Results for 'Falsificationism'

38 found
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  1. Falsificationism Unfalsified: A Reply to Callahan’s “Why Popper is Wrong on Induction”.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    Epistemology is often a problem for libertarianism. Many libertarian texts assume that they need to do more than explain and defend the libertarian conjecture. Instead, they try to offer epistemological support for it (whether empirically or morally); which falsificationism and, more broadly, critical rationalism explains is not possible. Moreover, they often mistake this attempt at support for an explanation of libertarianism (which ought to include an abstract theory of liberty and how it relates to liberty in practice). Therefore, when (...)
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  2.  81
    Falsificationism Redux Indeed: A Rebuttal of the Callahan Rejoinder.J. C. Lester - manuscript
    Readers of “Falsificationism Redux” (the rejoinder) may have found it to be another waffling non-explanation of induction and the alleged falsity of falsificationism—or even self-refuting, as its title indicates (redux: brought back, revived, restored). However, it seems worth another round of replies if only because the arguments are fairly typical of the would-be ‘inductivist’ and it might help some people who have yet to see how these arguments fail.
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  3. Confirmation Versus Falsificationism.Ray Scott Percival - 2015 - In Robin L. Cautin & Scott O. Lilienfeld (eds.), Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology.
    Confirmation and falsification are different strategies for testing theories and characterizing the outcomes of those tests. Roughly speaking, confirmation is the act of using evidence or reason to verify or certify that a statement is true, definite, or approximately true, whereas falsification is the act of classifying a statement as false in the light of observation reports. After expounding the intellectual history behind confirmation and falsificationism, reaching back to Plato and Aristotle, I survey some of the main controversial issues (...)
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  4. A Defence of Falsificationism Against Feyerabend's Epistemological Anarchism Using the Example of Galilei's Observations with the Telescope.Mario Günther -
    I confront Feyerabend's position and critical rationalism in order to have a foundation or starting point for my (historical) investigation. The main difference of his position towards falsificationism is the belief that different theories cannot be discussed rationally. Feyerabend is convinced that Galilei's observations with the telescope in the historical context of the Copernican revolution supports his criticism. In particular, he argues that the Copernican theory was supported by deficient hypotheses, and falsifications were disposed by ad hoc hypotheses and (...)
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  5.  64
    Lakatos on Dogmatic Falsificationism.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Dogmatic (naturalist) falsificationism accepts the falsifiability of all scientific theories without qualification but preserves an infallible empirical basis. He is strictly empiric without being inductivist: he denies the fact that certainty of the empirical basis can be conveyed to theories. Thus, dogmatic falsificationism is the weakest mark of justification. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.15196.33927 .
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  6.  45
    Constructive Verification, Empirical Induction, and Falibilist Deduction: A Threefold Contrast.Julio Michael Stern - 2011 - Information 2 (4):635-650.
    This article explores some open questions related to the problem of verification of theories in the context of empirical sciences by contrasting three epistemological frameworks. Each of these epistemological frameworks is based on a corresponding central metaphor, namely: (a) Neo-empiricism and the gambling metaphor; (b) Popperian falsificationism and the scientific tribunal metaphor; (c) Cognitive constructivism and the object as eigen-solution metaphor. Each of one of these epistemological frameworks has also historically co-evolved with a certain statistical theory and method for (...)
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  7. The Enlightenment Programme and Karl Popper.Nicholas Maxwell - 2006 - In I. I. Jarvie, K. Milford & D. Miller (eds.), Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment. Volume 1: Life and Times, Values in a World of Facts. Ashgate.
    Popper first developed his theory of scientific method – falsificationism – in his The Logic of Scientific Discovery, then generalized it to form critical rationalism, which he subsequently applied to social and political problems in The Open Society and Its Enemies. All this can be regarded as constituting a major development of the 18th century Enlightenment programme of learning from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards a better world. Falsificationism is, however, defective. It misrepresents the real, (...)
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  8. Analytic Philosophy (Alternative Title 'Analytic Atheism?').Charles Pigden - 2013 - In Stephen Bullivant & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Atheism. Oxford University Press. pp. 307-319.
