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  1. Why Successful Performance in Imagery Tasks Does Not Require the Manipulation of Mental Imagery.Thomas Park - 2019 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2 (X):1-11.
    Nanay (2017) argues for unconscious mental imagery, inter alia based on the assumption that successful performance in imagery tasks requires the manipulation of mental imagery. I challenge this assumption with the help of results presented in Shepard and Metzler (1971), Zeman et al. (2010), and Keogh and Pearson (2018). The studies suggest that imagery tasks can be successfully performed by means of cognitive/propositional strategies which do not rely on imagery.
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  2. Le problème de la souffrance chez Nietzsche et Parfit.Nicolas Delon - 2019 - Klesis 43:156-186.
    Dans On What Matters Parfit défénd un objectivisme moral sur lequel il espère que les philosophes finiront par converger. Au cœur de cet espoir sont des vérités normatives irréductibles telles que l’affirmation que la souffrance est intrinsèquement mauvaise. Parfit se demande si Nietzsche menace son édifice et lui consacre un chapitre entier chapeautant la discussion du désaccord moral et de la convergence, et conclut que Nietzsche soit n’est pas en vrai désaccord, soit ne raisonne pas dans des conditions satisfaisantes. Je (...)
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  3. On Defining Bruxism.W. Ceusters & B. Smith - 2018 - Studies in Health Technology and Informatics 247:551-555.
    In a series of recent publications, orofacial researchers have debated the question of how ‘bruxism’ should be defined for the purposes of accurate diagnosis and reliable clinical research. Following the principles of realism-based ontology, we performed an analysis of the arguments involved. This revealed that the disagreements rested primarily on inconsistent use of terms, so that issues of ontology were thus obfuscated by shortfalls in terminology. In this paper, we demonstrate how bruxism terminology can be improved by paying attention to (...)
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  4. The Integration of Emotion and Reason in Caregiver Pain Assessment.Simon van Rysewyk - 2010 - Journal of Pain 11 (8):804-805.
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  5. Towards an Ontology of Pain.Barry Smith, Werner Ceusters, Louis J. Goldberg & Richard Ohrbach - 2011 - In Proceedings of the Conference on Ontology and Analytical Metaphysics. Keio University Press.
    We present an ontology of pain and of other pain-related phenomena, building on the definition of pain provided by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP). Our strategy is to identify an evolutionarily basic canonical pain phenomenon, involving unpleasant sensory and emotional experience based causally in localized tissue damage that is concordant with that experience. We then show how different variant cases of this canonical pain phenomenon can be distinguished, including pain that is elevated relative to peripheral trauma, (...)
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  6. Hmm… Hill on the Paradox of Pain.Alex Byrne - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161:489-96.
    Critical discussion of Chris Hill's perceptual theory of pain.
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  7. Models as Interpreters.Chuanfei Chin - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):303-312.
    Most philosophical accounts of scientific models assume that models represent some aspect, or some theory, of reality. They also assume that interpretation plays only a supporting role. This paper challenges both assumptions. It proposes that models can be used in science to interpret reality. (a) I distinguish these interpretative models from representational ones. They find new meanings in a target system’s behaviour, rather than fit its parts together. They are built through idealisation, abstraction and recontextualisation. (b) To show how interpretative (...)
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  8. Privation Theories of Pain.Adam Swenson - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (3):139 - 154.
    Most modern writers accept that a privation theory of evil should explicitly account for the evil of pain. But pains are quintessentially real. The evil of pain does not seem to lie in an absence of good. Though many directly take on the challenges this raises, the metaphysics and axiology of their answers is often obscure. In this paper I try to straighten things out. By clarifying and categorizing the possible types of privation views, I explore the ways in which (...)
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  9. Why Computers Can't Feel Pain.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.
    The most cursory examination of the history of artificial intelligence highlights numerous egregious claims of its researchers, especially in relation to a populist form of ‘strong’ computationalism which holds that any suitably programmed computer instantiates genuine conscious mental states purely in virtue of carrying out a specific series of computations. The argument presented herein is a simple development of that originally presented in Putnam’s (Representation & Reality, Bradford Books, Cambridge in 1988 ) monograph, “Representation & Reality”, which if correct, has (...)
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  10. Knocking Out Pain in Livestock: Can Technology Succeed Where Morality has Stalled?Adam Shriver - 2009 - Neuroethics 2 (3):115-124.
    Though the vegetarian movement sparked by Peter Singer’s book Animal Liberation has achieved some success, there is more animal suffering caused today due to factory farming than there was when the book was originally written. In this paper, I argue that there may be a technological solution to the problem of animal suffering in intensive factory farming operations. In particular, I suggest that recent research indicates that we may be very close to, if not already at, the point where we (...)
