in the cognitivism/non-cognitivism debate. (shrink)

이 책은 조금 일자이지만, 살인의 심리학을 구체적으로 다루는 몇 가지 최근 인기있는 책이 있으며, 그것은 몇 달러에 사용할 수있는 빠른 개요입니다, 그래서 여전히 잘 노력 가치가. 그것은 포괄적 인 시도를하지 않으며, 독자가 그의 많은 다른 책과 폭력에 대한 광대 한 문학에서 공백을 채울 것으로 예상과 함께, 장소에서 다소 피상적이다. 업데이트는 예를 들어, 버스, 진화 심리학 의 핸드북 2nd. V1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270-282, 388-389, 545-546, 547, 566 및 버스, 진화 심리학 5 번째 에드. (2015) p 26, 96-97,223, 293-4, 300, (...) 300, 309-312, 410 및 Shackford2. 그는 수십 년 동안 최고의 진화 심리학자 중 한 명이었으며 그의 작품에서 광범위한 행동을 다루고 있지만, 여기서 그는 거의 전적으로 개인을 살해하게 하는 심리적 메커니즘과 EEA에서 가능한 진화적 기능(진화적 적응 환경, 즉 지난 백만 년 동안 아프리카평원)에 집중하고 있습니다. 버스는 다른 행동과 마찬가지로 정신 병리학, 질투, 사회 환경, 그룹 압력, 약물 및 알코올 등과 같은 '대안'설명이 실제로 설명되지 않는 것으로 시작됩니다. 언제나처럼, 그것은 필연적으로 포괄적 인 피트니스 (친족 선택)로 귀결되며, 모든 유기체의 모든 행동에 대한 궁극적 인 설명인 동료및 자원에 대한 접근을위한 투쟁으로 귀결됩니다. 사회학적 데이터 (그리고 상식)는 젊은 가난한 남성이 죽일 가능성이 가장 높다는 것을 분명히합니다. 그는 선진국과 부족 문화에서 자신의 살인 데이터, 동물, 고고학, FBI 데이터 및 일반 사람들의 살인 환상에 대한 자신의 연구를 제공합니다. 많은 고고학적 증거는 선사 시대에 전체 집단, 또는 젊은 여성을 뺀 집단의 살인을 포함하여 계속 축적되고 있습니다. Buss의 의견을 조사 한 후, 나는 의도적 인 심리학 (합리성의 논리적 구조)에 대한 매우 간략한 요약을 제시하며, 다른 많은 기사와 책에서 광범위하게 다룹니다. 진화적 관점에서 살인 폭력의 상세한 역사를 원하는 많은 시간을 가진 사람들은 스티븐 핑커의 '폭력이 거절된 이유 우리 자연의 더 나은 천사'(2012)와 내 리뷰를, 인터넷과 최근 두 권의 책에서 쉽게 구할 수 있습니다. 간단히 말해서, 핑커는 살인이 포저로 우리 시절부터 약 30 의 요인에 의해 꾸준히 극적으로 감소했다고 지적한다. 그래서, 총은 이제 사람이 죽일 매우 쉽게하지만, 살인은 훨씬 덜 일반적이다. 핑커는 이것이 우리의 '더 나은 천사'를 끌어내는 다양한 사회적 메커니즘 때문이라고 생각하지만, 주로 지구의 무자비한 강간에서 자원이 일시적으로 풍부하고 경찰의 존재가 증가하고 통신 및 감시 및 법적 시스템이 처벌 될 가능성이 훨씬 높기 때문이라고 생각합니다. 이것은 경찰의 짧고 지역 부재도있을 때마다 분명해진다. 현대 의 두 systems보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히 비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의언어' 2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다-철학, 심리학, 과학, 종교와 운명 행성에 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2019 3 rd ed (2019) 및 21st 세기 5th ed (2019) 및 기타에서 자살 유토피아 망상. (shrink)

