Results for 'epistemic authority'

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  1. For A Service Conception of Epistemic Authority: A Collective Approach.Michel Croce - 2019 - Social Epistemology (2):1-11.
    This paper attempts to provide a remedy to a surprising lacuna in the current discussion in the epistemology of expertise, namely the lack of a theory accounting for the epistemic authority of collective agents. After introducing a service conception of epistemic authority based on Alvin Goldman’s account of a cognitive expert, I argue that this service conception is well suited to account for the epistemic authority of collective bodies on a non-summativist perspective, and I (...)
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  2. Expert-Oriented Abilities Vs. Novice-Oriented Abilities: An Alternative Account of Epistemic Authority.Michel Croce - 2018 - Episteme 15 (4):476-498.
    According to a recent account of epistemic authority proposed by Linda Zagzebski (2012), it is rational for laypersons to believe on authority when they conscientiously judge that the authority is more likely to form true beliefs and avoid false ones than they are in some domain. Christoph Jäger (2016) has recently raised several objections to her view. By contrast, I argue that both theories fail to adequately capture what epistemic authority is, and I offer (...)
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  3. Epistemic Paternalism and the Service Conception of Epistemic Authority.Michel Croce - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (3):305-327.
    Epistemic paternalism is the thesis that in some circumstances we are justified in interfering with the inquiry of another for their own epistemic good without consulting them on the issue. In this paper, I address the issue of who is rationally entitled to undertake paternalistic interferences, and in virtue of which features one has this entitlement. First, I undermine the view according to which experts are the most apt people to act as paternalist interferers. Then, I argue that (...)
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  4. Standpoint Epistemology Without The?Standpoint??: An Examination of Epistemic Privilege and Epistemic Authority.Marianne Janack - 1997 - Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 12 (2):125-139.
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  5.  77
    A Review of Linda Zagzebski's Epistemic Authority[REVIEW]Jonathan Matheson, Valerie Joly Chock, Jensen Alex & Kyle Mallard - 2017 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6 (10):56-59.
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  6. Epistemic Authority and Its Critics.Linda Zagzebski - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):169--187.
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  7. Epistemic Authority, Preemption and Normative Power.Benjamin McMyler - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):101--119.
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  8. Epistemic Authority and Conscientious Belief.Charity Anderson - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):91--99.
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  9.  88
    Inconsistency, Uncertainty and Epistemic Authority.Damian Leszczyński - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):145--154.
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  10.  33
    Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. By Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. [REVIEW]Tomas Bogardus & Paige Massey - 2014 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):610-613.
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  11.  90
    Authority and Trust: Reflections on Linda Zagzebski’s Epistemic Autohrity.John Cottingham - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):25--38.
    Our modern egalitarian and individualistic age is suspicious of authority, and in recent times there have been almost daily reports in the press of cases where trust in various authorities, including financial, governmental, political and religious, has been found to have been abused or misplaced. Such disappointments seem to bolster the case for withholding trust in external authority and falling back on one’s own resources. But if the lessons from Linda Zagzebski’s groundbreaking work are accepted, 1 self- reliance (...)
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  12. Believing on Authority.Matthew A. Benton - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):133-144.
    Linda Zagzebski's "Epistemic Authority" (Oxford University Press, 2012) brings together issues in social epistemology with topics in moral and political philosophy as well as philosophy of religion. In this paper I criticize her discussion of self-trust and rationality, which sets up the main argument of the book; I consider how her view of authority relates to some issues of epistemic authority in testimony; and I raise some concerns about her treatment of religious epistemology and religious (...)
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  13. Zagzebski on Authority and Preemption in the Domain of Belief.Arnon Keren - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):61-76.
    The paper discusses Linda Zagzebski's account of epistemic authority. Building on Joseph Raz's account of political authority, Zagzebski argues that the basic contours of epistemic authority match those Raz ascribes to political authority. This, it is argued, is a mistake. Zagzebski is correct in identifying the pre-emptive nature of reasons provided by an authority as central to our understanding of epistemic authority. However, Zagzebski ignores important differences between practical and epistemic (...)
