The Hard Road to Presentism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):314-335 (2014)
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It is a common criticism of presentism – the view according to which only the present exists – that it errs against truthmaker theory. Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed by restricting truthmaker maximalism (the view that all truths have truthmakers), maintaining that propositions concerning the past are not made true by anything, but are true nonetheless. Support for this view is typically garnered from the case for negative existential propositions, which some philosophers contend are exceptions to truthmaker maximalism. In this article, we argue that a ‘no truthmakers’ approach to the truthmaker objection is critically flawed
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Truth and Truthmakers.Armstrong, D. M.
Truth and Ontology.Merricks, Trenton
Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics.Sider, Theodore; Hawthorne, John & Zimmerman, Dean W. (eds.)

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Presentism and Actualism.Noonan, Harold W.

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