Knowledge of Grammar and Concept Possession

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Abstract
This article deals with the cognitive relationship between a speaker and her internal grammar. In particular, it takes issue with the view that such a relationship is one of belief or knowledge (I call this view the ‘Propositional Attitude View’, or PAV). I first argue that PAV entails that all ordinary speakers (tacitly) possess technical concepts belonging to syntactic theory, and second, that most ordinary speakers do not in fact possess such concepts. Thus, it is concluded that speakers do not literally ‘know’ or ‘believe’ much of the contents of their grammars, and moreover, that these contents can only be attributed at a subpersonal level
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Archival date: 2011-11-04
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References found in this work BETA
Computation and Cognition.Pylyshyn, Zenon W.
The Varieties of Reference.Antony, Louise M.; Evans, Gareth & McDowell, John
The Modularity of Mind.Cummins, Robert & Fodor, Jerry

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2011-11-04

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