The Logic of Opacity

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):81-114 (2017)
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We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher-order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it stands for. We provide models to show that some of these logics are non-degenerate.

Author Profiles

Jeffrey Sanford Russell
University of Southern California
Andrew Bacon
University of Southern California


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