Groundless Truth

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (2):175-195 (2014)
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We defend two claims: (1) if one is attracted to a strong non-maximalist view about truthmaking, then it is natural to construe this as the view that there exist fundamental truths; (2) despite considerable aversion to fundamental truths, there is as yet no viable independent argument against them. That is, there is no argument against the existence of fundamental truths that is independent of any more specific arguments against the ontology accepted by the strong non-maximalist. Thus there is no argument that the strong non-maximalist herself will find dialectically motivating.

Author Profiles

Sam Baron
University of Melbourne
Kristie Miller
University of Sydney
James Norton
University of Tasmania


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