Acquaintance and the mind-body problem
In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. pp. 16 (2012)
Abstract
In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer while maintaining that qualia themselves are non-physical properties. In this case the non-physical nature of qualia may play no role in accounting for the features of acquaintance. But although the account could be used by a dualist, its existence provides support for physicalism.
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Mind-Body Meets Metaethics: A Moral Concept Strategy.Helen Yetter-Chappell & Richard Yetter Chappell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):865-878.
Quotational Higher-Order Thought Theory.Coleman, Sam
The Cognitive Significance of Phenomenal Knowledge.Veillet, Bénédicte
We Are Acquainted with Ourselves.Duncan, Matt
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2009-01-28
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781 ( #2,145 of 37,187 )
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78 ( #4,221 of 37,187 )
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