これは完璧な本ではありませんが、それはユニークであり、最初の400ページほどをスキミングすると、最後の300ページ(約700ページ)は、時間の経過とともに暴力やマナーの社会的変化に行動について知られて いるものを適用するかなり良い試みです。基本的なトピックは、私たちの遺伝学はどのように社会の変化を制御し、制限するかということです。驚くべきことに、彼は動物や人間の社会生活の多くを説明する親族の選択(包 括的なフィットネス)の性質を記述することができません。彼はまた、(ほぼすべての人と同様に)私が高次思考の記述心理学(DPHOT)と呼ぶのを好む合理性の論理的構造(LSR - John Searleの好ましい用語)を記述するための明確な枠組みを欠いている。彼は、人々や地球を虐待し、搾取する他の多くの方法について何かを言うべきでした nearly。暴力の概念を拡張して-、誰かの遺伝子の複製の世界的な長期的な結果を含め、進化がどのように機能するか(すなわち、親族の選択)の性質を把握することは、歴史、現在の出来事、そして物事が今後数百 年でどのように行われる可能性が高いかについて非常に異なる視点を提供します。歴史に対する身体的暴力の減少は、地球の絶え間なく増加する無慈悲な強姦(すなわち、人々が自分の子孫の将来を破壊することによって) 一致している(そして可能になった)ことを知るから始めるかもしれません’。ピンカー(ほとんどの人と同じように)は、重要なのは生物学であるときに、しばしば文化の表面性に気を取られます。ウィルソンの「地球の 社会的征服」とノワクとハイフィールドの「スーパーコオペレータ」の私の最近のレビューをここで、ネット上で「真の利他主義」(グループ選択)の空虚さ、そして親族選択の運営と文化的な言葉で行動を記述することの 無駄と表面性の簡単な要約を参照してください。 これは古典的な自然/育成の問題であり、自然の切り札は無限に育てます。本当に重要なのは、人口と資源破壊の容赦ない増加(医療と技術、警察と軍による紛争抑制による)によって地球に対して行われた暴力です。1日 に約20万人以上の人々(10日ごとに別のラスベガス、毎月別のロサンゼルス)、6海/人/年に入る6トンほどの表土-世界の全ての年間消えていく約1%などは、何らかの奇跡が起こらない限り、生物圏と文明が次の 2世紀の間に大部分が崩壊し、飢餓、悲惨、暴力が起こることを意味します。 暴力的な行為を行う人々のマナー、意見、傾向は、彼らがこの大惨事を避けるために何かを行うことができる限り、関連性はありませんし、私はそれがどのように起こるか分かりません。議論のためのスペースはなく、意味 もありません(はい、私は致命的です)ので、私は彼らが事実であるかのようにいくつかのコメントをします。私が他の人を犠牲にして1つのグループを宣伝することに個人的な利害関係があるとは想像しないでください。 私は78で、子孫も近親者もおらず、政治的、国家的、宗教的なグループと識別せず、デフォルトで属するものを他のすべてと同じように反発的なものと見なしません。 両親は地球上で最悪の生命の敵であり、物事の広い視野を持って、女性の暴力(男性が行うもののほとんどと同様に)は、主にスローモーションで行われ、時間と空間の距離で行われ、主に代理人によって行われているとい う事実を考えると、女性は男性と同じくらい暴力的です。ますます、女性は仲間を持っているかどうかに関係なく子供を産み、1人の女性の繁殖を止める効果は、生殖のボトルネックであるため、平均して1人の男性を止め るよりもはるかに大きい。人は、人々とその子孫が自分の道を来るどんな悲惨さにも豊かに値するという見解を取ることができ、(まれな例外を除いて)金持ちと有名人は最悪の犯罪者です。メリル・ストリープやビル・ゲ イツ、J.Kローリング、そして彼らの子供たちは、将来の世代のために毎年50トンの表土を破壊する可能性がありますが、インドの農家と彼は1トンを破壊する可能性があります。誰かがそれがうまくいくことを否定し 、その子孫に私は「地球上の地獄へようこそ」(WTHOE)と言います。 今日の重点は常に人権であるが、文明がチャンスに耐えるならば、人権に取って代わらなければならないことは明らかである。誰も責任ある市民でなく権利を得る、これは最初に意味するミニマル環境破壊です。あなたの社 会が彼らを作るように頼まなければ、最も基本的な責任は子供ではありません。人々が無作為に繁殖することを可能にする社会や世界は、それが崩壊するまで(または人生が生きる価値がないので恐ろしいポイントに達する )、常に利己的な遺伝子によって悪用されます。社会が人権を第一者として維持し続けるならば、その子孫に対して「WTHOE」は自信を持って言うことができる。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st 世紀 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