    Most analytic philosophers are atheists, but is there a deep connection between analytic philosophy and atheism? The paper argues a) that the founding fathers of analytic philosophy were mostly teenage atheists before they became philosophers; b) that analytic philosophy was invented partly because it was realized that the God-substitute provided by the previously fashionable philosophy - Absolute Idealism – could not cut the spiritual mustard; c) that analytic philosophy developed an unhealthy obsession with meaninglessness which led to a new kind (...)
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  9.  46
    Falsificaționismul metodologic sofisticat – Toleranța metodologică.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Lakatos a propus o modificare a criteriului lui Popper pe care l-a numit falsificaționism sofisticat (metodologic). Din această perspectivă, criteriul de delimitare ar trebui să se aplice nu unei ipoteze sau unei teorii izolate, ci mai degrabă unui întreg program de cercetare. În lucrările sale timpurii, Lakatos pare să accepte că după un punct de saturație: respingem teoria, pentru ca ulterior să afirme că, dimpotrivă, nu există un astfel de lucru ca punctul de saturație natural pentru un program de cercetare. (...)
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  10. Karl Popper's Critique of Idealism.İsmail Kurun - 2018 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):273-301.
    Karl Popper’s critique of idealism manifests itself with the application of his method, falsificationism, to metaphysics, epistemology, and social and political philosophy. According to Popper, who identifies himself as a philosophical realist, idealism has emerged as a result of the idea that reality cannot be known by reason and of the search for certainty which is erroneous, and it has begotten two mistaken and detrimental views. These views are historicism, the notion that history has an irresistible course, and holism, (...)
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  11.  87
    Appeal to the Court of Experience. [REVIEW]Ray Scott Percival - 1999 - Times Higher Education.
    Geoffrey Stokes's introduction to Karl Popper's work portrays it as an evolving system of ideas and aims to explore the little-understood intricate logical relationships between Popper's work on scientific method and his philosophy of politics. It is one of the few books to cover the debate between Popper and the Frankfurt School. Characteristic of many of Stokes's "criticisms" is that they are presented as Popper "admitting" or "granting" them - as if Popper was not the one who originally raised and (...)
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  12. A Tale of Three Theories: Feyerabend and Popper on Progress and the Aim of Science.Luca Tambolo - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 51:33-41.
    In this paper, three theories of progress and the aim of science are discussed: the theory of progress as increasing explanatory power, advocated by Popper in The logic of scientific discovery ; the theory of progress as approximation to the truth, introduced by Popper in Conjectures and refutations ; the theory of progress as a steady increase of competing alternatives, which Feyerabend put forward in the essay “Reply to criticism. Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam” and defended as late as (...)
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  13. The Hypothesis That Saves the Day: Ad Hoc Reasoning in Pseudoscience.Maarten Boudry - 2013 - Logique Et Analyse 223:245-258.
    What is wrong with ad hoc hypotheses? Ever since Popper’s falsificationist account of adhocness, there has been a lively philosophical discussion about what constitutes adhocness in scientific explanation, and what, if anything, distinguishes legitimate auxiliary hypotheses from illicit ad hoc ones. This paper draws upon distinct examples from pseudoscience to provide us with a clearer view as to what is troubling about ad hoc hypotheses. In contrast with other philosophical proposals, our approach retains the colloquial, derogative meaning of adhocness, and (...)
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  14.  82
    Věda, pseudověda a paravěda.Filip Tvrdý - 2020 - E-Logos 27 (2):4-17.
    Finding the demarcation criterion for the identification of scientific knowledge is the most important task of normative epistemology. Pseudoscience is not a harmless leisure activity, it can pose a danger to the functioning of liberal democratic societies and the well-being of their citizens. First, there is an outline of how to define science instrumentally without slipping into the detrimental heritage of conceptual essentialism. The second part is dedicated to Popper’s falsification criterion and the objections of its opponents, which eventually led (...)
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  15.  47
    Cognitive Constructivism, Eigen-Solutions, and Sharp Statistical Hypotheses.Julio Michael Stern - 2007 - Cybernetics and Human Knowing 14 (1):9-36.
