Results for 'Frege'

388 found
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  1. Frege and German Philosophical Idealism.Nikolay Milkov - 2015 - In Dieter Schott (ed.), Frege: Freund(e) und Feind(e): Proceedings of the International Conference 2013. Logos. pp. 88-104.
    The received view has it that analytic philosophy emerged as a rebellion against the German Idealists (above all Hegel) and their British epigones (the British neo-Hegelians). This at least was Russell’s story: the German Idealism failed to achieve solid results in philosophy. Of course, Frege too sought after solid results. He, however, had a different story to tell. Frege never spoke against Hegel, or Fichte. Similarly to the German Idealists, his sworn enemy was the empiricism (in his case, (...)
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  2. Frege and Peano on Definitions.Edoardo Rivello - forthcoming - In Proceedings of the "Frege: Freunde und Feinde" conference, held in Wismar, May 12-15, 2013.
    Frege and Peano started in 1896 a debate where they contrasted the respective conceptions on the theory and practice of mathematical definitions. Which was (if any) the influence of the Frege-Peano debate on the conceptions by the two authors on the theme of defining in mathematics and which was the role played by this debate in the broader context of their scientific interaction?
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  3. The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.
    I resolve the major challenge to an Expressivist theory of the meaning of normative discourse: the Frege–Geach Problem. Drawing on considerations from the semantics of directive language (e.g., imperatives), I argue that, although certain forms of Expressivism (like Gibbard’s) do run into at least one version of the Problem, it is reasonably clear that there is a version of Expressivism that does not.
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  4. Frege and Saving Substitution.Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    Goodman and Lederman (2020) argue that the traditional Fregean strategy for preserving the validity of Leibniz’s Law of substitution fails when confronted with apparent counterexamples involving proper names embedded under propositional attitude verbs. We argue, on the contrary, that the Fregean strategy succeeds and that Goodman and Lederman’s argument misfires.
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  5. Frege's Contribution to Philosophy of Language.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2006 - In Barry C. Smith & Ernest Lepore (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-39.
    An investigation of Frege’s various contributions to the study of language, focusing on three of his most famous doctrines: that concepts are unsaturated, that sentences refer to truth-values, and that sense must be distinguished from reference.
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  6.  47
    Why Did Frege Reject the Theory of Types?Wim Vanrie - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-20.
    I investigate why Frege rejected the theory of types, as Russell presented it to him in their correspondence. Frege claims that it commits one to violations of the law of excluded middle, but this complaint seems to rest on a dogmatic refusal to take Russell’s proposal seriously on its own terms. What is at stake is not so much the truth of a law of logic, but the structure of the hierarchy of the logical categories, something Frege (...)
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  7. What is Frege's "Concept Horse Problem" ?Ian Proops - 2013 - In Michael Potter and Peter Sullivan (ed.), Wittgenstein's Tractatus: History and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 76-96.
    I argue that Frege's so-called "concept 'horse' problem" is not one problem but many. When these separate sub-problems are distinguished, some are revealed to be more tractable than others. I further argue that there is, contrary to a widespread scholarly assumption originating with Peter Geach, little evidence that Frege was concerned with the general problem of the inexpressibility of logical category distinctions in writings available to Wittgenstein. In consequence, Geach is mistaken in thinking that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein (...)
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  8.  33
    Frege, Hankel, and Formalism in the Foundations.Richard Lawrence - forthcoming - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy.
    Frege says, at the end of a discussion of formalism in the Foundations of Arithmetic, that his own foundational program ``could be called formal'' but is ``completely different'' from the view he has just criticized. This essay examines Frege's relationship to Hermann Hankel, his main formalist interlocutor in the Foundations, in order to make sense of these claims. The investigation reveals a surprising result: Frege's foundational program actually has quite a lot in common with Hankel's. This undercuts (...)
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  9. Solving Frege's Puzzle.Richard Heck - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (1-2):132-174.
    So-called 'Frege cases' pose a challenge for anyone who would hope to treat the contents of beliefs (and similar mental states) as Russellian propositions: It is then impossible to explain people's behavior in Frege cases without invoking non-intentional features of their mental states, and doing that seems to undermine the intentionality of psychological explanation. In the present paper, I develop this sort of objection in what seems to me to be its strongest form, but then offer a response (...)
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  10. The Frege-Geach Problem.Jack Woods - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 226-242.
    This is an opinionated overview of the Frege-Geach problem, in both its historical and contemporary guises. Covers Higher-order Attitude approaches, Tree-tying, Gibbard-style solutions, and Schroeder's recent A-type expressivist solution.
