A paraconsistent route to semantic closure

Logic Journal of the IGPL 25 (4):387-407 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In this paper, we present a non-trivial and expressively complete paraconsistent naïve theory of truth, as a step in the route towards semantic closure. We achieve this goal by expressing self-reference with a weak procedure, that uses equivalences between expressions of the language, as opposed to a strong procedure, that uses identities. Finally, we make some remarks regarding the sense in which the theory of truth discussed has a property closely related to functional completeness, and we present a sound and complete three-sided sequent calculus for this expressively rich theory.

Author Profiles

Eduardo Alejandro Barrio
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
Federico Pailos
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
Damian Szmuc
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)


Added to PP

406 (#42,907)

6 months
128 (#30,091)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?