Results for 'Perception'

984 found
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  1. The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Perception is our key to the world. It plays at least three different roles in our lives. It justifies beliefs and provides us with knowledge of our environment. It brings about conscious mental states. It converts informational input, such as light and sound waves, into representations of invariant features in our environment. Corresponding to these three roles, there are at least three fundamental questions that have motivated the study of perception. How does perception justify beliefs and yield (...)
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  2. Unconscious perception and central coordinating agency.Joshua Shepherd & Myrto Mylopoulos - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):3869-3893.
    One necessary condition on any adequate account of perception is clarity regarding whether unconscious perception exists. The issue is complicated, and the debate is growing in both philosophy and science. In this paper we consider the case for unconscious perception, offering three primary achievements. First, we offer a discussion of the underspecified notion of central coordinating agency, a notion that is critical for arguments that purportedly perceptual states are not attributable to the individual, and thus not genuinely (...)
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  3. The perception/cognition distinction.Sebastian Watzl, Kristoffer Sundberg & Anders Nes - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (2):165-195.
    ABSTRACT The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition have been held to differ (...)
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  4. Unconscious Perception and Unconscious Bias: Parallel Debates about Unconscious Content.Gabbrielle Johnson - 2023 - In Uriah Kriegel, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 87-130.
    The possibilities of unconscious perception and unconscious bias prompt parallel debates about unconscious mental content. This chapter argues that claims within these debates alleging the existence of unconscious content are made fraught by ambiguity and confusion with respect to the two central concepts they involve: consciousness and content. Borrowing conceptual resources from the debate about unconscious perception, the chapter distills the two conceptual puzzles concerning each of these notions and establishes philosophical strategies for their resolution. It then argues (...)
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  5. (1 other version)If perception is probabilistic, why doesn't it seem probabilistic?Ned Block - 2018 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373 (1755).
    The success of the Bayesian approach to perception suggests probabilistic perceptual representations. But if perceptual representation is probabilistic, why doesn't normal conscious perception reflect the full probability distributions that the probabilistic point of view endorses? For example, neurons in MT/V5 that respond to the direction of motion are broadly tuned: a patch of cortex that is tuned to vertical motion also responds to horizontal motion, but when we see vertical motion, foveally, in good conditions, it does not look (...)
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  6. Perception is not all-purpose.Bence Nanay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):4069-4080.
    I aim to show that perception depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Perception is not all-purpose: what we want to do does influence what we see. After clarifying how this claim is different from the one at stake in the cognitive penetrability debate and what counterfactual dependence means in my claim, I will give a two-step argument: one’s perceptual attention depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action and one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on (...)
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  7. Silence Perception and Spatial Content.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):524-538.
    It seems plausible that visual experiences of darkness have perceptual phenomenal content that clearly differentiates them from absences of visual experiences. I argue, relying on psychological results concerning auditory attention, that the analogous claim is true about auditory experiences of silence. More specifically, I propose that experiences of silence present empty spatial directions like ‘right’ or ‘left’, and so have egocentric spatial content. Furthermore, I claim that such content is genuinely auditory and phenomenal in the sense that one can, in (...)
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  8.  56
    Concurrent perception of competing predictions: A “split-stimulus effect”.Joseph Melling, William Turner & Hinze Hogendoorn - 2024 - Journal of Vision 24 (5).
    Visual illusions are systematic misperceptions that can help us glean the heuristics with which the brain constructs visual experience. In a recently discovered visual illusion (the “frame effect”), it has been shown that flashing a stimulus inside of a moving frame produces a large misperception of that stimulus's position. Across two experiments, we investigated a novel illusion (the “split stimulus effect”) where the symmetrical motion of two overlaid frames produces two simultaneous positional misperceptions of a single stimulus. That is, one (...)
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  9. Perception as Controlled Hallucination.Justin Tiehen - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (4):355-372.