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  11. Does Semantic Relationism Solve Frege’s Puzzle?Bryan Pickel & Brian Rabern - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):97-118.
    In a series of recent works, Kit Fine, 605–631, 2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege’s puzzle. Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given (...)
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  12.  93
    Internalism and the Frege-Geach Problem.Caj Strandberg - 2019 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 32:68-91.
    According to the established understanding of the Frege-Geach problem, it is a challenge exclusively for metaethical expressivism. In this paper, I argue that it is much wider in scope: The problem applies generally to views according to which moral sentences express moral judgments entailing that one is for or against something, irrespective of what mental states the judgments consist in. In particular, it applies to motivational internalism about moral judgments. Most noteworthy, it applies to cognitivist internalism according to which (...)
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  13. Relational Approaches to Frege's Puzzle.Aidan Gray - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (10):e12429.
    Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representational relations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism—semantic relationism and formal relationism—corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I briefly discuss the consequences of relational approaches for foundational questions about propositional attitudes, intentional explanation, and compositionality.
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  14. De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles.Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, (...)
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  15.  14
    Nota Sobre o Frege de Evans.Sagid Salles - 2019 - Investigação Filosófica 10:39-46.
    Evans famosamente declarou que Frege não aceitou a possibilidade de sentido sem referente, o que significa que ele não foi tão tolerante com nomes vazios quanto comumente se pensa. Um problema central para a tese de Evans é que Frege diz explicitamente que aceita esta possibilidade, e parece que ele de fato foi tolerante com nomes vazios. Neste artigo, defendo que a solução de Evans para este problema implica que Frege estava comprometido com uma explicação implausível das (...)
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  16. Aesthetic Gestures: Elements of a Philosophy of Art in Frege and Wittgenstein.Nikolay Milkov - 2020 - In Shyam Wuppuluri & Newton da Costa (eds.), Wittgensteinian (adj.) Looking at the World from the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Berlin: Springer. pp. 506-18.
    Gottlob Frege’s conception of works of art has received scant notice in the literature. This is a pity since, as this paper undertakes to reveal, his innovative philosophy of language motivated a theoretically and historically consequential, yet unaccountably marginalized Wittgenstinian line of inquiry in the domain of aesthetics. The element of Frege’s approach that most clearly inspired this development is the idea that only complete sentences articulate thoughts and that what sentences in works of drama and literary art (...)
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  17. Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations?Murat Aydede & Philip Robbins - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.
    This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
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  18. Moral Inferentialism and the Frege-Geach Problem.Mark Douglas Warren - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2859-2885.
    Despite its many advantages as a metaethical theory, moral expressivism faces difficulties as a semantic theory of the meaning of moral claims, an issue underscored by the notorious Frege-Geach problem. I consider a distinct metaethical view, inferentialism, which like expressivism rejects a representational account of meaning, but unlike expressivism explains meaning in terms of inferential role instead of expressive function. Drawing on Michael Williams’ recent work on inferential theories of meaning, I argue that an appropriate understanding of the pragmatic (...)
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  19. Frege's Puzzle for Perception.Boyd Millar - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):368-392.
    According to an influential variety of the representational view of perceptual experience—the singular content view—the contents of perceptual experiences include singular propositions partly composed of the particular physical object a given experience is about or of. The singular content view faces well-known difficulties accommodating hallucinations; I maintain that there is also an analogue of Frege's puzzle that poses a significant problem for this view. In fact, I believe that this puzzle presents difficulties for the theory that are unique to (...)
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  20. Frege on Thoughts and Their Structure.José Luis Bermúdez - 2001 - Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 4:87-105.
    The idea that thoughts are structured is essential to Frege's understanding of thoughts. A basic tenet of his thinking was that the structure of a sentence can serve as a model for the structure of a thought. Recent commentators have, however, identified tensions between that principle and certain other doctrines Frege held about thoughts. This paper suggests that the tensions identified by Dummett and Bell are not really tensions at all. In establishing the case against Dummett and Bell (...)
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  21. Frege, Carnap, and Explication: ‘Our Concern Here Is to Arrive at a Concept of Number Usable for the Purpose of Science’.Gregory Lavers - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):225-41.
    This paper argues that Carnap both did not view and should not have viewed Frege's project in the foundations of mathematics as misguided metaphysics. The reason for this is that Frege's project was to give an explication of number in a very Carnapian sense — something that was not lost on Carnap. Furthermore, Frege gives pragmatic justification for the basic features of his system, especially where there are ontological considerations. It will be argued that even on the (...)
