Stake-invariant belief

Acta Analytica 23 (1):29-43 (2008)
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Abstract
What can rational deliberation indicate about belief? Belief clearly influences deliberation. The principle that rational belief is stake-invariant rules out at least one way that deliberation might influence belief. The principle is widely, if implicitly, held in work on the epistemology of categorical belief, and it is built into the model of choice-guiding degrees of belief that comes to us from Ramsey and de Finetti. Criticisms of subjective probabilism include challenges to the assumption of additive values (the package principle) employed by defenses of probabilism. But the value-interaction phenomena often cited in such challenges are excluded by stake-invariance. A comparison with treatments of categorical belief suggests that the appeal to stake-invariance is not ad hoc. Whether or not to model belief as stake-invariant is a question not settled here.
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References found in this work BETA
Elusive Knowledge.Lewis, David
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew

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Stakes and Beliefs.Armendt, Brad

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2009-01-28

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