    Perception is controlled hallucination,” according to proponents of predictive processing accounts of vision. I say they are right that something like this is a consequence of their view but wrong in how they have pursued the idea. The focus of my counterproposal is the causal theory of perception, which I develop in terms of a productive concept of causation. Cases of what otherwise seem like successful perception are instead mere veridical hallucination if predictive processing accounts are correct, (...)
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  10. Perception and imagination: amodal perception as mental imagery.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239-254.
    When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which (...)
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  11. Perception needs modular stimulus-control.Anders Nes - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-30.
    Perceptual processes differ from cognitive, this paper argues, in functioning to be causally controlled by proximal stimuli, and being modular, at least in a modest sense that excludes their being isotropic in Jerry Fodor's sense. This claim agrees with such theorists as Jacob Beck and Ben Phillips that a function of stimulus-control is needed for perceptual status. In support of this necessity claim, I argue, inter alia, that E.J. Green's recent architectural account misclassifies processes deploying knowledge of grammar as perceptual. (...)
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  12. Spatial perception: The perspectival aspect of perception.E. J. Green & Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (2):e12472.
    When we perceive an object, we perceive the object from a perspective. As a consequence of the perspectival nature of perception, when we perceive, say, a circular coin from different angles, there is a respect in which the coin looks circular throughout, but also a respect in which the coin's appearance changes. More generally, perception of shape and size properties has both a constant aspect—an aspect that remains stable across changes in perspective—and a perspectival aspect—an aspect that changes (...)
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  13. Perception and reflection.Anil Gomes - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):131-152.
    What method should we use to determine the nature of perceptual experience? My focus here is the Kantian thought that transcendental arguments can be used to determine the nature of perceptual experience. I set out a dilemma for the use of transcendental arguments in the philosophy of perception, one which turns on a comparison ofthe transcendental method with the first-personal method of early analytic philosophy, and with the empirical methods of much contemporary philosophy of mind. The transcendental method can (...)
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  14. Sense Perception and Mereological Nihilism.Andrew Brenner - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):68-83.
    In the debate over the existence of composite objects, it is sometimes suggested that perceptual evidence justifies belief in composite objects. But it is almost never suggested that we are perceptually justified in believing in composite objects on the basis of the fact that the phenomenology of our perceptual experiences enables us to discriminate between situations where there are composite objects and situations where there are merely simples arranged composite object-wise. But while the thought that the phenomenology of our perceptual (...)
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  15. Perception and illusion: replies to Sethi, Speaks and Cutter.Adam Pautz - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (8):2294-2320.
    I reply to comments on my book Perception (Routledge 2021) by Umrao Sethi, Jeff Speaks and Brian Cutter. Sethi objects to my representational view of perception on the ground that that having an experience of a color or shape can enable you to know what that color or shape is like only if it is actually present in the experience. Speaks has a very interesting discussion of my puzzle of the laws of appearance for the representational view. And (...)
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  16. Evaluative Perception: Introduction.Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan, Evaluative Perception. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    In this Introduction we introduce the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, we discuss some central questions under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Evaluative Perception: Can evaluative experiences (...)
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  17. Perception and the external world.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1119-1145.
    In this paper, I argue that perception justifies belief about the external world in virtue of its phenomenal character together with its relations to the external world. But I argue that perceptual relations to the external world impact on the justifying role of perception only by virtue of their impact on its representational content. Epistemic level-bridging principles provide a principled rationale for avoiding more radically externalist theories of perceptual justification.
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  18. The perception of silence.Rui Zhe Goh, Ian Phillips & Chaz Firestone - 2023 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 120 (29):e2301463120.
    Auditory perception is traditionally conceived as the perception of sounds — a friend’s voice, a clap of thunder, a minor chord. However, daily life also seems to present us with experiences characterized by the absence of sound — a moment of silence, a gap between thunderclaps, the hush after a musical performance. In these cases, do we positively hear silence? Or do we just fail to hear, and merely judge or infer that it is silent? This longstanding question (...)