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  14.  52
    Preemptive Authority: The Challenge From Outrageous Expert Judgment.Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - Episteme.
    Typically, expert judgments are regarded by laypeople as highly trustworthy. However, expert assertions that strike the layperson as obviously false or outrageous, seem to give one a perfect reason to dispute that this judgment manifests expertise. In this paper, I will defend four claims. First, I will deliver an argument in support of the preemption view on expert judgments according to which we should not rationally use our own domain-specific reasons in the face of expert testimony. Secondly, I will argue (...)
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  15. La ciencia como un punto de vista: algunos desafíos a la objetividad científica.Mario Gensollen & Marc Jiménez Rolland - 2018 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 75:43-57.
    Resumen: Algunos críticos de la ciencia afirman que es sólo un punto de vista entre otros, sin alguna autoridad epistémica especial. No obstante, en este artículo se defiende que la idea de que la investigación científica involucra una perspectiva o punto de vista no impone una restricción a su ideal de objetividad. Primero se presentan algunas aclaraciones sobre la noción de punto de vista, luego se atiende al concepto de objetividad científica, y por último se enfrentan algunos desafíos que se (...)
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  16. Standpoint Epistemology Without the 'Standpoint'.Marianne Janack - 1997 - Hypatia 12 (2):125-39.
    In this paper I argue that the distinction between epistemic privilege and epistemic authority is an important one for feminist epistemologists who are sympathetic to feminist standpoint theory. I argue that, while the first concept is elusive, the second is really the important one for a successful feminist standpoint project.
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  17. Epistemologies of Discomfort: What Military-Family Anti-War Activists Can Teach Us About Knowledge of Violence.Shari Stone-Mediatore - 2010 - Studies in Social Justice 4 (1):25-45.
    This paper examines the particular relevance of feminist critiques of epistemic authority in contexts of institutionalized violence. Reading feminist criticism of “experts” together with theorists of institutionalized violence, Stone-Mediatore argues that typical expert modes of thinking are incapable of rigorous knowledge of institutionalized violence because such knowledge requires a distinctive kind of thinking-within-discomfort for which conventionally trained experts are ill-suited. The author demonstrates the limitations of “expert” modes of thinking with reference to writings on the Iraq war by (...)
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  18.  28
    Kuhn e a racionalidade da escolha científica.Eros Carvalho - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (3):439-458.
    In this paper, I try to articulate and clarify the role of the epistemic authority of experts in Kuhn’s explanation for the transition process between rival paradigms in the scientific revolutionary period. If science progresses, that process should contribute to the attainment of the cognitive aim of science, namely, the articulation of paradigms increasingly successful at the resolution of problems. It is hard to see that process as rational and as attaining the cognitive aim of science without the (...)
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  19. Problems in the Theory of Democratic Authority.Christopher S. King - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):431 - 448.
    This paper identifies strands of reasoning underlying several theories of democratic authority. It shows why each of them fails to adequately explain or justify it. Yet, it does not claim (per philosophical anarchism) that democratic authority cannot be justified. Furthermore, it sketches an argument for a perspective on the justification of democratic authority that would effectively respond to three problems not resolved by alternative theories—the problem of the expert, the problem of specificity, and the problem of deference. (...)
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  20. The Epistemic Circumstances of Democracy.Fabienne Peter - 2016 - In Miranda Fricker Michael Brady (ed.), The Epistemic Life of Groups. pp. 133 - 149.
    Does political decision-making require experts or can a democracy be trusted to make correct decisions? This question has a long-standing tradition in political philosophy, going back at least to Plato’s Republic. Critics of democracy tend to argue that democracy cannot be trusted in this way while advocates tend to argue that it can. Both camps agree that it is the epistemic quality of the outcomes of political decision-making processes that underpins the legitimacy of political institutions. In recent political philosophy, (...)