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  22. Frege on Vagueness and Ordinary Language.Stephen Puryear - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):120-140.
    Frege, we are told, believes that vague predicates have no referent (Bedeutung). But given other things he evidently believes, such a position would seem to commit him to a suspect nihilism according to which assertoric sentences containing vague predicates are neither true nor false. I argue that we have good reason to resist ascribing to Frege the view that vague predicates have no Bedeutung and thus good reason to resist seeing him as committed to the suspect nihilism. In (...)
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  23. Ramified Frege Arithmetic.Richard Heck - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (6):715-735.
    Øystein Linnebo has recently shown that the existence of successors cannot be proven in predicative Frege arithmetic, using Frege’s definitions of arithmetical notions. By contrast, it is shown here that the existence of successor can be proven in ramified predicative Frege arithmetic.
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  24. What Frege Meant When He Said: Kant is Right About Geometry.Teri Merrick - 2006 - Philosophia Mathematica 14 (1):44-75.
    This paper argues that Frege's notoriously long commitment to Kant's thesis that Euclidean geometry is synthetic _a priori_ is best explained by realizing that Frege uses ‘intuition’ in two senses. Frege sometimes adopts the usage presented in Hermann Helmholtz's sign theory of perception. However, when using ‘intuition’ to denote the source of geometric knowledge, he is appealing to Hermann Cohen's use of Kantian terminology. We will see that Cohen reinterpreted Kantian notions, stripping them of any psychological connotation. (...)
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  25. Frege's Basic Law V and Cantor's Theorem.Manuel Bremer - manuscript
    The following essay reconsiders the ontological and logical issues around Frege’s Basic Law (V). If focuses less on Russell’s Paradox, as most treatments of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (GGA)1 do, but rather on the relation between Frege’s Basic Law (V) and Cantor’s Theorem (CT). So for the most part the inconsistency of Naïve Comprehension (in the context of standard Second Order Logic) will not concern us, but rather the ontological issues central to the conflict between (BLV) and (...)
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  26.  41
    The Latest Frege.Nikolay Milkov - 1999 - Prima Philosophia 12:41-48.
    Many authors believe that the manuscripts Frege wrote in 1924–1925 are not theoretically of interest. They are rather a product of his emotional despair and theoretical dead-end which he reached in the last years of his life. Such is also the judgement of Michael Dummett delivered in his seminal book Frege: Philosophy of Language. According to Dummett, “the few fragmentary writings of Frege’s final period—1919–1925—are not of high quality: they are interesting chiefly as showing that Frege (...)
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  27.  97
    Platonism in Lotze and Frege Between Psyschologism and Hypostasis.Nicholas Stang - 2019 - In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Logic from Kant to Russell. Routledge. pp. 138–159.
    In the section “Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III,” I explain Lotze’s famous distinction between existence and validity in Book III of Logik. In the following section, “Lotze’s Platonism,” I put this famous distinction in the context of Lotze’s attempt to distinguish his own position from hypostatic Platonism and consider one way of drawing the distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there are propositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section “Two Perspectives on Frege’s Platonism,” I argue that (...)
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  28. Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle?Stavroula Glezakos - 2009 - In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 202.
    Gottlob Frege maintained that two name-containing identity sentences, represented schematically as a=a and a=b,can both be true in virtue of the same object’s self-identity but nonetheless, puzzlingly, differ in their epistemic profiles. Frege eventually resolved his puzzlement by locating the source of the purported epistemic difference between the identity sentences in a difference in the Sinne, or senses, expressed by the names that the sentences contain. -/- Thus, Frege portrayed himself as describing a puzzle that can be (...)
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  29. Frege on the Relations Between Logic and Thought.Simon Evnine - manuscript
    Frege's diatribes against psychologism have often been taken to imply that he thought that logic and thought have nothing to do with each other. I argue against this interpretation and attribute to Frege a view on which the two are tightly connected. The connection, however, derives not from logic's being founded on the empirical laws of thought but rather from thought's depending constitutively on the application to it of logic. I call this view 'psycho-logicism.'.
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  30. Frege's Begriffsschrift is Indeed First-Order Complete.Yang Liu - 2017 - History and Philosophy of Logic 38 (4):342-344.
    It is widely taken that the first-order part of Frege's Begriffsschrift is complete. However, there does not seem to have been a formal verification of this received claim. The general concern is that Frege's system is one axiom short in the first-order predicate calculus comparing to, by now, the standard first-order theory. Yet Frege has one extra inference rule in his system. Then the question is whether Frege's first-order calculus is still deductively sufficient as far as (...)