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  11. Pain's Evils.Adam Swenson - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (2):197-216.
    The traditional accounts of pain’s intrinsic badness assume a false view of what pains are. Insofar as they are normatively significant, pains are not just painful sensations. A pain is a composite of a painful sensation and a set of beliefs, desires, emotions, and other mental states. A pain’s intrinsic properties can include inter alia depression, anxiety, fear, desires, feelings of helplessness, and the pain’s meaning. This undermines the traditional accounts of pain’s intrinsic badness. Pain is intrinsically bad in two (...)
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  12. Unconscious Pain.Nada Gligorov - 2008 - American Journal of Bioethics 8 (9):27 – 28.
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  13. Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, and a Posteriori Identities.Irwin Goldstein - 2004 - In Maite Ezcurdia, Robert Stainton & Christopher Viger (eds.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Calgary Press. pp. 261-273.
    Orthodox neural materialists think mental states are neural events or orthodox material properties of neutral events. Orthodox material properties are defining properties of the “physical”. A “defining property” of the physical is a type of property that provides a necessary condition for something’s being correctly termed “physical”. In this paper I give an argument against orthodox neural materialism. If successful, the argument would show at least some properties of some mental states are not orthodox material properties of neural events. Opposing (...)
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  14. Pain, Competency and Consent.William R. C. Harvey, George C. Webster & Derek L. Jones - 1993 - HEC Forum 5 (3):205-211.
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  15. A Note on Comparing Death and Pain.Adam Morton - 1988 - Bioethics 2 (2):129–135.
    I give ways of comparing the disvalue of death and of pain by comparing each to other evils.
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  16. The Problem of Pain.Eddy A. Nahmias - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
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  17. Applying the Concept of Pain.Charles Sayward - 2003 - Iyyun 52 (July):290-300.
    This paper reaches the conclusion that, while there are ordinary cases in which the pretending possibility is reasonable, these cases always contain some element that makes it reasonable. This will be the element we ask for when we ask why pretending possibility is raised. Knowledge that someone else is in pain is a matter of eliminating the proposed element or neutralizing its pain-negating aspect.
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The Concept of Pain
  1. The Unpleasantness of Pain.Abraham Sapien - 2018 - Dissertation,
    In this thesis I provide an account of the unpleasantness of pain. In doing this, I shed light on the nature of pain and unpleasantness. I propose to understand the unpleasantness of pain based on the determinable-determinate distinction. Unpleasantness is a determinable phenomenal property of mental states that entails badness. I propose that an unpleasant pain experience has two phenomenal properties: i) the phenomenal property of being a pain, and ii) a phenomenal determinate property (u1, u2, u3, etc.) of the (...)
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  2. Pain, Perception, and the Appearance-Reality Distinction.Thomas Park - 2017 - Philosophical Analysis 2017 (38):205-237.
    I argue that pain sensations are perceptual states, namely states that represent (actual or potential) damage. I defend this position against the objection that pains, unlike standard perceptual states, do not allow for an appearance-reality distinction by arguing that in the case of pain as well as in standard perceptual experiences, cognitive penetration or malfunctions of the underlying sensory systems can lead to a dissociation between the sensation on the one hand, and what is represented on the other hand. Moreover, (...)
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  3. Does the IASP Definition of Pain Need Updating?Murat Aydede - 2019 - PAIN Reports 4 (5 - e777):1-7.
    The current IASP definition of pain has come under renewed criticisms recently. There is a new momentum for its revision as reflected by the fact that IASP has now a Presidential Task Force dedicated to look into whether there is enough warrant to update the definition. I critically review all the major criticisms of the current definition in detail, and raise new difficulties rarely discussed before. I show that none of the major criticisms has enough warrant to force us to (...)
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  4. The Meaning of Pain Expressions and Pain Communication.Emma Borg, Tim Salomons & Nat Hansen - 2019 - In Simon Van Rysewyk (ed.), Meanings of Pain. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 261-282.
    Both patients and clinicians frequently report problems around communicating and assessing pain. Patients express dissatisfaction with their doctors and doctors often find exchanges with chronic pain patients difficult and frustrating. This chapter thus asks how we could improve pain communication and thereby enhance outcomes for chronic pain patients. We argue that improving matters will require a better appreciation of the complex meaning of pain terms and of the variability and flexibility in how individuals think about pain. We start by examining (...)
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  5. On The Content and Character of Pain Experience.Richard Gray - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):47-68.
