The Possibility Conditions of an Ethics of Belief

Dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (2024)
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Abstract

This dissertation explores the question of whether we bear moral responsibility for our beliefs and how this responsibility is possible. Since we cannot directly choose our convictions, some have argued that we have no obligations concerning what we believe. However, we frequently hold each other accountable for our beliefs. Philosophers have responded to the argument against ‘belief duties’ in various ways. One response is that we are responsible for how we influence our beliefs. Another argues that moral responsibility does not require the ability to choose. A third response claims that we, in fact, do have the ability to choose our beliefs. A fourth suggests that whether we have the freedom to choose our beliefs depends on how ‘belief’ is defined. The central claim of this dissertation is that the first response is incomplete, the second is mistaken, and that the third and fourth are the most promising. This book investigates in depth what ‘belief’ entails. If we understand belief as placing trust in a possible truth in our practical reasoning, rather than having convictions, then we can have both doxastic voluntary control and belief-related obligations. What we believe is crucial to our actions, and therefore, the ethics of belief is deeply connected with the ethics of action.

Author's Profile

Valentin Arts
Vrije University

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