यह दोनों अद्भुत और फिटिंग है कि इस विशाल, शब्दजाल से लदी (इस पुस्तक को वास्तव में एक शब्दकोष की जरूरत है!), भारी शैक्षणिक काम शिक्षित की दुनिया में एक सबसे अच्छा विक्रेता बन गया है. एक शब्दजाल जानने के लिए समर्पित किया जाना है और फिर पाठ के 551 पृष्ठों और नोटों के 238 पृष्ठों के माध्यम से हल. एम,हम बार बार कहा जाता है कि यह सिर्फ क्या आ रहा है की एक रूपरेखा है! हालांकि वह गंभीर रूप (...) से तीन आंदोलनों की ज्यादतियों की आलोचना करता है, यह एक विरचनात्मक और New आयु रहस्यमय और धर्म, दर्शन और व्यवहार विज्ञान के एक बहुत उदार, आध्यात्मिक दृष्टिकोण से व्यवहार विज्ञान है अर्थात्, डेसन, पीएम और गुट निरपेक्षता, उग्र समानतावाद और वैज्ञानिक विरोधी बौद्धिकता के बिना। वह कुछ विस्तार में दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, समाजशास्त्र और धर्म के विभिन्न दुनिया विचारों का विश्लेषण करती है, (ज्यादातर) देखभाल और brill iance के साथ उनके घातक रिडक्शनिस्ट खामियों को उजागर,लेकिन स्रोतों वह विश्लेषण के अधिकांश लगभग कोई प्रासंगिकता के आज कर रहे हैं. वे शब्दावली और अवधारणाओं है कि पहले से ही पुराने थे जब वह शोध और 20 साल पहले लिख रहा था का उपयोग करें. एक शब्दजाल के अंतहीन पन्नों के माध्यम से dig है - Habermas, कांत, Emerson, जंग et alias की चर्चा से लदी. मोती को पाने के लिए. तुम बुरा लेखन, उलझन में और पुराने विचारों और अप्रचलित शब्दजाल का एक भयानक नमूना मिलता है. यदि एक एक अच्छा वर्तमान शिक्षा है, यह doubly इस पुस्तक को पढ़ने के लिए दर्दनाक है (और मानव व्यवहार पर सबसे अधिक लेखन). दर्दनाक है क्योंकि यह बहुत अत्याचार और भ्रामक है, और फिर जब आप को एहसास कितना आसान यह आधुनिक मनोविज्ञान और दर्शन के साथ है. शब्दावली और विचारों को भयावह रूप से भ्रमित और दिनांकित कर रहे हैं (लेकिन Wilber में कम तो अपने स्रोतों की तुलना में अपने विश्लेषण). इस पुस्तक और इसके स्रोतों के अधिकांश होगा मनोविज्ञान ग्रंथों, हालांकि लेखकों के अधिकांश यह पता नहीं था. यह मानव व्यवहार और तर्क के बारे में है कि हम क्यों सोचते हैं और जिस तरह से हम करते हैं और कैसे हम भविष्य में बदल सकता है कार्य. लेकिन (हाल ही में जब तक इस तरह के सभी चर्चा की तरह) explanations में से कोई भीवास्तव में स्पष्टीकरण कर रहे हैं, और इसलिए वे मानव व्यवहार में कोई अंतर्दृष्टि दे. कोई भी शामिल मानसिक तंत्र पर चर्चा करता है. यह वर्णन कैसे एक कार काम करता है बीवाईस्टीयरिंग व्हील और धातु और इंजन, ईंधन या ड्राइव ट्रेन के किसी भी ज्ञान के बिना रंग पर चर्चा की तरह है. वास्तव में, व्यवहार के सबसे पुराने स्पष्टीकरण की तरह, ग्रंथों बोलीघ यहाँ और Wilber द्वारा comments अक्सर बातें वे स्वीकारकरते हैं की किस प्रकार के लिए और अधिक दिलचस्प हैं (औरछोड़!) स्पष्टीकरण के रूप में, और तर्क टीहे का उपयोग करें की तरह, वास्तविक सामग्री के लिए की तुलना में. यदि एक दर्शन और संज्ञानात्मक और विकासवादी मनोविज्ञान पर है, इस के अधिकांश पुरातन है. लगभग हर किसी की तरह (स्कॉलर और सार्वजनिक एक जैसे-ई.छ., Dennett स्वतंत्रता विकसित और अन्य पुस्तकों की मेरी समीक्षा देखें), वह समझ में नहीं आता कि धर्म और नैतिकता की मूल बातें - वास्तव में सभी मानव व्यवहार, हमारे जीन में क्रमादेशित रहे हैं. अपने आप को समझने में एक क्रांति हो रही थी जब वह अपनी कई किताबें लिख रहा था और यह उसे पारित कर दिया. आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 4वें एड (2019) . (shrink)

