Stakes and beliefs

Philosophical Studies 147 (1):71 - 87 (2010)
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Abstract
The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically exclude the idea and treat belief as stake-invariant , though an exception is briefly described. The role of the assumption of stake-invariance in familiar accounts of degrees of belief is also discussed, and morals are drawn concerning finite and countable Dutch book arguments.
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2009, 2010
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ARMSAB
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Archival date: 2015-09-12
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References found in this work BETA
Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew
The Aim of Belief.Wedgwood, Ralph

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2009-09-23

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