A recovery operator for nontransitive approaches

Review of Symbolic Logic:1-25 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
In some recent papers, Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij have defended the idea that abandoning transitivity may lead to a solution to the trouble caused by semantic paradoxes. For that purpose, they develop the Strict-Tolerant approach, which leads them to entertain a non-transitive theory of truth, where the structural rule of Cut is not generally valid. However, that Cut fails in general in the target theory of truth does not mean that there are not certain safe instances of Cut involving semantic notions. In this paper we intend to meet the challenge of answering how to regain all the safe instances of Cut, in the language of the theory, making essential use of a unary recovery operator. To fulfill this goal, we will work within the so-called Goodship Project, which suggests that in order to have non-trivial naïve theories it is sufficient to formulate the corresponding self-referential sentences with suitable biconditionals. Nevertheless, a secondary aim of this paper is to propose a novel way to carry this project out, showing that the biconditionals in question can be totally classical. In the context of this paper, these biconditionals will be essentially used in expressing the self-referential sentences and, thus, as a collateral result of our work we will prove that none of the recoveries expected of the target theory can be non-trivially achieved if self-reference is expressed through identities.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
BARARO-15
Revision history
First archival date: 2018-10-03
Latest version: 2 (2018-11-14)
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Tolerant, Classical, Strict.Cobreros, Pablo; Egré, Paul; Ripley, David & van Rooij, Robert

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2018-10-03

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