Akrasia and the Problem of the Unity of Reason

Ratio 28 (1):65-80 (2015)
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Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason
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First archival date: 2014-05-09
Latest version: 2 (2014-05-29)
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The Guise of the Good.Orsi, Francesco

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