आप p 135 या 326 पर इस पुस्तक का एक त्वरित सारांश प्राप्त कर सकते हैं. यदि आप विकासवादी मनोविज्ञान पर गति करने के लिए नहीं कर रहे हैं, तो आप पहली बार शीर्षक में इस शब्द के साथ कई हाल के ग्रंथों में से एक पढ़ा जाना चाहिए. सबसे अच्छा में से एक है "विकासवादी मनोविज्ञान की हैंडबुक" 2buss द्वाराएन डी एड. जब तक के बारे में 15 साल पहले तक, व्यवहार के स्पष्टीकरण- वास्तव में सभी में मानसिक प्रक्रियाओं (...) की व्याख्या नहीं किया गया है, बल्कि अस्पष्ट और मोटे तौर पर बेकार वर्णन क्या लोगों ने किया था और वे क्या कहा, क्यों में कोई अंतर्दृष्टि के साथ. हम कह सकते हैं कि लोग एक घटना को मनाने के लिए इकट्ठा होते हैं, भगवान की स्तुति करते हैं, उनके (या उनके) आशीर्वाद, आदि प्राप्तकरते हैं।, लेकिन इस में से कोई भी प्रासंगिक मानसिक प्रक्रियाओं का वर्णन,तो हम कह सकते हैं कि वे बहुत उसी तरह से स्पष्टीकरण कर रहे हैं कि यह बताते हैं कि क्यों एक सेब जमीन पर चला जाता है अगर हम कहते हैं कि इसकी वजह से हम इसे जारी ,और यह भारी है वहाँ कोई तंत्र और कोई व्याख्यात्मक या भविष्य कहनेवाला शक्ति है. यह पुस्तक मानव व्यवहार के आनुवंशिक आधार के स्पष्टीकरण जारी है जो लगभग सार्वभौमिक रूप से नजरअंदाज कर दिया गया है और शिक्षा, धर्म, राजनीति और जनता द्वारा इनकार कर दिया है (देखें पिंकर उत्कृष्ट पुस्तक ''द ब्लांक स्लेट'). उनका बयान (p3) है कि यह पूछने के लिए अगर धर्म आनुवंशिक है व्यर्थ है जीन और पर्यावरण के कारण किसी भी व्यवहार की भिन्नता के प्रतिशत के रूप में गलत है अध्ययन किया जा सकता है, बस के रूप में वे अन्य सभी व्यवहार के लिए कर रहे हैं (जैसे देखें, पिंकर). शीर्षक होना चाहिए "प्रारंभिक आदिम धर्म के कुछ पहलुओं की व्याख्या करने केलिए प्रयास", क्योंकि वह सब पर उच्च चेतना का इलाज नहीं करता है (उदा. satori, ज्ञान आदि) जो अब तक सबसे दिलचस्प घटना है और केवल 21 वीं सदी में बुद्धिमान, शिक्षित लोगों के लिए व्यक्तिगत हित के धर्म का हिस्सा. इस पूरी किताब को पढ़ना, आप ऐसी बातें मौजूद कभी नहीं लगता होगा. इसी तरह, दवाओं और धर्म के विशाल क्षेत्र के लिए. यह तर्कसंगतता के लिए एक रूपरेखा का अभाव है और सोचा देखने की दोहरी प्रणाली है जो अब इतना उत्पादक है उल्लेख नहीं है. वें के लिएमैं अपने हाल के कागजात का सुझाव है. फिर भी, किताब ब्याज की बहुतहै, और दिनांक होने के बावजूद अभी भी पढ़ने लायक है. आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 2006-2019 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 4वें एड (2019). (shrink)