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  31. Frege’s Unmanageable Thing.Michael Price - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):368-413.
    _ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 3, pp 368 - 413 Frege famously maintained that concepts are not objects. A key argument of Frege’s for this view is, in outline, as follows: if we are to account for the unity of thought, concepts must be deemed _unsaturated_; since objects are, by contrast, saturated entities, concepts cannot be objects. The author investigates what can be made of this argument and, in particular, of the unsaturated/saturated distinction it invokes. Systematically exploring a (...)
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  32.  35
    Frege on Referentiality and Julius Caesar in Grundgesetze Section 10.Bruno Bentzen - 2019 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 60 (4):617-637.
    This paper aims to answer the question of whether or not Frege's solution limited to value-ranges and truth-values proposed to resolve the "problem of indeterminacy of reference" in section 10 of Grundgesetze is a violation of his principle of complete determination, which states that a predicate must be defined to apply for all objects in general. Closely related to this doubt is the common allegation that Frege was unable to solve a persistent version of the Caesar problem for (...)
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  33. Review of Macbeth, D. Diagrammatic Reasoning in Frege's Begriffsschrift. Synthese 186 (2012), No. 1, 289–314. Mathematical Reviews MR 2935338.John Corcoran - 2014 - MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 2014:2935338.
    A Mathematical Review by John Corcoran, SUNY/Buffalo -/- Macbeth, Danielle Diagrammatic reasoning in Frege's Begriffsschrift. Synthese 186 (2012), no. 1, 289–314. ABSTRACT This review begins with two quotations from the paper: its abstract and the first paragraph of the conclusion. The point of the quotations is to make clear by the “give-them-enough-rope” strategy how murky, incompetent, and badly written the paper is. I know I am asking a lot, but I have to ask you to read the quoted passages—aloud (...)
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  34. Finagling Frege.Mark Schroeder - manuscript
    Michael Ridge claims to have ‘finessed’ the Frege-Geach Problem ‘on the cheap’. In this short paper I explain a couple of the reasons why this thought is premature.
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  35. A Frege‐Geach Style Objection to Cognitivist Judgment Internalism.Thorsten Sander - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (3):391-408.
    According to judgment internalism, there is a conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation. This paper offers an argument against that kind of internalism that does not involve counterexamples of the amoralist sort. Instead, it is argued that these forms of judgment internalism fall prey to a Frege-Geach type argument.
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  36. Frege's Attack on Husserl and Cantor.Claire Ortiz Hill - 1994 - The Monist 77 (3):345 - 357.
    By drawing attention to these facts and to the relationship between Cantor’s and Husserl's ideas, I have tried to contribute to putting Frege's attack on Husserl "in the proper light" by providing some insight into some of the issues underling criticisms which Frege himself suggested were not purely aimed at Husserl's book. I have tried to undermine the popular idea that Frege's review of the Philosophy of Arithmetic is a straightforward, objective assessment of Husserl’s book, and to (...)
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  37. Demythologizing the Third Realm: Frege on Grasping Thoughts.B. Scot Rousse - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (1).
    In this paper, I address some puzzles about Frege’s conception of how we “grasp” thoughts. I focus on an enigmatic passage that appears near the end of Frege’s great essay “The Thought.” In this passage Frege refers to a “non-sensible something” without which “everyone would remain shut up in his inner world.” I consider and criticize Wolfgang Malzkorn’s interpretation of the passage. According to Malzkorn, Frege’s view is that ideas [Vorstellungen] are the means by which we (...)
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  38. Corcoran Recommends Hambourger on the Frege-Russell Number Definition.John Corcoran - 1978 - MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 56.
    It is widely agreed by philosophers that the so-called “Frege-Russell definition of natural number” is actually an assertion concerning the nature of the numbers and that it cannot be regarded as a definition in the ordinary mathematical sense. On the basis of the reasoning in this paper it is clear that the Frege-Russell definition contradicts the following three principles (taken together): (1) each number is the same entity in each possible world, (2) each number exists in each possible (...)
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  39. Frege, Kant e le Vorstellungen.Gabriele Tomasi & Alberto Vanzo - 2006 - Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 61 (supplement):227-238.
    Gottlob Frege criticized Kant's use of the term "representation" in a footnote in the Foundations of Arithmetics. According to Frege, Kant used the term "representation" for mental images, which are private and incommunicable, and also for objects and concepts. Kant thereby gave "a strongly subjectivistic and idealistic coloring" to his thought. The paper argues that Kant avoided the kind of subjectivism and idealism which Frege hints in his remark. For Kant, having "Vorstellungen" requires the capacity of synthesis, (...)
