McDowell and the Presentation of Pains

Philosophical Topics 37 (1):1-24 (2009)
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Abstract
It can seem natural to say that, when in pain, we undergo experiences which present to us certain experience-dependent particulars, namely pains. As part of his wider approach to mind and world, John McDowell has elaborated an interesting but neglected version of this account of pain. Here I set out McDowell’s account at length, and place it in context. I argue that his subjectivist conception of the objects of pain experience is incompatible with his requirement that such experience be presentational, rationalizing, and classificatory.
ISBN(s)
0276-2080
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BAIMAT-4
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Archival date: 2017-10-28
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2009-01-28

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