On an account of virtue as skill, virtues are acquired in the ways that skills are acquired. In this paper I focus on one implication of that account that is deserving of greater attention, which is that becoming more skillful requires learning from one’s failures, but that turns out to be especially challenging when dealing with moral failures. In skill acquisition, skills are improved by deliberate practice, where you strive to correct past mistakes and learn how to overcome your current (...) limitations. A similar story applies to virtue acquisition, as moral failures will be a part of anyone’s life, and we will all have to learn from these experiences. However, despite the importance of being able to learn from our mistakes, this is very difficult in practice, given that failure of any kind can be distressing, and especially so for moral failure. The distress created by a recognition of moral failure often prompts responses of anger, avoidance, or defensiveness; rather than attempts to make amends and when necessary to work on self-improvement. The most potentially distressing response to moral failure is shame, as it is often associated with defensiveness. It is here where emotion regulation will be important to manage that distress, and I focus on the skill of emotion differentiation. I argue that emotion differentiation is a promising strategy for distinguishing the emotions we may experience in the wake of failure, including shame, and to encourage those emotions that motivate self-improvement. Thus, emotion regulation is important for virtue acquisition. (shrink)

This chapter explores the concept of judgmentalism: what it is and why it’s morally problematic. After criticizing an account offered by Gary Watson, the paper argues for a broader understanding of what it is to be judgmental, encompassing not just the overall beliefs that we form about someone else, but also the very pattern of our thoughts about those with whom we are involved in interpersonal relationships. The thesis is that to care about someone is to be oriented toward them, (...) or to see them through a particular mental lens, in a way that produces a particular pattern of salience and silence. That is: caring about someone (at least ideally) has the effect of making some features of that person particularly salient, and silencing or screening off other features from one’s consciousness. One is aptly described as judgmental when one’s thoughts do not display this sort of pattern, indicating a failure to fully adopt the orientation that constitutes properly caring about the person. (shrink)

Moral grandstanding, or the use of moral talk for self-promotion, is a threat to free expression. When grandstanding is introduced in a public forum, several ideals of free expression are less likely to be realized. Popular views are less likely to be challenged, people are less free to entertain heterodox ideas, and the cost of changing one’s mind goes up.