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  21.  74
    Perspective and Epistemic State Ascriptions.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):313-341.
    This article explores whether perspective taking has an impact on the ascription of epistemic states. To do so, a new method is introduced which incites participants to imagine themselves in the position of the protagonist of a short vignette and to judge from her perspective. In a series of experiments, perspective proves to have a significant impact on belief ascriptions, but not on knowledge ascriptions. For belief, perspective is further found to moderate the epistemic side-effect effect significantly. It (...)
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  22. On What It Takes to Be an Expert.Michel Croce - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):1-21.
    This paper tackles the problem of defining what a cognitive expert is. Starting from a shared intuition that the definition of an expert depends upon the conceptual function of expertise, I shed light on two main approaches to the notion of an expert: according to novice-oriented accounts of expertise, experts need to provide laypeople with information they lack in some domain; whereas, according to research-oriented accounts, experts need to contribute to the epistemic progress of their discipline. In this paper, (...)
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  23.  63
    Epistemic Democracy Without Truth: The Deweyan Approach.Michael Fuerstein - forthcoming - Raisons Politiques.
    In this essay I situate John Dewey’s pragmatist approach to democratic epistemology in relation to contemporary “epistemic democracy.” Like epistemic democrats, Dewey characterizes democracy as a form of social inquiry. But whereas epistemic democrats suggest that democracy aims to “track the truth,” Dewey rejects the notion of “tracking” or “corresponding” to truth in political and other domains. For Dewey, the measure of successful decision-making is not some fixed independent standard of truth or correctness but, instead, our own (...)
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  24. Trust and Belief: A Preemptive Reasons Account.Arnon Keren - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2593-2615.
    According to doxastic accounts of trust, trusting a person to \(\varPhi \) involves, among other things, holding a belief about the trusted person: either the belief that the trusted person is trustworthy or the belief that she actually will \(\varPhi \) . In recent years, several philosophers have argued against doxastic accounts of trust. They have claimed that the phenomenology of trust suggests that rather than such a belief, trust involves some kind of non-doxastic mental attitude towards the trusted person, (...)
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  25. Expressing First-Person Authority.Matthew Parrott - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2215-2237.
    Ordinarily when someone tells us something about her beliefs, desires or intentions, we presume she is right. According to standard views, this deferential trust is justified on the basis of certain epistemic properties of her assertion. In this paper, I offer a non-epistemic account of deference. I first motivate the account by noting two asymmetries between the kind of deference we show psychological self-ascriptions and the kind we grant to epistemic experts more generally. I then propose a (...)
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  26.  47
    Is the Fact That Other People Believe in God a Reason to Believe? Remarks on the Consensus Gentium Argument.Marek Dobrzeniecki - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (3):133.
    According to The Consensus Gentium Argument from the premise: “Everyone believes that God exists” one can conclude that God does exist. In my paper I analyze two ways of defending the claim that somebody’s belief in God is a prima facie reason to believe. Kelly takes the fact of the commonness of the belief in God as a datum to explain and argues that the best explanation has to indicate the truthfulness of the theistic belief. Trinkaus Zagzebski grounds her defence (...)
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  27. Epistemic Democracy and the Social Character of Knowledge.Michael Fuerstein - 2008 - Episteme 5 (1):pp. 74-93.
    How can democratic governments be relied upon to achieve adequate political knowledge when they turn over their authority to those of no epistemic distinction whatsoever? This deep and longstanding concern is one that any proponent of epistemic conceptions of democracy must take seriously. While Condorcetian responses have recently attracted substantial interest, they are largely undermined by a fundamental neglect of agenda-setting. I argue that the apparent intractability of the problem of epistemic adequacy in democracy stems in (...)