    In this paper epistemological, ontological and sociological questions concerning the statistical significance of sharp hypotheses in scientific research are investigated within the framework provided by Cognitive Constructivism and the FBST (Full Bayesian Significance Test). The constructivist framework is contrasted with the traditional epistemological settings for orthodox Bayesian and frequentist statistics provided by Decision Theory and Falsificationism.
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  16. Philosophical Responses to Underdetermination in Science.Seungbae Park - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):115–124.
    What attitude should we take toward a scientific theory when it competes with other scientific theories? This question elicited different answers from instrumentalists, logical positivists, constructive empiricists, scientific realists, holists, theory-ladenists, antidivisionists, falsificationists, and anarchists in the philosophy of science literature. I will summarize the diverse philosophical responses to the problem of underdetermination, and argue that there are different kinds of underdetermination, and that they should be kept apart from each other because they call for different responses.
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  17. Popper e o problema da predição prática.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2011 - Analytica (Rio) 15 (2):123-146.
    The problem of rational prediction, launched by Wesley Salmon, is without doubt the Achilles heel of the critical method defended by Popper. In this paper, I assess the response given both by Popper and by the popperian Alan Musgrave to this problem. Both responses are inadequate and thus the conclusion of Salmon is reinforced: without appeal to induction, there is no way to make of the practical prediction a rational action. Furthermore, the critical method needs to be vindicated if one (...)
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  18. Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Aim-Oriented Empiricism.Nicholas Maxwell - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):181-239.
    In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere[1], is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science (...)
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  19. Methodological Problems of Neuroscience.Nicholas Maxwell - 1985 - In David Rose & Vernon Dobson (eds.), Models of the Visual Cortex. New York: Wiley.
    In this paper I argue that neuroscience has been harmed by the widespread adoption of seriously inadequate methodologies or philosophies of science - most notably inductivism and falsificationism. I argue that neuroscience, in seeking to understand the human brain and mind, needs to follow in the footsteps of evolution.
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  20. Karl Popper, Science and Enlightenment.Nicholas Maxwell - 2017 - London: UCL Press.
    Karl Popper is famous for having proposed that science advances by a process of conjecture and refutation. He is also famous for defending the open society against what he saw as its arch enemies – Plato and Marx. Popper’s contributions to thought are of profound importance, but they are not the last word on the subject. They need to be improved. My concern in this book is to spell out what is of greatest importance in Popper’s work, what its failings (...)
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  21.  51
    Falsificaționismul metodologic.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscript
    Falsificaționismul metodologic este o marcă a convenționalismului. Există o delimitare importantă între teoriile "pasiviste" și "activiste" ale cunoașterii. "Pasiviștii susțin că adevărata cunoaștere este amprenta naturii pe o minte perfect inertă: activitatea mentală poate duce numai la părtinire și distorsiune. Cea mai influentă școală pasivistă este empirismul clasic. "Activiștii" susțin că nu putem citi cartea naturii fără activitate mentală, fără a o interpreta în lumina așteptărilor sau a teoriilor noastre. "Activiștii" conservatori susțin că suntem născuți cu așteptările noastre de bază; (...)
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  22. Karl Popper: Philosophy of Science.Brendan Shea - 2016 - In James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (eds.), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Karl Popper (1902-1994) was one of the most influential philosophers of science of the 20th century. He made significant contributions to debates concerning general scientific methodology and theory choice, the demarcation of science from non-science, the nature of probability and quantum mechanics, and the methodology of the social sciences. His work is notable for its wide influence both within the philosophy of science, within science itself, and within a broader social context. Popper’s early work attempts to solve the problem of (...)
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  23. Scientific Method.Howard Sankey - 2008 - In Stathis Psillos & Martin Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 248-258.
    This is an introductory overview of theories of scientific method.