The intuitive, folk concept of hypocrisy is not a unified moral category. While many theorists hold that all cases of hypocrisy involve some form of deception, I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I argue for a disjunctive account of hypocrisy whereby all cases of “hypocrisy” involve either the deceiving of others about the sincerity of an agent's beliefs or the lack of will to carry through with the demands of an agent's sincere beliefs. Thus, all cases of (...) hypocrisy can be described either as cases of deception or as cases of akrasia. If this analysis correct, then I suggest further that the moral status of all instances of hypocrisy must be reduced either to the moral blameworthiness of deception or to the moral blameworthiness of akrasia. There can be no unified account of the moral wrongness of “hypocrisy” that holds across the disjunction. (shrink)

Switching from a meat-heavy to a plant-based diet is one of the highest-impact lifestyle changes for climate mitigation and adaptation. Conventional demand-side energy policy has focused on increasing consumption of efficient machines and fuels. Regulating food demand has key advantages. First, food consumption is biologically constrained, thus switching to more efficient foods avoids unintended consequences of switching to more efficient machines, like higher overall energy consumption. Second, food consumption, like smoking, is primed for norm- shifting because it occurs in socially (...) conspicuous environments. While place-based bans and information regulation were essential in lowering the prevalence of smoking, the same strategies may be even more effective in reducing meat demand. Several policy reforms can be implemented at the federal level, from reform of food marketing schemes to publicly subsidized meal programs. (shrink)

Luminaries like Martin Luther King, Jr. urge that Black Americans love even those who hate them. This can look like a rejection of anger at racial injustice. We see this rejection, too, in the growing trend of characterizing social justice movements as radical hate groups, and people who get angry at injustice as bitter and unloving. Philosophers like Martha Nussbaum argue that anger is backward-looking, status focused, and retributive. Citing the life of the Prodigal Son, the victims of the Charleston (...) Church shooting, Gandhi, and King, she claims that we should choose love instead of anger – not only in our intimate relationships but also in the political realm. Buddhist monk and scholar, Śāntideva, argued that anger is an obstacle to love. Anger leads to suffering. Love frees us from suffering. All this makes an initially compelling case against anger at racial injustice. In addition, although philosophers Jeffrie Murphy and Antti Kauppinen argue that anger communicates self-respect and valuing, respectively––they make no connection between agape love and anger. In this essay I’ll show that the love King and others have in mind––agape love––is not only compatible with anger at hateful racists and complicit others, but finds valuable expression in such anger. (shrink)

We evaluated the reliability, validity, and differential item functioning (DIF) of a shorter version of the Defining Issues Test-1 (DIT-1), the behavioral DIT (bDIT), measuring the development of moral reasoning. 353 college students (81 males, 271 females, 1 not reported; age M = 18.64 years, SD = 1.20 years) who were taking introductory psychology classes at a public University in a suburb area in the Southern United States participated in the present study. First, we examined the reliability of the bDIT (...) using Cronbach’s α and its concurrent validity with the original DIT-1 using disattenuated correlation. Second, we compared the test duration between the two measures. Third, we tested the DIF of each question between males and females. Findings reported that first, the bDIT showed acceptable reliability and good concurrent validity. Second, the test duration could be significantly shortened by employing the bDIT. Third, DIF results indicated that the bDIT items did not favour any gender. Practical implications of the present study based on the reported findings are discussed. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that hypocrisy can undermine one’s moral standing to blame. According to the Nonhypocrisy Condition on standing, R has the standing to blame some other agent S for a violation of some norm N only if R is not hypocritical with respect to blame for violations of N. Yet this condition is seldom argued for. Macalester Bell points out that the fact that hypocrisy is a moral fault does not yet explain why hypocritical blame is standingless blame. (...) She raises a challenge: one must explain what is distinct about hypocritical blame such that the hypocritical blamer lacks the standing to blame, even if the arrogant or petty blamer does not. Of those writing on hypocrisy, only we offer a direct response to Bell’s challenge. Recently, however, our account has come under criticism. We argue here that (1) our account can handle these criticisms and that (2) no other rival account adequately addresses Bell’s challenge of explaining what is uniquely objectionable about hypocritical blame. Because answering Bell’s challenge is a necessary component of any plausible account of the relationship between hypocrisy and standing, our account remains the best on offer. (shrink)

We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.