In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, on this proposal, involve unique cognitive mechanisms, but none that could not be fully physically implemented. David Chalmers has recently presented a Master Argument to show that the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – not just this or that version of it, but any version of it – fails. Chalmers argues that the phenomenal concepts posited by such theories are either not physicalistically explicable, or they cannot explain our epistemic situation with regard to qualia. I argue that it is his Master Argument that fails. My claim is his argument does not provide any new reasons to reject the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. I also argue that, although the Phenomenal Concept Strategy is successful in showing that the physicalist is not rationally compelled to give up physicalism in the light of the anti-physicalist arguments, the anti-physicalist is not rationally compelled to give up the anti-physicalist argument in the light of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy either.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BALIDO-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-10-30
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Jackson, Frank

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Tracking Representationalism.Bourget, David & Mendelovici, Angela
Mind-Body Meets Metaethics: A Moral Concept Strategy.Yetter-Chappell, Helen & Chappell, Richard Yetter

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
993 ( #1,458 of 37,196 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
86 ( #3,795 of 37,196 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.