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  28. Liberal Foundations of Democratic Authority.Andrew Lister - 2010 - Representation 46 (1):19-34.
    In Democratic Authority, David Estlund argues that decision-procedures are to be judged solely by their tendency to generate morally superior decisions, but that because any relationship of authority must be acceptable to all qualified moral points of view, the epistemic benefits of less equal procedures must be evident beyond qualified objection. If all doctrines involved in political justification must be qualifiedly acceptable, however, the qualified acceptability requirement must itself be acceptable to qualified points of view. This article (...)
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  29. The Fictionality of Plays.John Dilworth - 2002 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (3):263–273.
    The category of works of fiction is a very broad and heterogeneous one. I do have a general thesis in mind about such works, namely, that they themselves are fictional, in much the same way as are the fictional events or entities that they are about. But a defense of such a broad thesis would provide an intractably complex topic for an introductory essay, so I shall here confine myself to a presentation of a similar thesis for narrative theatrical works (...)
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  30.  22
    A Postsecular Rationale – Religious and Secular as Epistemic Peers.Paolo Monti - 2013 - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 3 (2).
    In Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State, Robert Audi addresses disagreements among equally rational persons on political matters of coercion by analysing the features of discussions between epistemic peers, and supporting a normative principle of toleration. It is possible to question the extent to which Audi’s views are consistent with the possibility of religious citizens being properly defined as epistemic peers with their non-religious counterparts, insofar as he also argues for some significant constraints on (...)
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  31.  43
    Objective Expertise and Functionalist Constraints.Michel Croce - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (5):25-35.
    Christian Quast has recently embarked on the project of systematizing the debate about the notion of expertise, an extremely fascinating and important issue addressed by scholars of many disciplines yet still in need of an interdisciplinary take. He sheds light on a number of relevant features of this notion and defends what he calls a “balanced” account of expertise, namely one that defines this concept in light of an expert’s dispositions, manifestations of their dispositions, and social role or function. In (...)
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  32. The Basis of First-Person Authority.Kevin Falvey - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):69-99.
    This paper develops an account of the distinctive epistemic authority of avowals of propositional attitude, focusing on the case of belief. It is argued that such avowals are expressive of the very mental states they self-ascribe. This confers upon them a limited self-warranting status, and renders them immune to an important class of errors to which paradigm empirical (e.g., perceptual) judgments are liable.
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  33.  41
    Theorizing Multiple Oppressions Through Colonial History: Cultural Alterity and Latin American Feminisms.Elena Ruíz - 2011 - APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 2 (11):5-9.
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  34. Competing Epistemic Spaces.Mark Navin - 2013 - Social Theory and Practice 39 (2):241-264.
    Recent increases in the rates of parental refusal of routine childhood vaccination have eroded many countries’ “herd immunity” to communicable diseases. Some parents who refuse routine childhood vaccines do so because they deny the mainstream medical consensus that vaccines are safe and effective. I argue that one reason these vaccine denialists disagree with vaccine proponents about the reasons in favor of vaccination is because they also disagree about the sorts of practices that are conducive to good reasoning about healthcare choices. (...)
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  35. Zagzebski, Authority, and Faith.Trent Dougherty - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):47--59.
    Epistemic Authority is a mature work of a leading epistemologist and philosopher of religion. It is a work primarily in epistemology with applications to religious epistemology. There are obvious applications of the notion of epistemic authority to philosophy of religion. For, on the face of it, the notion of some kind of ”epistemic authority’ may serve as a conceptual anchor for our understanding of faith. Indeed, there is ample historical precedent for this. Faith, says (...)
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  36. Communal and Institutional Trust: Authority in Religion and Politics.C. A. J. Coady - 2014 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (4):1--23.
    Linda Zagzebski’s book on epistemic authority is an impressive and stimulating treatment of an important topic. 1 I admire the way she manages to combine imagination, originality and argumentative control. Her work has the further considerable merit of bringing analytic thinking and abstract theory to bear upon areas of concrete human concern, such as the attitudes one should have towards moral and religious authority. The book is stimulating in a way good philosophy should be -- provoking both (...)