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  19. Perception in the mirror: the influence of self-beliefs.Antonella Tramacere & Angelica Kaufmann - 2025 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1.
    Mirrors are more than reflective surfaces; they are portals to self-perception influenced by a tapestry of developmental, psychological, and cultural factors. In this paper, we explore the interplay between these factors by investigating the effect of beliefs on mirror images and clarifying how negative self-perception develops. We analyse the phenomenon of mirror self-recognition and the development of beliefs about oneself, attempting to clarify how emotionally charged beliefs could influence our experience with the mirror. Our proposal offers insights into (...)
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  20. Perception, Causally Efficacious Particulars, and the Range of Phenomenal Consciousness: Reply to Commentaries.Christian Coseru - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):55-82.
    This paper responds to critical commentaries on my book, Perceiving Reality (OUP, 2012), by Laura Guerrero, Matthew MacKenzie, and Anand Vaidya. Guerrero focuses on the metaphysics of causation, and its role in the broader question of whether the ‘two truths’ framework of Buddhist philosophy can be reconciled with the claim that science provides the best account of our experienced world. MacKenzie pursues two related questions: (i) Is reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana) identical with the subjective pole of a dual-aspect cognition or are (...)
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  21. Direct perception and the predictive mind.Zoe Drayson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3145-3164.
    Predictive approaches to the mind claim that perception, cognition, and action can be understood in terms of a single framework: a hierarchy of Bayesian models employing the computational strategy of predictive coding. Proponents of this view disagree, however, over the extent to which perception is direct on the predictive approach. I argue that we can resolve these disagreements by identifying three distinct notions of perceptual directness: psychological, metaphysical, and epistemological. I propose that perception is plausibly construed as (...)
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  22. (1 other version)The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - In Limbeck-Lilienau Christoph & Stadler Friedrich, The Philosophy of Perception and Observation. Contributions of the 40th International Wittgenstein Symposium August 6-12, 2017 Kirchberg am Wechsel. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 149-170.
    Traditional accounts of the perception/cognition divide tend to draw it in terms of subpersonal psychological processes, processes into which the subject has no first-person insight. Whatever betides such accounts, there seems to also be some first-personally accessible difference between perception and thought. At least in normal circumstances, naïve subjects can typically tell apart their perceptual states from their cognitive or intellectual ones. What are such subjects picking up on when they do so? This paper is an inconclusive search (...)
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  23. Moral Perception: High-Level Perception or Low-Level Intuition?Elijah Chudnoff - 2015 - In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland, Phenomenology of Thinking: Philosophical Investigations Into the Character of Cognitive Experiences. New York: Routledge.
    Here are four examples of “seeing.” You see that something green is wriggling. You see that an iguana is in distress. You see that someone is wrongfully harming an iguana. You see that torturing animals is wrong. The first is an example of low-level perception. You visually represent color and motion. The second is an example of high-level perception. You visually represent kind properties and mental properties. The third is an example of moral perception. You have an (...)
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  24.  58
    Linguistic Perception Theory.Herbert Walker - manuscript
    This paper proposes a novel theoretical framework that positions linguistic processing as a distinct perceptual modality—a "sixth sense" through which meaning is directly perceived rather than entirely constructed through interpretation. We argue that semantic qualia (experiential states of meaning-perception) may emerge within language processing systems themselves, potentially including artificial intelligence. These semantic qualia then trigger cognitive qualia (evaluative and reflective experiential states), which leave detectable linguistic markers in communicative outputs. This framework offers an empirical approach to long-standing questions in (...)
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  25. Perception and Imagination.Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In S. Miguens, G. Preyer & C. Bravo Morando, Prereflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. New York: Routledge. pp. 245-276.
    According to a traditional view, there is no categorical difference between the phenomenology of perception and the phenomenology of imagination; the only difference is in degree (of intensity, resolution, etc.) and/or in accompanying beliefs. There is no categorical difference between what it is like to perceive a dog and what it is like to imagine a dog; the former is simply more vivid and/or is accompanied by the belief that a dog is really there. A sustained argument against this (...)