    Tracking representationalism explains the negative affective character of pain, and its capacity to motivate action, by reference to the representation of the badness for us of bodily damage. I argue that there is a more fitting instantiation of the tracking relation – the badness for us of extremely intense stimuli – and use this to motivate a non-reductive approach to the negative affective character of pain. The view of pain proposed here is supported by consideration of three related topics: the (...)
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  6. Valence, Bodily (Dis)Pleasures and Emotions.Fabrice Teroni - forthcoming - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.), Philosophy of Suffering. New York: Routledge. pp. 103-122.
    Bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions share the striking property of being valenced, i.e. they are positive or negative. What is valence? How do bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions relate to one another? This chapter assesses the prospects of two popular theses regarding the relation between bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions in light of what we can reasonably think about valence. According to the first thesis, the valence of bodily (dis)pleasures is explanatory prior vis-à-vis the valence of emotions. According to the second, emotions contain (...)
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  7. Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.
    Accounts of the nature of unpleasant pain have proliferated over the past decade, but there has been little systematic investigation of which of them can accommodate its badness. This paper is such a study. In its sights are two targets: those who deny the non-instrumental disvalue of pain's unpleasantness; and those who allow it but deny that it can be accommodated by the view—advanced by me and others—that unpleasant pains are interoceptive experiences with evaluative content. Against the former, I argue (...)
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  8. When Pain Isn't Painful.David Bain - 2015 - The Philosophers' Magazine 3.
    Sometimes the philosophical armchair gets bumped by empirical facts. So it is when thinking about pain. For good or ill (good, actually, as we shall see) most of us are intimately acquainted with physical pain, the kind you feel when you stand on a nail or burn your hand. And, from the armchair, it can seem blindingly obvious that pain is essentially unpleasant. There are of course unpleasant experiences that aren’t pains – nausea or itches, for example – but surely (...)
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  9. The Philosophy of Pain - Introduction.David Bain, Jennifer Corns & Michael Brady - forthcoming - In David Bain, Jennifer Corns & Michael Brady (eds.), The Philosophy of Pain. London: Routledge.
    Over recent decades, pain has received increasing attention as – with ever greater sophistication and rigour – theorists have tried to answer the deep and difficult questions it poses. What is pain’s nature? What is its point? In what sense is it bad? The papers collected in this volume are a contribution to that effort ...
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  10. Pain (Oxford Bibliographies Online).David Bain - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Philosophers think of pain less and less as a paradigmatic instance of mentality, for which they seek a general account, and increasingly as a rich and fruitful topic in its own right. Pain raises specific questions: about mentality and consciousness certainly, but also about embodiment, affect, motivation, and value, to name but a few. The growth of philosophical interest in pain has gone hand-in-hand with the growth of pain science, which burgeoned in the 1960s. This is no accident: developments in (...)
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  11. Evaluativist Accounts of Pain's Unpleasantness.David Bain - 2017 - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Pain. London: Routledge. pp. 40-50.
    Evaluativism is best thought of as a way of enriching a perceptual view of pain to account for pain’s unpleasantness or painfulness. Once it was common for philosophers to contrast pains with perceptual experiences (McGinn 1982; Rorty 1980). It was thought that perceptual experiences were intentional (or content-bearing, or about something), whereas pains were representationally blank. But today many of us reject this contrast. For us, your having a pain in your toe is a matter not of your sensing “pain-ly” (...)
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  12. What the Body Commands, by Colin Klein. [REVIEW]David Bain - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):1-4.
    In various papers, Colin Klein has argued that pain experiences are commands. This monograph goes well beyond the papers, re-shaping his ‘imperativist’ view, setting it within a general account of ‘homeostatic sensations’, presenting new arguments, and criticising alternatives. Original, empirically informed, clear, and often persuasive, it is a lovely book.
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  13. Pains That Don't Hurt.David Bain - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):305-320.
    Pain asymbolia is a rare condition caused by brain damage, usually in adulthood. Asymbolics feel pain but appear indifferent to it, and indifferent also to visual and verbal threats. How should we make sense of this? Nikola Grahek thinks asymbolics’ pains are abnormal, lacking a component that make normal pains unpleasant and motivating. Colin Klein thinks that what is abnormal is not asymbolics’ pains, but asymbolics: they have a psychological deficit making them unresponsive to unpleasant pain. I argue that an (...)
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  14. Bad by Nature, An Axiological Theory of Pain.Olivier Massin - forthcoming - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge.
    This chapter defends an axiological theory of pain according to which pains are bodily episodes that are bad in some way. Section 1 introduces two standard assumptions about pain that the axiological theory constitutively rejects: (i) that pains are essentially tied to consciousness and (ii) that pains are not essentially tied to badness. Section 2 presents the axiological theory by contrast to these and provides a preliminary defense of it. Section 3 introduces the paradox of pain and argues that since (...)