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  37. Practice Oriented Controversies and Borrowed Epistemic Support in Current Evolutionary Biology. The Case of Phylogeography.Alfonso Arroyo-Santos, Mark E. Olson & Francisco Vergara-Silva - 2015 - Perspectives on Science 23 (3):310-334.
    Although there is increasing recognition that theory and practice in science are often inseparably intertwined, discussions of scientific controversies often continue to focus on theory, and not practice or methodologies. As a contribution to constructing a framework towards understanding controversies linked to scientific practices, we introduce the notion of borrowed epistemic credibility, to describe the situation in which scientists exploit fallacious similarities between accepted tenets in other fields to garner support for a given position in their own field. Our (...)
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  38. Disagreement and Philosophical Progress.Brent Ables - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (1): 115-127.
    In “Belief in the Face of Controversy,” Hilary Kornblith argues for a radical form of epistemic modesty: given that there has been no demonstrable cumulativeprogress in the history of philosophy – as there has been in formal logic, math, and science – Kornblith concludes that philosophers do not have the epistemic credibility to be trusted as authorities on the questions they attempt to answer. After reconstructing Kornblith's position, I will suggest that it requires us to adopt a different (...)
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  39. The Epistemic Benefits of Reason Giving.Lisa Bortolotti - 2009 - Theory and Psychology 19 (5):1-22.
    There is an apparent tension in current accounts of the relationship between reason giving and self knowledge. On the one hand, philosophers like Richard Moran (2001) claim that deliberation and justification can give rise to first-person authority over the attitudes that subjects form or defend on the basis of what they take to be their best reasons. On the other hand, the psychological evidence on the introspection effects and the literature on elusive reasons suggest that engaging in explicit deliberation (...)
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  40. Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote?Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):353-360.
    In trying to distinguish the right kinds of reasons from the wrong, epistemologists often appeal to the connection to truth to explain why practical considerations cannot constitute reasons. The view they typically opt for is one on which only evidence can constitute a reason to believe. Talbot has shown that these approaches don’t exclude the possibility that there are non-evidential reasons for belief that can justify a belief without being evidence for that belief. He thinksthat there are indeed such reasons (...)
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  41. Divide and Conquer: The Authority of Nature and Why We Disagree About Human Nature.Maria Kronfeldner - forthcoming - In Elizabeth Hannon & Tim Lewens (eds.), Why we disagree about human nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 186-206.
    The term ‘human nature’ can refer to different things in the world and fulfil different epistemic roles. Human nature can refer to a classificatory nature (classificatory criteria that determine the boundaries of, and membership in, a biological or social group called ‘human’), a descriptive nature (a bundle of properties describing the respective group’s life form), or an explanatory nature (a set of factors explaining that life form). This chapter will first introduce these three kinds of ‘human nature’, together with (...)
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  42. Why Arguments From Expert Opinion Are Still Weak: A Reply to Seidel.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - Informal Logic 36 (2):238-252.
    In this paper, I reply to Seidel’s objections against my argument from expert performance to the effect that arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. I clarify what Seidel takes to be unclear points in my argument and show that it withstands Seidel’s objections.
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  43.  11
    Truth, Inquiry and Democratic Authority in the Climate Debate.Phillip Deen - 2014 - Public Affairs Quarterly 28 (4):375-394.
    Recent attempts to legislate climate science out of existence raises the question of whether citizens are obliged to obey such laws. The authority of democratic law is rooted in both truth and popular consent, but neither is sufficient and they may conflict. These are reconciled in theory and, more importantly, in practice once we incorporate insights from the pragmatist theory of inquiry.