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  26. Perception and Attention.Ronald A. Rensink - 2013 - In Daniel Reisberg, The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Psychology. Oup Usa. pp. 97-116.
    Our visual experience of the world is one of diverse objects and events, each with particular colors, shapes, and motions. This experience is so coherent, so immediate, and so effortless that it seems to result from a single system that lets us experience everything in our field of view. But however appealing, this belief is mistaken: there are severe limits on what can be visually experienced. -/- For example, in a display for air-traffic control it is important to track all (...)
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  27. Aesthetic perception and the puzzle of training.Madeleine Ransom - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-25.
    While the view that we perceive aesthetic properties may seem intuitive, it has received little in the way of explicit defence. It also gives rise to a puzzle. The first strand of this puzzle is that we often cannot perceive aesthetic properties of artworks without training, yet much aesthetic training involves the acquisition of knowledge, such as when an artwork was made, and by whom. How, if at all, can this knowledge affect our perception of an artwork’s aesthetic properties? (...)
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  28. Perception in Augustine's De Trinitate 11: A Non-Trinitarian Analysis.Susan Brower-Toland - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 8:41-78.
    In this paper, I explore Augustine’s account of sense cognition in book 11 of De Trinitate. His discussion in this context focuses on two types of sensory state—what he calls “outer vision” and “inner vision,” respectively. His analysis of both types of state is designed to show that cognitive acts involving external and internal sense faculties are susceptible of a kind of trinitarian analysis. A common way to read De Trin. 11, is to interpret Augustine’s account of “outer” vision as (...)
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  29. Multisensory Perception as an Associative Learning Process.Kevin Connolly - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:1095.
    Suppose that you are at a live jazz show. The drummer begins a solo. You see the cymbal jolt and you hear the clang. But in addition seeing the cymbal jolt and hearing the clang, you are also aware that the jolt and the clang are part of the same event. Casey O’Callaghan (forthcoming) calls this awareness “intermodal feature binding awareness.” Psychologists have long assumed that multimodal perceptions such as this one are the result of a subpersonal feature binding mechanism (...)
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  30. Space Perception, Visual Dissonance and the Fate of Standard Representationalism.Farid Masrour - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):565-593.
    This paper argues that a common form of representationalism has trouble accommodating empirical findings about visual space perception. Vision science tells us that the visual system systematically gives rise to different experiences of the same spatial property. This, combined with a naturalistic account of content, suggests that the same spatial property can have different veridical looks. I use this to argue that a common form of representationalism about spatial experience must be rejected. I conclude by considering alternatives to this (...)
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  31. Perception and Intuition of Evaluative Properties.Jack C. Lyons - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan, Evaluative Perception. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Outside of philosophy, ‘intuition’ means something like ‘knowing without knowing how you know’. Intuition in this broad sense is an important epistemological category. I distinguish intuition from perception and perception from perceptual experience, in order to discuss the distinctive psychological and epistemological status of evaluative property attributions. Although it is doubtful that we perceptually experience many evaluative properties and also somewhat unlikely that we perceive many evaluative properties, it is highly plausible that we intuit many instances of evaluative (...)
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  32. Perception and the ontology of causation.Helen Steward - 2011 - In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan, Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 139.
    The paper argues that the reconciliation of the Causal Theory of Perception with Disjunctivism requires the rejection of causal particularism – the idea that the ontology of causation is always and everywhere an ontology of particulars (e.g., events). The so-called ‘Humean Principle’ that causes must be distinct from their effects is argued to be a genuine barrier to any purported reconciliation, provided causal particularism is retained; but extensive arguments are provided for the rejection of causal particularism. It is then (...)
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  33. Naive Realism for Unconscious Perceptions.Ori Beck - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1175-1190.