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  15. Pain and Incorrigibility.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - In J. Corns (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge.
    This chapter (from Routledge's forthcoming handbook on the philosophy of pain) considers the question of whether people are always correct when they judge themselves to be in pain, or not in pain. While I don't show sympathy for traditional routes to the conclusion that people are "incorrigible" in their pain judgments, I explore--and perhaps even advocate--a different route to such incorrigibility. On this low road to incorrigibility, a sensory state's being judged unpleasant is what makes it a pain (or not).
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  16. Pain and Value.Adam Swenson - 2006 - Dissertation, Rutgers University, New Brunswick
    All existing explanations of why pain is intrinsically bad are false. They all rest upon a mistaken conception of what pains are. On this false view, pain is merely a kind of sensation or feeling. The nature of a stubbed toe is exhausted by the way it stings and throbs. However, on the correct view, pains are much richer and much more complex. For example, a pain’s intrinsic properties also include its sufferer’s beliefs about the causes and implications of her (...)
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  17. The Demarcation Between Philosophy and Science.Gustavo Fernández Díez - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):131-146.
    This paper is based on a criterion recently proposed by Richard Fumerton for demarcating philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I suggest to extend it to a demarcation criterion between philosophy and science in general, and put it in the context of the historical changes of boundaries between the philosophical and the scientifi c fi eld. I point to a number of philosophical claims and approaches that have been made utterly obsolete by the advancement of science, and conjecture that a (...)
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  18. Pain: A Natural State Without a Nature? Dealing with the Ambiguity of „Pain“ in Science and Ethics.S. Benjamin Fink - 2010 - In Heather McKenzie, John Quintner & Gillian Bendelow (eds.), At the Edge of Being: The Aporia of Pain. Inter-Disciplinary Press.
    Can we find necessary and sufficient conditions for a mental state to be a pain state? That is, does pain have a nature? Or is the term ‘pain’ ambiguous? I argue here that our expression ‘pain’ lacks necessary use conditions if one considers a range of contexts. As use conditions constrain the reference class, I argue that ‘pain’ does not refer to a natural category, but binds together a bunch of loosely resembling phenomena. This leads to problems for scientific and (...)
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  19. The Ambiguity of "Pain".S. Benjamin Fink - 2010 - In Jane Fernandez-Goldborough (ed.), Making Sense Of: Pain. Inter-Disciplinary Net.
    I argue that the understanding of "pain" as presented in the official medical definition by the IASP is ambiguous and likely a cluster concept.
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  20. What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
    The unpleasantness of pain motivates action. Hence many philosophers have doubted that it can be accounted for purely in terms of pain’s possession of indicative representational content. Instead, they have explained it in terms of subjects’ inclinations to stop their pains, or in terms of pain’s imperative content. I claim that such “noncognitivist” accounts fail to accommodate unpleasant pain’s reason-giving force. What is needed, I argue, is a view on which pains are unpleasant, motivate, and provide reasons in virtue of (...)
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  21. The Imperative View of Pain.David Bain - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10):164-85.
    Pain, crucially, is unpleasant and motivational. It can be awful; and it drives us to action, e.g. to take our weight off a sprained ankle. But what is the relationship between pain and those two features? And in virtue of what does pain have them? Addressing these questions, Colin Klein and Richard J. Hall have recently developed the idea that pains are, at least partly, experiential commands—to stop placing your weight on your ankle, for example. In this paper, I reject (...)
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  22. Everyday Thinking About Bodily Sensations.Todd Ganson & Dorit Ganson - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):523-534.
    In the opening section of this paper we spell out an account of our na ve view of bodily sensations that is of historical and philosophical significance. This account of our shared view of bodily sensations captures common ground between Descartes, who endorses an error theory regarding our everyday thinking about bodily sensations, and Berkeley, who is more sympathetic with common sense. In the second part of the paper we develop an alternative to this account and discuss what is at (...)
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  23. Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, Edited by Murat Aydede. [REVIEW]David Bain - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):451-456.
    Our preoccupation with pain can seem an eccentricity of philosophers. But just a little reflection leads one into the thickets. When I see a pencil on my desk, I’m aware of a physical thing and its objective properties; but what am I aware of when I feel a pain in my toe? A pain, perhaps? Or my toe’s hurting? But what is the nature of such things? Are they physical? Are they objective? To avoid unexperienced pains, we might say they (...)
