The Simulation Hypothesis and Meta-Problem of Everything

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Abstract
In a new paper, David. J. Chalmers examines eleven possible solutions to the meta-problem of consciousness, ‘the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness.’ The present paper argues that Chalmers overlooks an explanation that he has otherwise taken seriously, and which a number of philosophers, physicists, and computer scientists have taken seriously as well: the hypothesis that we are living in a computer simulation. This paper argues that a particular version of the simulation hypothesis is at least as good of a solution to the meta-problem of consciousness as many explanations Chalmers considers, and may even be a better one—as it may be the best solution to a much broader meta-philosophical problem: the ‘meta-problem of everything’, the problem of explaining why our world has the quantum-mechanical, relativistic, and philosophical features it does.
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First archival date: 2019-02-23
Latest version: 8 (2019-02-25)
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A New Theory of Free Will.Marcus Arvan - 2013 - Philosophical Forum 44 (1):1-48.

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