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  24. O Problema da Indução.Eduardo Castro & Diogo Fernandes - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    State of the art paper on the problem of induction: how to justify the conclusion that ‘all Fs are Gs’ from the premise that ‘all observed Fs are Gs’. The most prominent theories of contemporary philosophical literature are discussed and analysed, such as: inductivism, reliabilism, perspective of laws of nature, rationalism, falsificationism, the material theory of induction and probabilistic approaches, according to Carnap, Reichenbach and Bayesianism. In the end, we discuss the new problem of induction of Goodman, raised by (...)
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  25. Are “All-and-Some” Statements Falsifiable After All?: The Example of Utility Theory.Philippe Mongin - 1986 - Economics and Philosophy 2 (2):185-195.
    Popper's well-known demarcation criterion has often been understood to distinguish statements of empirical science according to their logical form. Implicit in this interpretation of Popper's philosophy is the belief that when the universe of discourse of the empirical scientist is infinite, empirical universal sentences are falsifiable but not verifiable, whereas the converse holds for existential sentences. A remarkable elaboration of this belief is to be found in Watkins's early work on the statements he calls “all-and-some,” such as: “For every metal (...)
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  26. Channels’ Confirmation and Predictions’ Confirmation: From the Medical Test to the Raven Paradox.Chenguang Lu - 2020 - Entropy 22 (4):384.
    After long arguments between positivism and falsificationism, the verification of universal hypotheses was replaced with the confirmation of uncertain major premises. Unfortunately, Hemple proposed the Raven Paradox. Then, Carnap used the increment of logical probability as the confirmation measure. So far, many confirmation measures have been proposed. Measure F proposed by Kemeny and Oppenheim among them possesses symmetries and asymmetries proposed by Elles and Fitelson, monotonicity proposed by Greco et al., and normalizing property suggested by many researchers. Based on (...)
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  27. El sentido lógico de la refutabilidad.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    According to falsificationism, a theory is scientific if it can be incompatible with some empirically testable statements. This epistemological approach has been criticized because, in practice, it is impossible to decide when a particular fact should be considered incompatible with a theory. These criticisms, however, neglect the fact that the Popperian sense of falsification is a “logical sense.” Thus, the Popperian criterion of falsifiability only requires that, assuming certain auxiliary hypotheses, the theory in question be logically incompatible with some (...)
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  28. Goltz Against Cerebral Localization: Methodology and Experimental Practices.J. P. Gamboa - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 84:101304.
    In the late 19th century, physiologists such as David Ferrier, Eduard Hitzig, and Hermann Munk argued that cerebral brain functions are localized in discrete structures. By the early 20th century, this became the dominant position. However, another prominent physiologist, Friedrich Goltz, rejected theories of cerebral localization and argued against these physiologists until his death in 1902. I argue in this paper that previous historical accounts have failed to comprehend why Goltz rejected cerebral localization. I show that Goltz adhered to a (...)
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  29. The Necessity of Exosomatic Knowledge for Civilization and a Revision to Our Epistemology.Ray Scott Percival - 2012 - In Norbert-Bertrand Barbe (ed.), Le Néant dans la Pensée contemporaine. [The Nothing in Contemporary Thought.]. pp. 136-150.
    The traditional conception of knowledge is justified, true belief. If one looks at a modern textbook on epistemology, the great bulk of questions with which it deals are to do with personal knowledge, as embodied in beliefs and the proper experiences that someone ought to have had in order to have the right (or justification) to know. I intend to argue that due to the explosive growth of knowledge whose domain is “outside the head”, this conception has outlived its relevance. (...)
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  30.  43
    Chess Masters' Hypothesis Testing.Michelle B. Cowley-Cunningham - 2004 - In K. D. Forbus, D. Gentner & Regier (eds.), Proceedings of the Twenty- Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Chicago, IL, USA: pp. pp. 250- 255..
    Falsification may demarcate science from non-science as the rational way to test the truth of hypotheses. But experimental evidence from studies of reasoning shows that people often find falsification difficult. We suggest that domain expertise may facilitate falsification. We consider new experimental data about chess experts’ hypothesis testing. The results show that chess masters were readily able to falsify their plans. They generated move sequences that falsified their plans more readily than novice players, who tended to confirm their plans. The (...)
