Retiring Popper: Critical realism, falsificationism, and the crisis of replication

Theory and Psychology 34 (5):561-584 (2024)
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Abstract

The recent so-called crisis of replication continues to dominate psychology’s methodological landscape. It is argued here that the apparent renaissance of Popperian thinking that characterises some of the key responses to the crisis of replication is fundamentally flawed. In essence, there is a serious lack of any sustained and rigorous treatment of ontology that underpins much of the current debate about replication and Popper’s falsificationist approach. The overriding problem is that the replication debate reflects the methodologist tendency for mainstream psychologists to avoid or gloss over crucial ontological questions. In contradistinction, this article (a) underscores the primacy of ontology; (b) delineates and applies a critical realist stratified ontology to psychology; (c) utilises the latter as a springboard from which to argue for Popper’s methodological “retirement”; and (d) revindicates the indispensability of context and the subtlety of psychological phenomena in arguing for the intrinsic limits of replication and experimentalism in general.

Author's Profile

Robert Archer
University of Warwick (PhD)

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