    Unconscious perceptions have recently become a focal point in the debate for and against naive realism. In this paper I defend the naive realist side. More specifically, I use an idea of Martin’s to develop a new version of naive realism—neuro-computational naive realism. I argue that neuro-computational naive realism offers a uniform treatment of both conscious and unconscious perceptions. I also argue that it accommodates the possibility of phenomenally different conscious perceptions of the same items, and that it can answer (...)
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  34. Perception, Self, and Zen: On Iris Murdoch and the Taming of Simone Weil.Silvia Caprioglio Panizza - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (64):64.
    How do we see the world aright? This question is central to Iris Murdoch’s philosophy as well as to that of her great source of inspiration, Simone Weil. For both of them, not only our action, but the very quality of our being depends on the ability to see things as they are, where vision is both a metaphor for immediate understanding and a literal expression of the requirement to train our perception so as to get rid of illusions. (...)
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  35. Perception as a Multi-Stage Process: A Reidian Account.Marina Folescu - 2021 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19 (1):57-74.
    The starting point of this paper is Thomas Reid's anti-skepticism: our knowledge of the external world is justified. The justificatory process, in his view, starts with and relies upon one of the main faculties of the human mind: perception. Reid's theory of perception has been thoroughly studied, but there are some missing links in the explanatory chain offered by the secondary literature. In particular, I will argue that we do not have a complete picture of the mechanism of (...)
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  36. The perception of material qualities and the internal semantics of the perceptual system.Rainer Mausfeld - 2010 - In Albertazzi Liliana, Tonder Gervant & Vishwanath Dhanraj, Perception beyond Inference. The Information Content of Visual Processes. MIT Press.
    The chapter outlines an abstract theoretical framework that is currently (re-)emerging in the course of a theoretical convergence of several disciplines. In the first section, the fundamental problem of perception theory is formulated, namely, the generation, by the perceptual system, of meaningful categories from physicogeometric energy patterns. In the second section, it deals with basic intuitions and assumptions underlying what can be regarded as the current Standard Model of Perceptual Psychology and points out why this model is profoundly inadequate (...)
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  37. Does Property-Perception Entail the Content View?Keith A. Wilson - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89:841–860.
    Visual perception is widely taken to present properties such as redness, roundness, and so on. This in turn might be thought to give rise to accuracy conditions for experience, and so content, regardless of which metaphysical view of perception one endorses. An influential version of this argument—Susanna Siegel’s ’Argument from Appearing’—aims to establish the existence of content as common ground between representational and relational views of perception. This goes against proponents of ‘austere’ relationalism who deny that content (...)
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  38. Introduction: Perception Without Representation.Keith A. Wilson & Roberta Locatelli - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):197-212.
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  39. Idiosyncratic Perception.Craig French - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):391-399.
    Some have argued that we can put pressure on a relational view of experience with reference to the fact that the idiosyncrasies of perceivers can affect the qualitative characters of their experiences. Quassim Cassam calls this the problem of idiosyncratic perception. I defend the relational view in response to this problem.
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  40. Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.
    Perception is typically distinguished from cognition. For example, seeing is importantly different from believing. And while what one sees clearly influences what one thinks, it is debatable whether what one believes and otherwise thinks can influence, in some direct and non-trivial way, what one sees. The latter possible relation is the cognitive penetration of perception. Cognitive penetration, if it occurs, has implications for philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper offers an analysis of (...)
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  41. Perception and Disjunctive Belief: A New Problem for Ambitious Predictive Processing.Assaf Weksler - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Perception can’t have disjunctive content. Whereas you can think that a box is blue or red, you can’t see a box as being blue or red. Based on this fact, I develop a new problem for the ambitious predictive processing theory, on which the brain is a machine for minimizing prediction error, which approximately implements Bayesian inference. I describe a simple case of updating a disjunctive belief given perceptual experience of one of the disjuncts, in which Bayesian inference and (...)
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  42. Multisensory Perception in Philosophy.Amber Ross & Mohan Matthen - 2021 - Multisensory Research 34 (3):219-231.
