Akrasia and the Problem of the Unity of Reason

Ratio 28 (1):65-80 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2014-05-09
Latest version: 2 (2014-05-29)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
562 ( #10,983 of 2,454,407 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #26,146 of 2,454,407 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.