Horgan and Tienson on phenomenology and intentionality

Philosophical Studies 167 (2):313-326 (2014)
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Abstract
Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the capacity of phenomenology to map onto intentionality in a way that would be appropriate for any determiner of content/fixer of truth conditions
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Archival date: 2013-10-21
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Mental Reality.Strawson, Galen

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A New Puzzle for Phenomenal Intentionality.Clutton, Peter & Sandgren, Alexander
Phenomenal Intentionality.Bourget, David & Mendelovici, Angela

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