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  44. Responsible Innovation in Social Epistemic Systems: The P300 Memory Detection Test and the Legal Trial.John Danaher - forthcoming - In Van den Hoven (ed.), Responsible Innovation Volume II: Concepts, Approaches, Applications. Springer.
    Memory Detection Tests (MDTs) are a general class of psychophysiological tests that can be used to determine whether someone remembers a particular fact or datum. The P300 MDT is a type of MDT that relies on a presumed correlation between the presence of a detectable neural signal (the P300 “brainwave”) in a test subject, and the recognition of those facts in the subject’s mind. As such, the P300 MDT belongs to a class of brain-based forensic technologies which have proved popular (...)
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  45.  50
    Reliability of a Speaker and Recognition of a Listener: Bocheński and Nyāya on the Relation of Authority.Agnieszka Rostalska - 2017 - Kervan. International Journal of Afro-Asiatic Studies 21:155-173.
    In the Nyāyasūtras (NS), the fundamental text of the Nyāya tradition, testimony is defined as a statement of a reliable speaker (āpta). According to the NS, such a speaker should possess three qualities: competence, honesty and desire to speak. The content of a discourse, including the prescriptions, is also considered reliable due to the status of a given author and the person that communicated it. -/- The Polish philosopher J.M. Bocheński similarly stresses the role of a speaker; he holds that (...)
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  46. Deontological Evidentialism, Wide-Scope, and Privileged Values.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):485-506.
    Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again (...)
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  47. The Solution to Poor Opinions is More Opinions: Peircean Pragmatist Tactics for the Epistemic Long Game.Catherine Legg - 2018 - In Michael Peters, Sharon Rider, Tina Besley & Mats Hyvonen (eds.), Post-Truth, Fake News: Viral Modernity & Higher Education. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 43-58.
    Although certain recent developments in mendacious political manipulation of public discourse are horrifying to the academic mind, I argue that we should not panic. Charles Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology with its teleological arc, long horizon, and rare balance between robust realism and contrite fallibilism offers guidance to weather the storm, and perhaps even see it as inevitable in our intellectual development. This paper explores Peirce’s classic “four methods of fixing belief”, which takes us on an entertaining and still very pertinent tour (...)
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  48.  40
    Madhyamaka Philosophy of No-Mind: Taktsang Lotsāwa’s On Prāsaṅgika, Pramāṇa, Buddhahood and a Defense of No-Mind Thesis.Sonam Thakchoe & Julien Tempone Wiltshire - 2019 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 47 (3):453-487.
    It is well known in contemporary Madhyamaka studies that the seventh century Indian philosopher Candrakīrti rejects the foundationalist Abhidharma epistemology. The question that is still open to debate is: Does Candrakīrti offer any alternative Madhyamaka epistemology? One possible way of addressing this question is to find out what Candrakīrti says about the nature of buddha’s epistemic processes. We know that Candrakīrti has made some puzzling remarks on that score. On the one hand, he claims buddha is the pramāṇabhūta-puruṣa (person (...)
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  49.  27
    Critical Performances.Jonathan A. Neufeld - 2012 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):89-104.
    Philosophers of music commonly distinguish performative from critical interpretations. I would like to suggest that the distinction between critical and performative interpretations is well captured by an analogy to legal critics and judges. This parallel draws attention to several features of performative interpretation that are typically overlooked, and deemphasizes epistemic problems with performative interpretations that I believe are typically blown out of proportion and ultimately fail to capture interesting features of performative interpretation. There is an important distinction to be (...)
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  50. Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology.Alison M. Jaggar - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):151 – 176.
    This paper argues that, by construing emotion as epistemologically subversive, the Western tradition has tended to obscure the vital role of emotion in the construction of knowledge. The paper begins with an account of emotion that stresses its active, voluntary, and socially constructed aspects, and indicates how emotion is involved in evaluation and observation. It then moves on to show how the myth of dispassionate investigation has functioned historically to undermine the epistemic authority of women as well as (...)
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