Loving Someone in Particular

Ethics 125 (2):477-507 (2015)
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Abstract
People loved for their beauty and cheerfulness are not loved as irreplaceable, yet people loved for “what their souls are made of” are. Or so literary romance implies; leading philosophical accounts, however, deny the distinction, holding that reasons for love either do not exist or do not include the beloved’s distinguishing features. In this, I argue, they deny an essential species of love. To account for it while preserving the beloved’s irreplaceability, I defend a model of agency on which people can love each other for identities still being created, through a kind of mutual improvisation
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2015
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First archival date: 2014-07-03
Latest version: 5 (2015-07-19)
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References found in this work BETA
Love as a Moral Emotion.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
Beyond Price.Velleman, J. David

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