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Location of Pain
  1. The Intuitive Invalidity of the Pain-in-Mouth Argument.Michelle Liu - forthcoming - Analysis.
    In a recent paper, Reuter, Sienhold and Sytsma (2019) put forward an implicature account to explain the intuitive failure of the pain-in-mouth argument. They argue that utterances such as ‘there is tissue damage/a pain/an inflammation in my mouth’ carry the conversational implicature that there is something wrong with the speaker’s mouth. Appealing to new empirical data, this paper argues against the implicature account and for the entailment account, according to which pain reports using locative locutions, e.g. ‘There is a pain (...)
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  2. On The Content and Character of Pain Experience.Richard Gray - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):47-68.
    Tracking representationalism explains the negative affective character of pain, and its capacity to motivate action, by reference to the representation of the badness for us of bodily damage. I argue that there is a more fitting instantiation of the tracking relation – the badness for us of extremely intense stimuli – and use this to motivate a non-reductive approach to the negative affective character of pain. The view of pain proposed here is supported by consideration of three related topics: the (...)
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  3. Suffering Pains.Olivier Massin - forthcoming - In Jennifer Corns & Michael S. Brady David Bain (ed.), Philosophy of Suffering. London: Routledge.
    The paper aims at clarifying the distinctions and relations between pain and suffering. Three negative theses are defended: 1. Pain and suffering are not identical. 2. Pain is not a species of suffering, nor is suffering a species of pain, nor are pain and suffering of a common (proximate) genus. 3. Suffering cannot be defined as the perception of a pain’s badness, nor can pain be defined as a suffered bodily sensation. Three positive theses are endorsed: 4. Pain and suffering (...)
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  4. Pain (Oxford Bibliographies Online).David Bain - 2015 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Philosophers think of pain less and less as a paradigmatic instance of mentality, for which they seek a general account, and increasingly as a rich and fruitful topic in its own right. Pain raises specific questions: about mentality and consciousness certainly, but also about embodiment, affect, motivation, and value, to name but a few. The growth of philosophical interest in pain has gone hand-in-hand with the growth of pain science, which burgeoned in the 1960s. This is no accident: developments in (...)
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  5. What the Body Commands, by Colin Klein. [REVIEW]David Bain - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):1-4.
    In various papers, Colin Klein has argued that pain experiences are commands. This monograph goes well beyond the papers, re-shaping his ‘imperativist’ view, setting it within a general account of ‘homeostatic sensations’, presenting new arguments, and criticising alternatives. Original, empirically informed, clear, and often persuasive, it is a lovely book.
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  6. Bad by Nature, An Axiological Theory of Pain.Olivier Massin - forthcoming - In Jennifer Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge.
    This chapter defends an axiological theory of pain according to which pains are bodily episodes that are bad in some way. Section 1 introduces two standard assumptions about pain that the axiological theory constitutively rejects: (i) that pains are essentially tied to consciousness and (ii) that pains are not essentially tied to badness. Section 2 presents the axiological theory by contrast to these and provides a preliminary defense of it. Section 3 introduces the paradox of pain and argues that since (...)
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  7. Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, Edited by Murat Aydede. [REVIEW]David Bain - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):451-456.
    Our preoccupation with pain can seem an eccentricity of philosophers. But just a little reflection leads one into the thickets. When I see a pencil on my desk, I’m aware of a physical thing and its objective properties; but what am I aware of when I feel a pain in my toe? A pain, perhaps? Or my toe’s hurting? But what is the nature of such things? Are they physical? Are they objective? To avoid unexperienced pains, we might say they (...)
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  8. The Location of Pains.David Bain - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (2):171-205.
    Perceptualists say that having a pain in a body part consists in perceiving the part as instantiating some property. I argue that perceptualism makes better sense of the connections between pain location and the experiences undergone by people in pain than three alternative accounts that dispense with perception. Turning to fellow perceptualists, I also reject ways in which David Armstrong and Michael Tye understand and motivate perceptualism, and I propose an alternative interpretation, one that vitiates a pair of objections—due to (...)
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  9. The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
    Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one’s leg feels to be in the leg, not ‘in the mind’. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the (...)
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Pain and Pain Experience
  1. Loopy Regulations: The Motivational Profile of Affective Phenomenology.Luca Barlassina & Max Khan Hayward - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.
    Affective experiences such as pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenology: they feel (un)pleasant. This type of phenomenology has a loopy regulatory profile: it often motivates us to act a certain way, and these actions typically end up regulating our affective experiences back. For example, the pleasure you get by tasting your morning coffee motivates you to drink more of it, and this in turn results in you obtaining another pleasant gustatory experience. In this article, we argue that reflexive imperativism (...)
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