Two Theories of Transparency

Erkenntnis:1-21 (forthcoming)
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Perceptual experience is often said to be transparent; that is, when we have a perceptual experience we seem to be aware of properties of the objects around us, and never seem to be aware of properties of the experience itself. This is a (purported) introspective fact. It is also often said that we can infer a metaphysical fact from this introspective fact, e.g. a fact about the nature of perceptual experience. A transparency theory fills in the details for these two facts, and bridges the gap between them. Our aim in this paper is threefold: to scrutinize Michael Tye's transparency theory (2002, 2009, 2014a), introduce a new transparency theory, and advance a meta-theoretical hypothesis about the interest and import of transparency theories in general.
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First archival date: 2019-03-27
Latest version: 2 (2019-03-29)
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