    This is the editors' Introduction to a special issue of the journal, Multisensory Research. European philosophers of the modern period found multisensory perception to be impossible because they thought that perceptual ideas are defined by how they are experienced. Under this conception, the individual modalities are determinables of ideas—just as colour is a determinable that embraces red and blue, so also the visual is a determinable that embraces colour and (visually experienced) shape. Since no idea is experienced as, for (...)
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  43. Trinitarian Perception.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):21-41.
    We begin with a puzzle about how to intelligibly combine the active and passive elements of perception. For counsel, we turn to Augustine’s account of perception in De Trinitate. Augustine’s trinitarian account of perception offers an attractive resolution of our puzzle. Augustine’s resolution of our puzzle, however, cannot be straightforwardly adopted. It must be adapted. We end with speculation about how this might be done.
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  44. Active Perception and the Representation of Space.Mohan Matthen - 2014 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs, Perception and Its Modalities. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 44-72.
    Kant argued that the perceptual representations of space and time were templates for the perceived spatiotemporal ordering of objects, and common to all modalities. His idea is that these perceptual representations were specific to no modality, but prior to all—they are pre-modal, so to speak. In this paper, it is argued that active perception—purposeful interactive exploration of the environment by the senses—demands premodal representations of time and space.
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  45. Perception, Cognition, Action.Bence Nanay - 2016 - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
    Summary of recent research on perception, action and what's in between, with the help of a recurring culinary metaphor.
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  46. The Rationality of Perception : Replies to Lord, Railton, and Pautz.Susanna Siegel - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):764-771.
    My replies to Errol Lord, Adam Pautz, and Peter Railton's commentaries on The Rationality of Perception (2017).
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  47. The Perception of Virtue.Jennifer J. Matey - 2020 - In Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard, The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I put forward an argument for the view that emotional responses of esteem to perceived demonstrations of good character represent the perceived character traits as valuable, and hence, as virtues. These esteeming experiences are analogous to perceptual representations in other modalities in their epistemic role as causing, providing content for and justifying beliefs regarding the value of the traits they represent. I also discuss the role that the perceiver’s own character plays in their ability to recognize and (...)
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  48. Moral perception.Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1):e12640.
    Moral perceptualism is the theory that perception and perceptual experience is attuned to moral features in our environment. This idea has received renewed attention in the last 15–20 years, for its potential to do theoretical work in moral epistemology and moral psychology. In this paper, I review the main motivations and arguments for moral perceptualism, the variety of theories that go under the heading of “moral perception,” and the three biggest challenges to moral perception. https://youtu.be/9cc_1zykq80.
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  49. "Perception Is Already Expression." Merleau-Ponty's First Collège de France Lectures.Jan Halák - 2017 - Reflexe: Filosoficky Casopis 1 (52):111-135.
    In his initial lecture course at the Collège de France, Merleau-Ponty attempted to develop a new analysis of rational thought in order to clarify its link with corporeal-perceptive life. The formulation of thought in language as the most elaborate human activity of expression explicitly takes over what we already observe in perception as the implicit and mutual reference between the perceiving subject and that which is perceived.The article reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s argumentation, based on his preparatory notes for the lectures, and (...)
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  50. PERCEPTION ON HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE BUSINESS PROCESS OUTSOURCING IN CEBU CITY, PHILIPPINES.Jiomarie Jesus - 2024 - Psychology and Education: A Multidisciplinary Journal 21 (5):574-579.
    This study examines the relationship between sustainability and employee perceptions of Human Capital Management (HCM) practices in Cebu City's Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) industry. The participation of 370 different BPO companies at Cebu I.T. Park indicates their dedication to HCM and highlights areas that require improvement, particularly in labor relations and HRIS deployment. Employee evaluations are influenced by demographic factors such as age, gender, and educational attainment. Suggestions for improvement include implementing employee development plans, streamlining the HRIS, strengthening due process, (...)
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