Run Aground: Kit Fine’s Critique of Truthmaker Theory

Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268):443-463 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Kit Fine, the leading proponent of the metaphysical project of grounding theory, has offered a number of potentially devastating objections to truthmaker theory, the branch of metaphysics dedicated to exploring the ontological grounds for truths. In this paper I show what presuppositions about truthmaker theory Fine’s objections are based upon, and why they are false. I discuss four objections that Fine raises, and demonstrate how truthmaker theorists may respond to them. I then showcase the positive contribution that truthmaker theory can make to metaphysics, including its ability to speak to a core metaphysical topic (the ontological grounds for truths) that Fine’s approach to grounding must ultimately remain silent on. I conclude by exploring what I take to be the best option when it comes to understanding how truthmaking and grounding fit together.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ASARAK
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-10-14
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The World and Truth About What Is Not.Noël B. Saenz - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):82-98.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Much Ado About Aboutness.Sam Baron, Reginald Mary Chua, Kristie Miller & James Norton - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-29.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2016-10-14

Total views
334 ( #7,732 of 37,985 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #12,543 of 37,985 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.