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  40. A Logic for Frege's Theorem.Richard Heck - 2011 - In Frege’s Theorem: An Introduction. Oxford University Press.
    It has been known for a few years that no more than Pi-1-1 comprehension is needed for the proof of "Frege's Theorem". One can at least imagine a view that would regard Pi-1-1 comprehension axioms as logical truths but deny that status to any that are more complex—a view that would, in particular, deny that full second-order logic deserves the name. Such a view would serve the purposes of neo-logicists. It is, in fact, no part of my view that, (...)
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  41. Definition by Induction in Frege's Grundgesetze der Arithmetik.Richard Heck - 1995 - In W. Demopoulos (ed.), Frege's Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford University Press.
    This paper discusses Frege's account of definition by induction in Grundgesetze and the two key theorems Frege proves using it.
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  42. Review of Perception: Essays After Frege, by Charles Travis. [REVIEW]James Genone - forthcoming - Mind.
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  43. Arguing for Frege's Fundamental Principle.Bryan Frances - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):341–346.
    Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief demonstrates the lack of soundness of the traditional argument for the Fregean fundamental principle that the sentences 'S believes that a is F' and 'S believes that b is F' can differ in truth value even if a = b. This principle is a crucial premise in the traditional Fregean argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, individuative elements of beliefs that are sensitive to our varying conceptions of what the beliefs are about. Joseph (...)
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  44.  79
    Frege, the Complex Numbers, and the Identity of Indiscernibles.Wenzel Christian Helmut - 2010 - Logique Et Analyse 53 (209):51-60.
    There are mathematical structures with elements that cannot be distinguished by the properties they have within that structure. For instance within the field of complex numbers the two square roots of −1, i and −i, have the same algebraic properties in that field. So how do we distinguish between them? Imbedding the complex numbers in a bigger structure, the quaternions, allows us to algebraically tell them apart. But a similar problem appears for this larger structure. There seems to be always (...)
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  45.  64
    The Diversity of Sense: An Appreciation of Frege’s Theory of Sense.Dr Sanjit Chakraborty - 2011 - Indian Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (2):79-96.
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  46.  69
    Book Review: Gottlob Frege, Basic Laws of Arithmetic. [REVIEW]Kevin Klement - 2016 - Studia Logica 104 (1):175-180.
    Review of Basic Laws of Arithmetic, ed. and trans. by P. Ebert and M. Rossberg (Oxford 2013).
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  47.  24
    Frege's Intellectual Life As a Logicist Project. [REVIEW]Joan Bertran-San Millán - 2020 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 39:127-138.
    I critically discuss Dale Jacquette’s Frege: A Philosophical Biography. First, I provide a short overview of Jacquette’s book. Second, I evaluate Jacquette’s interpretation of Frege’s three major works, Begriffsschrift, Grundlagen der Arithmetik and Grundgesetze der Arithmetik; and conclude that the author does not faithfully represent their content. Finally, I offer some technical and general remarks.
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  48. What Frege Asked Alex the Parrot: Inferentialism, Number Concepts, and Animal Cognition.Erik Nelson - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (2):206-227.
    While there has been significant philosophical debate on whether nonlinguistic animals can possess conceptual capabilities, less time has been devoted to considering 'talking' animals, such as parrots. When they are discussed, their capabilities are often downplayed as mere mimicry. The most explicit philosophical example of this can be seen in Brandom's frequent comparisons of parrots and thermostats. Brandom argues that because parrots (like thermostats) cannot grasp the implicit inferential connections between concepts, their vocal articulations do not actually have any conceptual (...)
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  49.  13
    La Lógica de Gottlob Frege: 1879-1903.Joan Bertran-San Millán - 2016 - Dissertation, Universitat de Barcelona
    In this dissertation I offer a global and detailed reconstruction of the logic developed by Gottlob Frege throughout his career. Even though Frege's logic suffered profound modifications from his initial formulation in Begriffsschrift to its revised version in Grundgesetze, the significant differences between these two works have been rarely taken at face value. I not only argue that these differences exist, but I also explain how they should be understood in the light of the evolution of Frege's (...)
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  50. Frege’s Puzzle is About Identity After All.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):628-643.
    Many philosophers have argued or taken for granted that Frege's puzzle has little or nothing to do with identity statements. I show that this is wrong, arguing that the puzzle can only be motivated relative to a thinker's beliefs about the identity or distinctness of the relevant object. The result is important, as it suggests that the puzzle can be solved, not by a semantic theory of names or referring expressions as such, but simply by a theory of identity (...)
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