Pragmatic Interests and Imprecise Belief

Philosophy of Science 80 (5):758-768 (2013)
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Does the strength of a particular belief depend upon the significance we attach to it? Do we move from one context to another, remaining in the same doxastic state concerning p yet holding a stronger belief that p in one context than in the other? For that to be so, a doxastic state must have a certain sort of context-sensitive complexity. So the question is about the nature of belief states, as we understand them, or as we think a theory should model them. I explore the idea and how it relates to work on imprecise probabilities and second-order confidence.
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