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  31. Popper, Refutation and 'Avoidance' of Refutation.Greg Bamford - 1989 - Dissertation, The University of Queensland
    Popper's account of refutation is the linchpin of his famous view that the method of science is the method of conjecture and refutation. This thesis critically examines his account of refutation, and in particular the practice he deprecates as avoiding a refutation. I try to explain how he comes to hold the views that he does about these matters; how he seeks to make them plausible; how he has influenced others to accept his mistakes, and how some of the ideas (...)
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  32. El falsacionismo revisado.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - 2021 - Analítica 11 (11):85-102.
    In this paper I formalise the falsificationist proposal omitting Popper’s requirement of consistency. This omission results in (i) trivial theories being falsifiable in an inappropriate sense of the term, but also in (ii) some inconsistent non-trivial theories being so in an appropriate one. This justifies a slight alteration of the definition of falsifiability that excludes (i) but allows (ii). Instead of requiring that a falsifiable theory be consistent, my proposal only requires that the intersection of its classes of potential corroborators (...)
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  33. The Sophisticated Inductive Approach and Science Education.Khosrow Bagheri Noaparast, Zahra Niknam & Mohammad Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast - 2011 - Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 30:1365-1369.
    Introduction: The aim of the present study was to explore the relationship between sophisticated view of induction and science education. Method: This study is a critical review on the relation between philosophical approaches to science and science education. Thus, an analytic method is used in investigating the theories of science and their relationship to science education. Results: Analysing the arguments against induction, we argue that the sophisticated view of induction is not only resistant against the critiques but also inspiring for (...)
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  34. Aim-Oriented Empiricism: David Miller's Critique.Nicholas Maxwell - 2006 - PhilSci Archive.
    For three decades I have expounded and defended aim-oriented empiricism, a view of science which, l claim, solves a number of problems in the philosophy of science and has important implications for science itself and, when generalized, for the whole of academic inquiry, and for our capacity to solve our current global problems. Despite these claims, the view has received scant attention from philosophers of science. Recently, however, David Miller has criticized the view. Miller’s criticisms are, however, not valid.
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  35.  76
    Expanded Science.Joao Carlos Holland de Barcellos - manuscript
    Initially, in this article, we present the foundation on which current science stands. Next, we explain the main stream of modern science, the “Popperian Falsificationism”, and show why the current criticism to the system is flawed. Later, we will prove that the “falsificationism” is logically inconsistent and we will propose a new concept of science, unifying it with philosophy.
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  36. Observation, Meaning and Theory: Review of For and Against Method by Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend. [REVIEW]Nicholas Maxwell - 2000 - Times Higher Education Supplement 1:30-30.
    Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend initially both accepted Popper's philosophy of science, but then reacted against it, and developed it in different directions. Lakatos sought to reconcile Kuhn and Popper by characterizing science as a process of competing research programmes, competing fragments of Kuhn's normal science. Feyerabend emphasized the need to develop rival theories to facilitate severe empirical testing of accepted theories, but then, as a result of a disastrous mistake, came to hold that theories that are incompatible with one (...)
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  37. Jerzy Kmita’s Methodological Interpretation of Karl Marx’s Philosophy. From Ideology to Methodological Concepts.Anna Pałubicka - 2017 - Hybris. Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny 37:114-140.
    The article presents J. Kmita’s methodological interpretation of selected cognitive methods used by K. Marx. Those methods were (and I believe they still are) significant for the social sciences and the humanities, even a century after they had been developed. J Kmita’s interpretation reveals specificity of epistemic procedures carried out by the author of “Capital” and emphasizes contemporary actuality of Marx’s epistemological ideas. To achieve that aim, Kmita refers to the concepts established in the field of philosophy of science of (...)
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  38.  92
    Can We Test Inconsistent Empirical Theories?Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    This paper discusses the logical possibility of testing inconsistent empirical theories. The main challenge for answering this affirmatively is to avoid that the inconsistent consequences of a theory both corroborate it and falsify it. I answer affirmatively by showing that we can define a class of empirical sentences whose truth would force us to abandon such inconsistent theory: the class of its potential rejecters. Despite this, I show that the observational contradictions implied by a theory could only be verified (provided (...)
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