A paraconsistent route to semantic closure

Logic Journal of the IGPL 25 (4):387-407 (2017)
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In this paper, we present a non-trivial and expressively complete paraconsistent naïve theory of truth, as a step in the route towards semantic closure. We achieve this goal by expressing self-reference with a weak procedure, that uses equivalences between expressions of the language, as opposed to a strong procedure, that uses identities. Finally, we make some remarks regarding the sense in which the theory of truth discussed has a property closely related to functional completeness, and we present a sound and complete three-sided sequent calculus for this expressively rich theory.
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Archival date: 2018-11-29
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