Is feeling pain the perception of something?

Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567 (2009)
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Abstract
According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will also examine the relationship between perceptual views and two (weak and strong) forms of representationalism about experience. I will argue that pains pose very serious problems for strong representationalism as well.
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
AYDIFP
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First archival date: 2013-03-31
Latest version: 2 (2020-12-15)
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2009-01-28

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