The Case for a Feminist Hinge Epistemology

Wittgenstein-Studien 10 (1):153-163 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper I make the case for a feminist hinge epistemology in three steps. My first step is to explain hinge epistemologies as contemporary epistemologies that take Wittgenstein’s work in On Certainty as their starting point. My second step is to make three criticisms of this literature as it currently stands. My third step is to introduce feminist epistemologies, which argue that social factors like race and gender affect what different people and groups justifiably believe, and argue that developing a feminist hinge epistemology is both plausible and desirable.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ASHTCF-4
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-06-13
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-01-17

Total views
197 ( #30,474 of 2,448,878 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #20,810 of 2,448,878 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.